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Resumption of ICBM Tests: North Korea’s Intentions Seen from the Nuclear Deterrence Perspective

Resumption of ICBM Tests: North Korea’s Intentions Seen from the Nuclear Deterrence Perspective

Resumption of ICBM Tests: North Korea’s Intentions Seen from the Nuclear Deterrence Perspective

북한

미국

Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Previous Path  of the Other Nuclear States and North Korea’s Physical Limitations 
Ⅲ. The Kremlin Raising the Specter of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine: Implications for Pyongyang
Ⅳ. Outlook


Ⅰ. Introduction

Predictions turned out to be wildly wrong. On March 24\ North Korea launched its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from Sunan airport near Pyongyang. The latest launch came as little surprise; A spate of missile tests conducted in January hinted at a possible end to North Korea’s self-imposed moratorium on ICBM and nuclear tests. But while analysts predicted that the North may test its new ICBM under the disguise of launching a reconnaissance satellite\ Pyongyang dropped its old strategy of calling its ICBM launch a space launch vehicle (SLV) test as if it no longer even bothers to justify its actions. The latest test by Pyongyang and the change in its attitude reveal a discrepancy between outside observations and the actual timetable set by the regime for advancing its nuclear capabilities. 
 
While Analysts remain divided on whether or not the missile launched on March 24th is the Hwasong-17\ as claimed by the North\ one thing seems clear: Pyongyang wants to be seen as having developed a super-large ICM capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads. North Korea may have rushed to fire an additional missile a week after a botched test or launched a modified version of Hwasong-15 to fabricate a successful Hwasong-17 test. Hwasong-17 or not\ it is evident that North Korea wants to change how the outside world perceives its capabilities. Pyongyang is desperate to be seen as capable of resisting America’s unilateral deterrence with the multi-warhead ICBM as its new leverage. 

The situation began to change in January 2021\ when Kim Jong-un unveiled the five-year plan for weapon systems and defense science development at the 8th Party Congress. Kim announced plans to develop weapons systems ranging from tactical nuclear weapons to a nuclear-powered submarine and is ticking the boxes on his weapons wish list through a series of tests. More recently\ Kim’s regime reviewed ‘tactical measures to implement a strategic policy towards the U.S.’ during September and October last year\ when North Korea staged a defense development exhibition and held the Supreme People’s Assembly. North Korea’s state-run media outlets reported that in his policy speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly\ Kim Jong-un called for an in-depth analysis of the Biden administration’s current stance toward the North\ the U.S. political landscape\ and the possibility of a sudden change in the global balance of power to map out Pyongyang’s tactical measures to deal with Washington.

As part of the five-year plan\ North Korea has stressed the importance of advancing reconnaissance satellite technology since February\ with Kim Jong-un himself inspecting North Korea’s National Aerospace Development Administration. When it was found that the projectile used in the testing process was Hwasong-17 first-stage rocket\ experts thought the regime had two primary objectives: Developing a reconnaissance satellite and evaluating its super-large ICBM system before conducting a test at full range. This reinforced the view that the North will first launch an SLV to evaluate the performance of the Hwasong-17 and fire the new ICBM afterward. While experts predicted the North was very likely to launch a long-range missile camouflaged as a reconnaissance satellite around the 110th anniversary of the birth of North Korean founder Kim Il-sung on April 15\ the March 24 test was irrelevant to the test for reconnaissance satellite systems\ and the regime claimed to have successfully test-fired a Hwasong-17\ a new intercontinental ballistic missile.  
 
Clearly\ Pyongyang chose to skip an SLV launch and did not hide the nature of the latest ICBM test which appears to be carefully timed by the Kim Jong-un regime to come at a time of dysfunctional U.N. Security Council amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Experts predicted that North Korea would disguise the new ICBM as a reconnaissance satellite to give China and Russia a pretext to delay a U.S. bid to impose more sanctions on North Korea. But North Korea did not even bother to fake a space launch; it must have sensed a rare window of opportunity to steer the situation in its favor. The increasing uncertainty on Ukraine’s battlefield\ however\ appears to have pushed the North to move up the schedule. And on March 24\ the day North Korea test-fired its ICBM\ the UNSC failed to issue a statement. Pyongyang’s gambit seems to be paying off. 
 

