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Ⅰ. Key Takeaways
Ⅱ. North Korea’s Pursuit of Self-Reliant Defense Capabilities and Economic Self-Sufficiency and External Environment
Ⅲ. Outlook: North Korea’s Foreign Policy in 2023
Ⅰ. Key Takeaways
From December 26 to 31, 2022, North Korea convened the 6th Enlarged Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). The key takeaways of the meeting specify North Korea’s main policy directions for 2023. According to the Rodong Sinmun, the participants discussed five agenda items including a review of the implementation of major policies in 2022 and the work plan for 2023, the WPK’s organizations, a review of the execution of the 2022 budget and a draft budget for 2023, the party’s leadership for revolutionary schools, and five paths to be taken for the party’s establishment - politics, the party’s organizations, ideology, party discipline, and the North Korean people’s principle and methodology in the field. The results of the plenary session are summarized as follows.
First, the meeting hailed North Korea’s strengthened defense capabilities, improved agricultural production, pushes for new housing projects, and revamped Covid-19 responses as the party’s major achievements in 2022. In particular, the participants underscored that Kim Jong-un’s successful efforts at building up unparalleled military capabilities are his biggest achievement in 2022, and praised his pushes for projects for building homes in Pyongyang’s Hwasong and Yeonpo districts. It is forecast that Pyongyang’s work plan will revolve around these four achievements in 2023. And as a detailed goal for 2023 to reinforce North Korea’s defense capabilities, the participants of the meeting proposed developing new ICBMs, working on the massive production of tactical nuclear weapons, launching the first military satellite, and increasing the inventory of nuclear warheads.
Second, discussions on the party’s organizations mainly addressed the reshuffling of the WPK’s military elite. In appreciation of the outstanding achievements made in the military sector, Ri Yong-gil was appointed as a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the WPK, replacing Pak Jong-chon, who used to be a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK. In addition, Pak Su-il was named the chief of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) General Staff, and Kang Sun-nam took over as defense minister. Moreover, Ri Thae-sop was appointed as the public security minister, and Kim Sang-gun was appointed as a Vice Chairman of the Central Auditing Commission (CAC) of the WPK. The meeting also appointed Ju Chang-il as the Deputy Department Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD) of the WPK, and Ri Hi-yong as the Deputy Department Director of the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) of the Central Committee of the WPK. There are also newly appointed members of the Cabinet including Minister Kim Chul-ha of the Chemical Industry, Minister Kim Chang-suk of the Light Industry, Chairman Cho Suk-chol of the National Quality Management Commission, and Ri Yong-sik, Director of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK and Head Secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK.
The meeting also appointed other minister-level officials in the Cabinet as the members or candidate members of the Central Committee of the WPK to raise the status of the Cabinet. The reshuffling of the North’s elite in the Cabinet announced at the expanded plenary session appears to be aimed at boosting economic growth, and the appointment of the Ministers of the Chemical Industry and the Light Industry deserves attention. Minister Kim Chul-ha of the Chemical Industry was in charge of the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex and Minister Kim Chang-suk of the Light Industry was in charge of the Sinuiju Textile Mill. The appointment of economic experts who made outstanding achievements in municipalities implies that the Kim regime is intent on boosting productivity in the agricultural and light industry sectors.
Third, the draft budget for 2023 outlines that the Kim regime plans to focus on economic growth, and its defense budget for 2023 will be similar to that of 2022. And the 8th session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) held on January 17 and 18 passed the draft budget. According to the finalized budget plan, the Kim regime allocated 45% of the annual budget for 2023 to build the socialist economy, which is up 1.2% from 2022, and 15.9% to build up its defense capabilities. It was also announced that North Korea’s rural and agricultural development spending in 2023 will rise by 14.7% from the previous year, and its spending on combating C0vid-19 relapses in 2023 will remain the same as that of 2022.
And it is forecast that the five paths for the party’s establishment will be pursued to streamline public mobilization and strengthen the WPK’s leadership in 2023.
Ⅱ. North Korea’s Pursuit of Self-Reliant Defense Capabilities and Economic Self-Sufficiency and External Environment
It is assessed that the results of the 6th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK reaffirmed the Kim Jong-un regime’s will to maintain the last year’s tit-for-tat strategy. And it has been reported that General Secretary Kim Jong-un of the WPK sketched out the core tasks in formulating and implementing policies toward South Korea and the overall contour of his foreign policy at the meeting. The gist of Kim Jong-un’s policy report delivered at the meeting is North Korea under his rule will scale up policy efforts to strengthen self-reliant defense capabilities amid the strained inter-Korean relations based on its strategic perception that the era of a “New Cold War” is dawning. In other words, North Korea in 2023 will seek to enhance self-reliance in defense capabilities and economic self-sufficiency. And behind North Korea’s continued pursuit of this policy line is a rapidly shifting external environment.
