| bibo:abstract |
On December 7, 2022, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the State Council) announced the partial deregulation of the strict quarantine policy that had been in place for nearly three years. And on January 9, 2023, the State Council completely abolished the so-called “Zero COVID-19” policy by ▲lifting mandatory quarantine measures and ▲opening borders. This stands in contrast to China’s authoritarian strengthening demonstrated at the 20th Party Congress held last October then has attracted international attention as an unprecedented policy change that occurred suddenly.
This transition was largely driven by the “Blank Sheet of Paper,” a mass protest movement, and was evaluated as being directly caused by the rapid spread of anti-government sentiment abroad. However, under authoritarian regimes like that of China, visible expression of anti-government sentiment remains meager, and it is even rarer for such opposition to change the decision-making of the leadership. Against this backdrop, while the reversal of the quarantine policy appears to be an achievement of Chinese civil society, there is also an interpretation that it has been used as a means to strengthen the authority of the leadership by transferring responsibility for the social turmoil that occurred after the opening of epidemic control to civil society.
The “Blank Sheet of Paper” protest is rooted in structural problems such as increasing social fatigue due to prolonged isolation, dissatisfaction and anger resulting from individual sacrifice without compensation, and the poor domestic economy of China. In this regard, this paper highlights how these problems were triggered by the Urumqi (烏魯木齊) fire on November 24, exacerbated by the development of the Internet and the increase in the use of social media, related to a change in Chinese people’s perception of the state-society relationship and enabled collective action, then finally led to the sudden redirection of China’s quarantine policy.
A series of events from the “Blank Sheet of Paper” protest that resulted in the policy reversal suggest that there has been some change in China’s state-society relationship. It was a meaningful case in which the voice of the public has been conveyed to the leadership, resulting in a shift in the national policy. There is a significant movement that is also observed in the question of whether the collective of Chinese people who expressed their opposition to government policy can serve as a civil society in a universal sense, contrary to the existing conception. Chinese society has been divided between elite groups such as entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and social organizations and the masses due to the characteristics of the socialist system and the difference in social conditions after Reform and Opening up (改革開放) since the 21st century. However, there have been an increasing number of cases of the elite groups who began to alert their social conscience, and have raised their voice to advocate individual rights rather than seeking group interest in the 21st century. The 2020 Dr. Li Wenliang (李文亮) memorial rally, which was the precursor to the “Blank Sheet of Paper” protest, began with the media freedom and individual rights and responsibilities claimed by intellectuals in China.
The commemoration ceremony for Dr. Li Wenliang in 2020, the predecessor of the “Blank Sheet of Paper” protest was a typical case for the discussions on freedom of the press and individual rights among Chinese intellectuals spread nationwide through social media, and received public support. Conversely, at the heart of the 2022 anti-lockdown protest triggered by public fatigue over the government’s draconian COVID-19 lockdown measures sat a group of intellectuals seeking freedom and individual rights, and the demonstrations rapidly evolved into a “Blank Sheet of Paper” movement with the protesters chanting political demands. Such solidarity was likely the driving force behind the rapid proliferation of protests and their evolution into broader demands.
If we consider these groups of citizens a “civil society,” despite various constraints and contradictions inherent in the concept, it appears that Chinese civil society has finally begun to function as the communication channel connecting the Chinese citizens and the authorities. Moreover, it is noteworthy that while the Chinese public had largely relied on domestic elite groups associated with the Chinese leadership, cyberspace has allowed them to directly communicate with the international society. The consensus on universal values such as freedom and solidarity between China and the international community was shared in real-time through international media reports and the Internet, leaving the Chinese government with little choice but to care about how the outside world views China.
However, given the strong bond between China’s civil society and the ruling elites, it is difficult to say that the recent developments would result in the weakening of the authoritarian regime or China’s democratization. In other words, while the Chinese civil society has grown significantly in size, that does not necessarily translate into political democratization. The Chinese people’s consciousness as citizens, the power to organize public opinion, and the presence and capacity of leaders who can lead public discourse all remain insufficient, while the government’s administrative power remains strong. In the process of dealing with the fire in Urumqi and rolling back its strict COVID-19 measures, the government swiftly moved to mitigate social turmoil by blaming local governments and the public, especially the “Blank Sheet of Paper” protesters, rather than reflecting on excessive pandemic restrictions.
Currently, there is no extreme social turmoil or humanitarian crisis in China, but we need to closely observe the development in the neighboring country and be adequately prepared for possible unrest. The freedom of the press and individual rights that the Chinese people have advocated in the “Blank Sheet of Paper” protests are universal values, and such movements could act as a bridge connecting China with the rest of the world. We need to first try to understand China’s distinctive context and its narratives, but at the same time, we can demand that China’s advocacy for the rule of law and consensus should go beyond a simple narrative justifying the government’s actions; the international community could call for China’s greater contributions for the establishment of freedom and rules-based global order as part of a broader effort to uphold universal values.
Furthermore, as the world gears up to enter an endemic stage after more than three years of hardships and sacrifices, cooperation and collaboration among countries are more important than ever. Korea declared its “With COVID-19” policy when it was in a more unstable situation than the one China has experienced over the past months, and the Korean government has been preparing for a post-COVID-19 world. Consideration of Korea’s experience could prove useful for many countries around the world, and cooperation with Korea might enable China and the international community to recover faster and emerge stronger from the pandemic in the months and years ahead.
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