Ⅱ. The Previous Path  of the Other Nuclear States and North Korea’s Physical Limitations 

From the perspective of military utility\ The primary value of the new missile is its larger payload capacity\ which could facilitate the deployment of multiple warheads\ very-large-yield single warheads. North Korea appeared to have clustered two Hwasong-15 booster engines to give more power to the Hwasong-17\ which would be able to deliver a payload of about 1\700 kg if successfully developed and deployed as claimed by the North. Given North Korea’s longstanding efforts to acquire nuclear-warhead-miniaturization technology and the photos of nuclear warheads it had released\ Pyongyang’s technology may be robust enough to load three or four miniaturized warheads in the payload. Pyongyang believes if their missiles carrying multiple warheads could reach the U.S. mainland\ this would further complicate the already complex calculations of the U.S. military.
 
Washington\ on the other hand\ has an entirely different set of calculations. The United States maintains overwhelming nuclear superiority over North Korea\ which makes North Korea’s nuclear attack on the U.S. mainland a suicidal move. This gives the U.S. confidence that its deterrence against the North will always be robust. On top of that\ Washington is thoroughly prepared for Pyongyang’s irrational act and is committed to preparing for the risk of a potential nuclear event. One viable option is launching a disarming nuclear first strike to achieve damage limitation against an adversary. It is conceptually different from deterrence by punishment\ which seeks to prevent aggression by threatening retaliation. The primary goal of conducting a disarming nuclear first strike is to neutralize an adversary\ not to ensure mutual deterrence. 
 
According to what U.S. military officials have told Congress in recent years\ there are two measures designed to defend against North Korean ICBMs. First\ if the Pentagon deems that an attack is imminent\ it would execute precision strikes against North Korea’s missile launch points in advance. And if North Korea fires the leftover missiles that survived the first strike attempt\ the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) deployed in Alaska and California would intercept incoming missiles. 
 
But lately\ Pyongyang has tried to blunt Washington’s ability to neutralize North Korean missile forces. North Korean ICBMs\ including the Hwasong-17\ are evolving in a way that can be launched from road-mobile transporter erector launchers (TEL)\ and missiles launched from a TEL vehicle are more difficult to strike early compared to the ones fired from fixed launch sites like underground silos. One of Kim Jong-un’s objectives laid out at the 8th Party Congress is to develop an ICBM propelled by solid fuel engines\ and if North Korea succeeds\ it will become difficult for the U.S. to defend against Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal as signs of an ICBM launch using solid fuel engines are hard to detect early. 
 
When a missile is designed to carry multiple warheads\ three or four warheads detach from the rocket and re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere to glide to its target - a capacity that would make it much harder for U.S. missile defenses to intercept. There are two types of multiple-warhead systems: Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) are capable of pushing each warhead towards different individual targets. Another type is multiple reentry vehicles (MRV)\ which carries several warheads which are dispersed but not individually aimed\ as the missile is unable to push each warhead onto a selected course. Pyongyang has yet to demonstrate an ability to push each warhead in the desired direction. For this reason\ many analysts believe that the Hwasong-17  might carry multiple reentry vehicle. Still\ no matter the exact type of the missile\ the most recent developments from North Korea indicate a need to shore up the current Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system\ as argued by U.S. Northern Command boss Gen. Glen D. VanHerck. The progress demonstrated with the latest flurry of tests will likely put some pressure on the GBIs based at Fort Greely in Alaska and their abilities to take down an incoming missile. Fort Greely currently accommodates 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs). 
 