First, the intensifying rivalry between U.S. and China has prompted the North to augment its current self-reliance policy. The regime used the term “New Cold War” at the meeting to describe the intensifying U.S.-China great power competition and the global conflict between the forces of liberal democracy and authoritarianism further materialized after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. and China had worked together in the 2000s to arrange several rounds of the six-party talks to resolve the North Korean issue, but with the dawn of a new Cold War, the prospects of cooperation between the two powers on the matters related to North Korea appear dim. With U.S. and China being unable to control or manage North Korea at the moment, the regime will likely take advantage of the current landscape to bolster its defense capabilities.
Second, as the war in Ukraine drags on, North Korea has become increasingly convinced that only military power could guarantee its survival. Moreover, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has to some extent restored cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia that peaked in the Cold War era. Pyongyang has been openly supporting Russia and China’s stance while trying to join forces with the two nations on various issues.
Third, the economic sanctions network targeting North Korea has been loosened. The international community has so far faced setbacks in imposing additional sanctions on North Korea over its provocative actions largely due to opposition from China and Russia. On top of that, the existing sanctions regime has been unsuccessful in effectively curbing the North’s behavior. From 2020 to 2022, North Korea has imposed strict Covid-19 related border closures and stringent measures to control the virus. Covid-19 control measures were arguably the biggest cause for North Korea’s economic contraction, rather than international sanctions. Also, the pandemic and the Ukrainian war have made it difficult to track and monitor countries’ enforcement of UN sanctions on North Korea. According to research on economic sanctions, sanctions become less effective if UN member states with deep economic ties with sanctioned countries do not cooperate. Without cooperation from Russia and China — which accounted for more than 90% of pre-pandemic trade with North Korea, the effectiveness of sanctions against the regime will inevitably erode.
Ⅲ. Outlook: North Korea’s Foreign Policy in 2023
North Korea has been striving to curb the spread of Covid-19 and bolster its defense capabilities to navigate the rapid shifts in the global political landscape, but the fallout of border closures continues to grip the country’s already anemic economy. As the North’s economic woes are expected to persist throughout 2023, forging deeper economic partnerships with friendly nations will be the regime’s most prominent foreign policy goal to address its ailing economy. With a particular focus on the economy, the Kim Jong-un regime is expected to roll out the following foreign policies to navigate its path forward.
First, the principle of “strength to strength” will continue to underpin North Korea’s approach toward South Korea and the United States. Pyongyang will not rush to mend relations with Seoul and Washington based on the assessment that the chances of dramatic improvements in inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea relations are low under a “New Cold War.”
Second, North Korea will likely reopen borders to broaden the scope of economic cooperation with China. China opened its borders to the world in January 2022 and dropped its most extreme Covid-19 containment measures. The regime has not yet fully reopened borders given the latest Covid-19 surge in China and the WPK’s timetable for holding the enlarged plenary meeting of the party across North Korean cities and provinces, but it will gradually expand economic cooperation with China once China’s Covid-19 infection wave begin to subside. According to Asia Press International, which reports data on North Korea’s exchange rate, the exchange rate of the North Korean won to the Chinese Yuan returned to the pre-pandemic level in November 2022. This is indicative of the widespread optimism in North Korea about a possible resumption of large-scale cross-border trade with China.
Third, North Korea is expected to deepen its relationship with Russia and the regions it claims to have annexed. North Korea and Russia have gradually developed their relations in the wake of the 2019 summit meeting between Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin. North Korea has openly supported Russia’s stance on Ukraine, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko recently thanked North Korea for its support. North Korea and Russia are known to have resumed cross-border railway trade in the second half of 2022. And in July 2022, North Korea officially recognized the independence of the “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk. These two breakaway regions’ Russian-style security systems could have prompted this decision, as Pyongyang might be considering the idea of initiating security cooperation with these regions. Also, North Korean workers will likely be sent to support Russia’s efforts to rebuild the two regions.
Taken together, the primary focus of Pyongyang’s foreign policy in 2023 will be on boosting the trilateral cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia while redoubling efforts to revive its ailing economy. It is advised that the Korean government consider various policy options to deal with an array of North Korea’s foreign policy moves that will likely materialize in the coming years.
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