외교안보연구소 발간자료

The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for South Korea

The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for South Korea

The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for South Korea

중국

미국

Ⅰ. The Main Content of the Indo-Pacific Strategy
Ⅱ. Implications for South Korea


On Februrary 11\ the Biden administration unveiled its Indo-Pacific Strategy. It is the first time that the administration has released a document dedicated to its Indo-Pacific strategy. The Indo-Pacific Strategy is the first regional strategy published by the Biden administration since the release of the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in March 2021\ underscoring the Indo-Pacific region’s strategic importance for the U.S. in mapping out its global strategy.

The primary focus of the document is on laying out the Biden administration’s plans to work with allies and partners to achieve the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific that is more connected\ prosperous\ secure\ and resilient\ to check the rise of China and maintain U.S. leadership in that vital region. The document also includes an action plan that the administration will pursue in the next 12 to 24 months.


Ⅰ. The Main Content of the Indo-Pacific Strategy

The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy begins with a statement that the United States has long recognized the Indo-Pacific as vital to its security and prosperity. In its document\ the administration points out that Indo-Pacific governments grapple with major challenges like the

PRC’s growing influence\ North Korean nuclear weapons\ and missile programs\ climate change\ COVID-19\ natural disasters\ resource scarcity\ internal conflict\ and governance challenges\ and that left unchecked\ these forces threaten to destabilize the region.

The new strategy document stresses the intensifying American focus on the Indo-Pacific\ which due in part is to the fact that the region faces mounting challenges\ particularly from the PRC. It notes that collective efforts over the next decade will determine whether the PRC succeeds in transforming the rules and norms that have benefited the Indo-Pacific and the world. The document adds that the U.S. is investing in the foundations of the country’s strength at home\ aligning its approach with those of allies and partners abroad\ and competing with the PRC to defend the interests and vision for the shared future. The administration clearly states that its objective is not to change the PRC but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates\ building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States\ allies and partners\ and shared interests and values. It states that the U.S. will seek to manage competition with the PRC responsibly.

The document shows that the United States will pursue an Indo-Pacific region that is free and open. It notes that the country’s vital interests and those of its closest partners require a free and open Indo-Pacific\ and a free and open Indo-Pacific requires that governments can make their own choices and that shared domains are governed lawfully. It plans to advance a free and open region\ including by investing in democratic institutions\ a free press\ and a vibrant civil society; improving fiscal transparency in the Indo-Pacific to expose corruption and drive reform; ensuring the region’s seas and skies are governed and used according to international law; and advancing common approaches to critical and emerging technologies\ the internet\ and cyber space.

Secondly\ the document states that a free and open Indo-Pacific can only be achieved by building collective capacity for a new age\ and the alliances\ organizations\ and rules that the United States and its partners have helped to build must be adapted. The U.S. vows to build collective capacity within and beyond the region\ including by deepening the five regional treaty alliances with Australia\ the Republic of Korea (ROK)\ Japan\ the Philippines\ and Thailand; strengthening relationships with leading regional partners\ including India\ Indonesia\ Malaysia\ Mongolia\ New Zealand\ Singapore\ Taiwan\ Vietnam\ and the Pacific Islands; contributing to an empowered and unified ASEAN; strengthening the Quad and delivering on its commitments; supporting India’s continued rise and regional leadership; partnering to build resilience in the Pacific Islands; forging connections between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic; and expanding U.S. diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific\ particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.

Third\ the U.S. stresses that it will drive Indo-Pacific prosperity by proposing an Indo-Pacific economic framework through which it will develop new approaches to trade\ create a new digital economy framework\ and make shared investments in decarbonization and clean energy. It notes that other ways to achieve prosperity include promoting free\ fair\ and open trade and investment through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and closing the region’s infrastructure gap through Build Back Better World.

Fourth\ to deter aggression against U.S. territory and against our allies and partners and bolster Indo-Pacific security\ the U.S. vows to advance integrated deterrence; deepen cooperation and enhance interoperability with allies and partners; maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait; innovate to operate in rapidly evolving threat environments\ including space\ cyberspace\ and critical- and emerging-technology areas; strengthen extended deterrence and coordination with the ROK and Japan and pursue the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; continue to deliver on AUKUS; expand U.S. Coast Guard presence and cooperation against other transnational threats; and work with Congress to fund the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the Maritime Security Initiative.

