외교안보연구소 발간자료

Aiming for the ‘Either/Or’ Game: North Korea’s Recent Moves to Re-frame Nuclear Talks 

Aiming for the ‘Either/Or’ Game: North Korea’s Recent Moves to Re-frame Nuclear Talks 

Aiming for the ‘Either/Or’ Game: North Korea’s Recent Moves to Re-frame Nuclear Talks 

북한

I. The Issue 
II. Background: Diversification of Nuclear Capabilities
III. Analysis and Outlook: The 'Nuclear Arms Control Argument' Taking Shape 
IV. Implications


I.  The Issue 

Something is different. The back-to-back display of short-range missile capabilities in January\ the launching of intermediate-range missiles (IRBMs)\ and remarks about resuming intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests signal a marked change in Pyongyang’s behavior this year. These are reasons behind the analysis that North Korea might abandon the management mode and reserved attitude it maintained since the breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi summit meeting and revert back to 2017. Where is North Korea headed? What are Pyongyang's underlying intentions and calculations?

It is safe to assume that the starting point was back in January 2021 when plans for developing future tactical nuclear weapons and the concept of ‘preemptive strike’ were discussed at the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). In the ensuing period up to January this year\ North Korea continued to develop more sophisticated short-and medium-range missile capabilities - an indication that Pyongyang aims to include nuclear weapons as part of its war-fighting capabilities\ and use it in the Korean peninsula’s theater of war in a contingency. Basically\ Pyongyang used the long impasse in negotiations as an opportunity to build up its relevant capabilities. Throughout this period\ the overall focus of North Korea’s foreign policy was on stable or rapid buildup of short-range missile/tactical nuclear capabilities for use on and around the Korean Peninsula.

The direction North Korea is headed for is also apparent in its terminology. In recent statements\ North Korea clearly distinguishes 'tactical weapons' which refers to short-range missiles and artillery systems that are intended for use on the Korean Peninsula from 'strategic weapons' which are weapons systems that can strike Guam\ the Pacific region\ and the US mainland. This method of classification reflects the distinctive characteristic of North Korea’s recent nuclear escalation concept which consists of strengthening deterrence by showing that it can use tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional war while securing strike capability on the US mainland to prevent the war from escalating to a level involving strategic nuclear weapons.

This manner of distinguishing the two - deterrence by punishment against the US mainland and deterrence by denial on the Korean peninsula and in the region - is indicative of the framework that Pyongyang has in mind for what it calls 'nuclear arms control talks.' In other words\ strengthening regional nuclear war-fighting capabilities is most likely aimed at obtaining a partial compensation in return for partial or selective dismantlement of its nuclear/missile capabilities. This means that Pyongyang's approach to 'nuclear arms control talks' can develop into a more specific framework that differentiates 'tactical weapons' and 'strategic weapons' and establishes that only one of the two can discarded or reduced through negotiations

Before and after the series of missile tests in September 2021\ speeches by Kim Jong Un himself and a series of statements issued by the Foreign Ministry referred to Western arms control concepts such as 'balance of military power\' 'eliminating instability\' and 'double standards.' Through such statements\ Pyongyang was claiming legitimacy to the buildup of its regional war-fighting capabilities. This paper is based on the analysis that the above mentioned terms can be a sign of North Korea’s attempt to change the framework of nuclear negotiations. For example\ the arms control talks between the Eastern and Western blocs during the Cold War\ represented by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement\ was based on the method of negotiating partial concessions\ i.e.\ dismantling the capability that enables either deterrence by punishment or deterrence by denial. Likewise\ in future nuclear talks with the US\ North Korea will probably argue that negotiations should start with only one of its diversified nuclear capabilities. In this context\ this paper will reinterpret recent actions taken by North Korea through the prism of the nuclear negotiations method Pyongyang has in mind for the future.


* Attached the File

IFANS PERSPECTIVES

아시아

전술핵병기

전략핵무기(Strategic nuclear weapon)

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황일도 안보통일연구부 조교수

황일도

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2022-05E

KOR