| bibo:abstract |
Ⅰ. Foreword
Ⅱ. Background and Premise
Ⅲ. Analysis of Recent Developments
Ⅳ. Key Premises of the North Korean Concept of Nuclear Escalation
Ⅴ. Policy Approaches: Direction for the Message of Deterrence
Ⅰ. Foreword
The nuclear contingency doctrine that North Korea has in mind and the direction of the military structure for the enforcement of the doctrine have taken shape fast through a series of test-fires of its weapons system since April this year and through messages from its top leadership. A series of messages, such as the Nuclear Forces Policy Act adopted by the Supreme People's Assembly in September and resolutions passed by the Party Central Military Commission in June, indicate that the policies, made official through the report issued at the 8th Party Congress in 2021, to bolster tactical nuclear weapons capabilities are translating into action plans to leverage nuclear weapons as warfighting capabilities in the theater of the Korean peninsula. North Korea is poised to conduct its 7th nuclear test to prepare the hardware of tactical nuclear weapons while fast advancing its “software side” of nuclear readiness such as nuclear doctrine, nuclear posture, command & control, etc.
It is worth noting, in a series of steps North Korea has taken, that the conditions of the use of the nuclear forces and the command and control structure thereof have been explicitly specified in detail. Those steps, on the one hand, back up the policies of Pyongyang to deploy nuclear weapons, and on the other hand, the explicit declaration to the outside world is deemed to be part of its deterrence scheme. Breaking with its original attitude to use nuclear weapons for ultimate retaliation against enemies, Pyongyang has formally shifted its gears, opening up the possibility that it will strike first when necessary with its nuclear weapons while engaging in a conventional war, should a war break out on the Korean peninsula. In fact, the statements and actions unleashed by Pyongyang in the first half of the year turned out to be preparatory steps for the nuclear policy shift. And the adoption and declaration of the September 8 Nuclear Forces Policy Act and a series of ballistic-missile-fire exercises carried out from the end of September to early October for the operation of tactical nuclear weapons were indeed Pyongyang’s finale to the preparatory steps it had taken.
In this regard, while many analyses, scenarios, and response plans are being discussed at present, this paper intends to provide an in-depth analysis of the steps North Korea has taken within the conceptual framework of escalation. As widely known, the operational strategies of nuclear weapons devised by all nuclear-armed states are commonly centered around how to intimidate adversaries with the threat of nuclear escalation or how to deter the adversary’s threat of nuclear escalation. The steps Pyongyang has taken since its official declaration of tactical nuclear capabilities policy in the 8th Party Congress in 2021 do not deviate from this path of strategy and from the evolutions of nuclear doctrines adopted by earlier nuclear states that had faced similar circumstances as North Korea. As such, the response by the ROK-US allies toward the North’s nuclear operational strategy, highlighted by its posture to integrate tactical nuclear weapons into warfighting capabilities, needs to be formulated based on the exact understanding of the concept of Pyongyang’s nuclear escalation.
For this purpose, this paper reviews the evolutionary path of North Korea’s nuclear doctrine in comparison to similar earlier cases elsewhere; the concept and features of the North’s nuclear doctrine implied in recent events; and the room for miscalculation by Pyongyang in regard to the “loopholes” in response strategies of the ROK-US allies, and, in consideration of thereof, explores the options of the due direction the ROK and the U.S. should take in sending out the message of deterrence.
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