For decades\ North Korea has sought to make significant strides in developing its ICBM system. It has strived to acquire a range of capabilities including transporter erector launchers\ solid-fuel engines\ and multi-warhead rockets\ following the path of other major nuclear-weapons states. In the early days of the nuclear arms race\ it was believed that a missile capable of reaching another country’s territory could create some existential deterrent effect\ even to the smallest degree\ by deterring potential aggressors from carrying out attacks. But that was more than half a century ago\ and the situation has changed dramatically in the last few decades. Rapid advancements in precision-strike capabilities and interceptors with far better accuracy than their predecessors increased the number of nuclear weapons and the level of technological sophistication required to successfully strike an opponent’s territory. China\ which has tried to build a state of mutual deterrence with the U.S. only with ICBM\ also relied mostly on liquid-propellant missiles fired from fixed launch sites in the early days of its nuclear buildup. 
 
However\ in the early 2000s when the U.S. saw remarkable progress in precision strike capabilities and began to step up missile defense efforts\ some pointed out that the possibility of China’s assured retaliation to launch significant nuclear attacks in the continental U.S. is close to zero. Seriously concerned about the U.S.’ advancing precision strike and missile defense capabilities\ Beijing could raise the chances of successful nuclear attacks up to 38% only after improving its capabilities of operating solid propellants\ transporter erector launchers (TELs)\ and multiple warheads. 
 
There is no doubt that Pyongyang’s all-out efforts to advance its ICBM capabilities model on Beijing’s case. However\ considering  stockpile of ICBM warheads North Korea possesses that falls significantly short of that of China and the North’s small territory\ it would be an overstatement to say that Pyongyang acquired assured retaliation capabilities against the U.S. mainland even if outside observers assume that the test of the Hwasong-17 was successful. Moreover\ the intrinsic physical limitations of North Korea’s small territory are the factor that significantly increases the possibility of an early U.S. strike by allowing Washington to conduct regular surveillance and reconnaissance of the entire North Korean territory. In addition\ all ICBMs fired within the North Korean territory cannot deviate from a highly narrow orbit\ substantially increasing the predictability and making it relatively easy for the U.S. to intercept them. In other words\ Washington is unlikely to take seriously the possibility that the North’s missiles will penetrate its first precision strike and interception capabilities causing significant damage to the U.S. mainland.
 
Moreover\ the U.S. announced its decision to deploy submarine-launched missiles with low-yield nuclear warheads in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR) shortly after North Korea’s acquisition of ICBM capabilities became imminent\ and has expanded its first precision strike capability since then. As it was confirmed that the North tested the ‘monster missile’ Hwasong 17\  it cannot be ruled out that Washington could deploy additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) to its current plan to augment 20 GBIs in Alaska by 2028. In other words\ the U.S. has been gradually scaling up efforts to minimize any risk or damage in response to the North’s nuclear and ICBM build-up\ which is likely to thwart Pyongyang’s efforts to acquire missile capabilities for assured retaliation against the U.S. mainland. Considering the overwhelming military and economic asymmetry between the U.S. and North Korea\ the North is unlikely to make breakthroughs to advance its missile development by narrowing the current gap with the U.S. in terms of missile stockpiles for the time being. And this is an essential dilemma for North Korea’s ICBM capabilities.


Ⅲ. The Kremlin Raising the Specter of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine: Implications for Pyongyang

Seen from a broader perspective\ North Korea’s continuing nuclear and missile build-up since the collapse of the Hanoi Summit in 2019 and Pyongyang’s plan unveiled at the 8th Party Congress in 2021 show that the Kim regime has two primary goals in pursuing its nuclear weapons program. The first goal is to countervail the superior conventional military capabilities of South Korea and the U.S. and block the wartime reinforcement of U.S. forces by threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons loaded on short-range missiles on the Korean Peninsula. This doctrine often referred to as asymmetric escalation\ has also been commonly adopted by countries with inferior conventional capabilities compared to potential adversaries. Russia’s so-called “Escalate to De-escalate” doctrine is a case in point\ which can be interpreted in this context as the Kremlin’s threat to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine to block NATO and U.S. military intervention.
 