Fifth\ the document lays out the Biden administration’s plans to build regional resilience to 21st-century transnational threats like the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change\ which include: working with allies and partners to develop 2030 and 2050 targets\ strategies\ plans\ and policies consistent with limiting global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius; reducing regional vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation and; ending the COVID-19 pandemic and bolstering global health security.



Ⅱ. Implications for South Korea

The Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy reflects its foreign policy stance toward the Indo-Pacific region. It gives shape to the contours of the Biden administration’s thinking on the Indo-Pacific region. The administration announced in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance released in March 2021 that it aims to restore U.S. leadership by working together with allies and partners that share values with the United States. The Guidance emphasizes the U.S.’ commitment towards working with like-minded allies and partners to revitalize democracy to counter challenges from authoritarian powers like China and Russia. The Guidance also states the U.S. will promote shared norms and forge new agreements on emerging technologies\ space\ cyberspace\ health and biological threats\ climate and the environment\ and human rights. Since its launch\ the Biden administration strived to advance cooperation with key allies and partners such as South Korea\ Japan\ Australia\ and India to check the rise of China and maintain U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific\ a region of vital importance to the United States.

The U.S. expects South Korea\ a key ally in the region\ to actively participate in its efforts to maintain the regional leadership. The Biden administration\ which vowed to rebuild trust among allies\ largely focuses on encouraging each ally to make a maximum contribution to its policy efforts\ rather than forcing its allies to align their actions with its stance to advance the national interests. Since the launch of the Biden administration\ South Korea and the U.S. have intensified cooperation on areas in which South Korea has a competitive advantage and where the strategic interests of the two countries converge\ such as semiconductors\ large-capacity batteries\ artificial intelligence\ and vaccine supply. This is the result of a compromise between the Biden administration\ which wants to enhance trust with its allies and prioritizes building stable U.S.-led supply chains in core items and industries\ and South Korea\ which possesses advanced technologies and manufacturing capabilities and seeks to maintain its strategic autonomy between the U.S. and China. In light of these circumstances\ the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy could have some important implications for the future direction of South Korea and the U.S. cooperation.

First\ it is expected that South Korea's participation and active roles will be required in forming minilateral or multilateral consultative bodies on the basis of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The Indo-Pacific Strategy report offers a plan to work in flexible groupings that pool the collective strength of U.S. allies and partners to face up to the defining issues of our time through the Quad. It also states that the U.S. will continue to strengthen cooperation on global health\ climate change\ critical and emerging technology\ infrastructure\ cyber\ education\ and clean energy through the Quad. The Biden administration defines the Quad as an open\ transparent platform\ which is designed to increase cooperation across a range of issues\ and wants to take advantage of the Quad as a mechanism to work closely with like-minded countries on non-traditional security issues such as vaccine supply\ climate change\ and emerging technologies.

The use of Quad is likely to be 'Quad Plus (Quad members – X + α)\' which is a mini or multilateral consultative body composed of all or some of the Quad member countries as well as other prospective members. The Quad Plus will be developed in a complex manner by issue in various areas\ and countries with entangled interests in specific issues will participate in each Quad Plus. Accordingly\ the composition of participating countries will be different for each issue.

South Korea's participation in the Quad Plus for the development and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region is expected to have positive impacts on enhancing trust between South Korea and the U.S. and increasing South Korea's influence in the region and improving its international status as a global leading country. Considering South Korea's capabilities and strategic interests\ it would be appropriate and beneficial for the country to participate in and play an active role in the Quad Plus on non-traditional security areas such as vaccine supply\ emerging technology\ climate change\ infrastructure\ maritime security\ and cyber security.

Second\ it is necessary for South Korea to take its positions to the U.S.-led efforts to rebuild supply chains through the Indo-Pacific economic framework (IPEF). IPEF began to draw attention in October 2021 when the Biden administration proposed it as a vehicle to bring together regional allies and partners such as South Korea\ Japan\ and India to forge a stronger partnership. At that time\ the Biden administration said it had no intention of joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and suggested it would leverage the IPEF to strengthen strategic cooperation among allies and partner countries in areas such as supply chains\ digital economy\ and semiconductor. In February 2022\ the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy stated it would launch\ in early 2022\ a new partnership that would promote and facilitate high-standards trade\ govern the digital economy\ improve supply-chain resiliency and security\ catalyze investment in transparent\ high-standards infrastructure\ and build digital connectivity—doubling down on economic ties to the region while contributing to broadly shared Indo-Pacific opportunity.

