외교안보연구소 발간자료

Comparison of U.S. Japan and EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategies with a Focus on Development Cooperation 

Comparison of U.S. Japan and EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategies with a Focus on Development Cooperation 

Comparison of U.S. Japan and EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategies with a Focus on Development Cooperation 

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미국

I.  Introduction
II. Development Cooperation Elements in the U.S.\ Japan and EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategies
Ⅲ. In-depth Analysis of Infrastructure Sector
Ⅳ. Policy Recommendations


I.  Introduction

In light of the strategic competition between the United States (hereafter\ U.S.) and China\ the Indo-Pacific region became strategically more important than ever. It also fueled other major countries\ including Japan and the European Union (hereafter\ EU) to develop their strategies on the Indo-Pacific region\ as part of its efforts to strengthen their political\ economic\ and military influence in the region.

The U.S.’ focus on Asia is not new. The Obama administration placed its focus on Asia with the ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy\ and the Trump administration made efforts for deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific region with a series of key strategic documents on the region\ including the National Security Council’s ‘Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific’\ Department of State (DoS)’s ‘A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision’\ and the Department of Defense’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Report’. The Biden administration continued the U.S.’ emphasis on the region and published the ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ in February 2022. All of the aforementioned documents highlight the need to respond to China’s mounting influence in various areas\ including but not limited to economy and security\ based on joint efforts with allies and partner countries. In particular\ the U.S. vowed to build connectivity to provide an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (hereafter\ BRI).  

EU announced the ‘EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ in September 2021 and laid out its rationale\ principles\ and priority areas for its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. EU proposed to strengthen its engagement across the economy\ security\ and maritime security considering the region’s growing economic\ demographic and political weight. As a key principle\ the EU stated that it will ‘promote inclusive and effective multilateral cooperation based on shared values and principles.’ While the EU expressed its concern on China on human rights issues\ it was inclusive in the sense that it left room for potential engagement on China in other areas. Connectivity was also mentioned in the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy as one of seven priority areas.

Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy became more concrete with Prime Minister Abe’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and its three specifics: rule of law\ freedom of navigation\ free trade; economic prosperity; and peace and stability. In the document entitled ‘Japan’s Efforts for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”’ published in March 2021\ Japan also stated its commitment towards maritime order\ economic order\ governance\ and connectivity. While Japan also stressed cooperation with like-minded countries and partner countries\ in  U.S.\ it does not make any direct reference to China. Instead\ its 2021 strategic document states that ‘Japan cooperates with any partners which share the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)’\ implying the need to maintain stable relations with China which is its key trading partner. Prime Minister Kishida virtually met President Biden in January 2022 and reaffirmed the two countries’ cooperation on regional security\ health\ energy\ infrastructure\ etc.

It’s worth noting that the U.S.\ Japan and EU all stressed connectivity as a key issue in their Indo-Pacific Strategic documents\ such as ports\ railways and digital infrastructure. In addition\ the three countries announced separate infrastructure initiatives while stressing mutual cooperation with each other. Such actions can be interpreted as an attempt to rival China's building infrastructure in the region through BRI.

It is highly likely that the U.S.\ Japan and EU will utilize development cooperation as a key instrument to implement their Indo-Pacific strategies in areas such as connectivity\ health\ climate and disaster risk reduction. The same can also be said for the three countries’ infrastructure initiatives. Considering the difference in the styles of foreign assistance between the U.S.\ Japan\ and EU\ who are all members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (hereafter\ DAC)\ and China\ a non-DAC member\ development cooperation will likely be used as a diplomatic tool to deepen cooperation and partnership among allies and like-minded countries in response to China. 

Therefore\ this study will focus on the three aforementioned countries\ i.e. the U.S.\ Japan and EU\ that established independent Indo-Pacific strategies as well as infrastructure initiatives and have provided a considerable amount of development cooperation to the region. In particular\ the author will review development cooperation elements mentioned in the Indo-Pacific strategies within the context of U.S.-China strategic competition\ analyze each infrastructure initiative in-depth\ and draw policy recommendations for South Korea’s development cooperation.


* Attached the File

IFANS PERSPECTIVES

유럽연합(EU)

아시아

북아메리카

인도태평양

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송지선 경제통상개발연구부 조교수

송지선

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2022-06E

KOR