However\ for the deterrence of asymmetrical nuclear use to be effective\ it is essential to create an environment where an adversary cannot easily decide to launch massive retaliatory attacks in response to the limited use of nuclear weapons. In other words\ it is critical for Pyongyang to secure reliable assured retaliation capabilities against the continental U.S.\ even if it narrowly aims to realize the doctrine of using tactical nuclear weapons to offset its inferiority in conventional military capabilities. For example\ if Russia\ which has maintaine strategic nuclear retaliatory capability comparable to that of the U.S.\ opts for limited use of nuclear weapons\ it would be difficult for Washington to launch massive retaliatory attacks\ which means that the deterrent of asymmetrical nuclear use could be more or less effective. In contrast\ the physical disadvantage of North Korea emanating from its small territory and the insufficient stockpile of missiles are critical challenges for Pyongyang in avoiding the U.S.’ surveillance activities\ thereby making it difficult for its asymmetrical nuclear use blackmailing to achieve the desired effect. 
 
Therefore\ Pyongyang will weigh up various options to find suitable diversions. For instance\ the concentration of major missile bases around the North Korea-China border could be Pyongyang’s attempt to disrupt the first precision strike from the U.S in case of emergency. This strategy aims to stoke Washington’s concerns about China’s intervention\ or in the worst-case scenario\ accidental nuclear exchanges between the U.S. and China to discourage Washington from launching the first precision strike. Furthermore\  the recent tests of the Hwasong-17 conducted at the Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang seems to be in line with such strategy. They might believe that   they can prevent or at least complicate Washington’s considerations of launching the first precision strike with low-yield nuclear warheads by operating TELs in locations that could result in considerable civilian casualties of the capital city. And the long-running debate among Washington’s policymakers and those in academia over the U.S.’ full-scale nuclear response scenario to the virtual adversary’s limited use of nuclear weapons could also reinforce Pyongyang’s perception. 
 
Nevertheless\ the only feasible option for Pyongyang that can offset its geographic and physical disadvantages – the exposure of surveillance and reconnaissance assets and the narrow launch angle - would be to advance its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capabilities. The U.K. and France\ which have smaller territories than the U.S. and China\ decided to adopt SLBMs as their main platform instead of IRBMs to build nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union for a quite similar reason. As nuclear and missile capabilities and the relevant military doctrine evolve\ Pyongyang will likely focus more on SLBMs\ which is anticipated to lead to the construction of nuclear-powered submarines and the attempt to extend the range of SLBMs based on the Bukgeungsong engine.
 

Ⅳ. Outlook

Let us revisit Kim Jong-un’s policy speech delivered at the Supreme People’s Assembly in October 2021. Among the three considerations mentioned\ the recent direction and developments of the Biden administration’s North Korea policy appear to be related to Pyongyang’s perception that the North Korea-U.S. nuclear talks are unlikely to resume in the foreseeable future in its preferred format. More specifically\ the North seems to believe that the rapidly changing global political landscape in the wake of the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry and a so-called ‘new Cold War’ has broadened the spectrum of its options. What deserves attention is that the North is taking the U.S.’ domestic political developments into consideration. The fact that Pyongyang seemingly forecasts that the U.S.’ North Korea policy under President Biden is unlikely to change from a short-term perspective could also mean that it has drawn up Plan B in preparation for the results of the 2024 U.S. presidential election from a long-term perspective. In other words\ Pyongyang is poised to outline and flesh out its policy toward the U.S. by factoring the next U.S. administration’s stance and policy toward North Korea after 2025 into its calculation.
 
Since its efforts around 2000 at salvaging relations with the U.S. under the Bill Clinton administration and the relevant process faltered with the U.S.’ presidential transition process\ Pyongyang has remained keen to change of government in the U.S. in formulating and implementing its foreign policy. This implies that the central node within Pyongyang’s current strategic tapestry has been crafted for more than three to four years\ and until then\ its focus will likely be more on the completion of the five-year military development plan than the early resumption of nuclear talks with Washington. The resumption of ICBM tests and development of ICBMs capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads are only intermediate goals\ and it is forecast that Pyongyang will likely showcase its nuclear and missile capabilities through a series of test-firings down the road. Pyongyang will also likely fine-tune the specific timing and actions\ making the most of another ‘window of opportunity’ within a given time frame in the process of achieving its long-term goal.


* Attached the File

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김정은

조 바이든

아시아

북아메리카

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황일도 안보통일연구부 조교수

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