Such developments clearly show that the IPEF will play a central role in the U.S.-led efforts to rebuild supply chains during the Biden presidency. More specifically\ the IPEF will likely serve as an equivalent of the Quad in the economic sphere. The U.S. and China competition in the Biden administration is rapidly unfolding over rebuilding global supply chains in the high-tech and strategic industries\ where the gap between the two countries has been rapidly closing in recent years. Therefore\ it would be more effective for the Biden administration to take the initiative in developing international norms and standards by forming flexible and ad hoc groups on trade\ technology\ supply chains\ and digital connectivity than opting for a comprehensive consultative body covering the entire trade sector to check the rise of China.

It is anticipated that cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. through the IPEF will take shape in the form of South Korea’s participation in the issue-specific multilateral consultative bodies on trade\ technology\ supply chains\ and digital connectivity. Furthermore\ considering that the U.S. remains superior over China in most cases for possessing foundational technologies and capabilities in the high-tech and strategic industries\ it seems necessary for South Korea to pursue a strategy that advances its national interests and capabilities by deepening cooperation with the U.S. in compliance with the U.S.-led efforts to rebuild supply chains and develop international norms and standards in the high-tech and strategic industries while keeping the door open for cooperation with China.

Thirdly\ the intensifying U.S.-China competition vying for the technological hegemony calls for South Korea to maintain its strategic autonomy by pursuing “principled diplomacy centered on national interests.” With the growing importance of economic security in the overall national security areas\ it is not easy to effectively reflect South Korea’s national interests with the dichotomy of separately seeking security cooperation with the U.S. and economic cooperation with China. Accordingly\ it is necessary for South Korea to take its positions based on the universal principles of cooperation such as “openness\ inclusiveness\ and transparency” with the goal of maximizing its national interests at the center. In particular\ as the high-tech industry involving semiconductors\ high-capacity batteries\ and artificial intelligence forms the backbone of South Korea’s future growth engine\ calibrating South Korea’s positions in the technology sector requires more deliberations that prioritize its national interests than any other sector. South Korea will be able to receive domestic and international support for its positions when it consistently places its national interests at the center in making decisions. Moreover\ South Korea needs to galvanize support for its decisions by playing a more active role in expanding multilateral cooperation with leading countries in the high-tech industry. When South Korea continues developing and expanding various forms of cooperation with major players based on the universal principles of cooperation\ it will be able to safeguard its national interests and preserve its strategic value as a leading country in the international arena.

The Biden administration utilizes all the elements of 'competition\ confrontation\ and cooperation' to check the rise of China. As it has scaled up pressure on China\ U.S.-China competition has intensified in high-tech and strategic industries. Moreover\ the two countries have been pitted against each other over democratic values and political systems involving human rights violations in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. These developments have left scant room for cooperation to address global challenges such as climate change and health security.

These situations suggest that South Korea needs to establish itself as the U.S.’ reliable partner in the aspects of 'competition' and 'cooperation'. South Korea’s national interests lie in striking a well-calibrated balance between U.S. and China and\ thus\ its deep involvement in the U.S.-China confrontations over democratic values and political systems collides with the vital interests. The Biden administration seeks to strategically take advantage of all the elements of 'competition\ confrontation\ and cooperation' to effectively check the rise of China and manage its relations with China in a responsible manner. Australia and Japan are playing supporting roles for the U.S. in terms of 'confrontation' and 'competition' based on their own national interests. Therefore\ South Korea’s efforts at positioning itself as a trustworthy partner of the U.S. in the aspects of 'competition' and 'cooperation' could work for the strategic interests of both U.S. and South Korea. It will also make a contribution that South Korea will form consensus and cooperate with major middle powers such as India\ Germany\ and ASEAN. When South Korea consistently makes strategic decisions rooted in the consistent pursuit of its national interests\ it will be able to win support and prime its way toward strategic autonomy amid the U.S.-China rivalry in the coming years.


* Attached the File

IFANS Focus

쿼드(Quad)

인도태평양경제프레임워크(IPEF)

아시아

북아메리카

인도태평양

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MIN Jeonghun

민정훈

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2022-06E

ENG