외교안보연구소 발간자료

The Resurfacing of Japan’s Enemy Base Strike Debate: Analysis and Implications

The Resurfacing of Japan’s Enemy Base Strike Debate: Analysis and Implications

The Resurfacing of Japan’s Enemy Base Strike Debate: Analysis and Implications

Since Prime Minister Fumio Kishida took office\ the debate over the acquisition of enemy base strike capability has resurfaced in Japan. Although some politicians and experts have in the past argued for the need to possess enemy base strike capabilities\ it is unusual that the Japanese government and Prime Minister Kishida officially announced to weigh options regarding the issue. The deliberations will likely mark a turning point in Japanese military politics as it would be a departure from the Japanese government’s dovish\ exclusively defense-oriented security policy toward a more hawkish one backed by offensive strike capability. 
 
The Japanese government is weighing into the acquisition of enemy base strike capability as it is pressing ahead with the revision of the “National Security Strategy (NSS).” In December 2013\ the Abe cabinet enacted the NSS to outline its long-term guidelines in steering foreign and national security policies\ and the NSS is ahead of the first revision at the end of this year. Therefore\ analyzing the current status of Japan’s ongoing enemy base strike discussions will help understand the direction of the amendment. Furthermore\ as it is forecast that Japan’s acquisition of enemy base strike capability is closely related to Japan’s military role surrounding the security dynamics on the Korean peninsula\ it is crucial that South Korea draw security policy implications from recent developments regarding the issue.
 
With this perception in mind\ this article aims to examine the security factors and domestic political context for considering the acquisition of enemy base strike capability\ provide an analysis of the critical issues dominating the debate and outlook\ and draw implications for Korean diplomacy. 
 
The Japanese government’s decision to cancel the deployment of the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system in June 2020 appears to have triggered the current strike capability debate. The Japanese government opted for the Aegis Ashore system to enhance its ballistic missile defense system. However\ concerns over expenses and the assessment that the rocket boosters used on the interceptor missiles could fall into civilian areas led to canceling of the deployment. Since then\ as a way to respond to the ballistic missile threats\ claims were made\ primarily by the government of Japan and the Liberal Democratic Party(LDP)\ that Japan needs to acquire enemy base strike capability to manage better ballistic missile threats posed in the region. On September 11\ 2020\ then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said in a statement\ “We cannot respond to imminent threats of ballistic missiles just simply by improving our interception capabilities\” and underscored the need to consider acquiring strike capability for a more comprehensive defense system in the face of imminent and rising missile threats in the region. Additionally\ the Japanese government views that Japan’s progress in advancing its interception capability is falling behind the recent progress made in the missile development programs of China and North Korea. Since Japan can not respond through unilateral interceptions\ it is considering the option of security policy which holds a certain level of striking capabilities. 
 
Moreover\ some observers argue that Japan’s acquisition of enemy base strike capability would empower the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to take on the spear role in the U.S.-Japan alliance\ enhancing the alliance’s deterrence capabilities and credibility. In August 2020\ the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) said that Japan’s bid for the acquisition of strike capability is part of its proactive efforts to improve the U.S.-Japan alliance overall deterrence and measured responses based on the robust solidarity with the U.S. through a Japan-led movement in order to respond without any missing pieces to all threats on land and air. It is also worth noting that Tokyo’s strategic thinkers and policy-makers argue for acquiring enemy base strike capability because of their skepticism in U.S. extended deterrence. Until last year\ the acquisition of strike capability remained a discourse within Japan but the debate became concrete this year after the U.S.-Japan summit on January 21\ and the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting on January 7 put renewed focus on the issue.  
 
Meanwhile\ the resurfacing of the debate means that the Kishida cabinet has inherited the Abe era’s policy agenda. Since former Prime Minister Abe’s statement in September 2020\ the enemy strike capability issue has become an important agenda among LDP conservatives\ with the constitutional revision and abductions issues. In this regard\ Prime Minister Kishida’s frequent and outspoken remarks on the acquisition of enemy base strike capability aim partly to garner support from the conservative within the LDP. 
 
It seems that the Japanese government is seeking ways to acquire enemy base strike capability without violating Article 9 of the Constitution. Some within the LDP argue that Japan’s enemy base strike capability should be limited to counterattacks to the adversary’s first strike. They propose that a policy option should be established which shoot down the adversary’s first strike and launching counterattacks on enemy bases to thwart the subsequent attacks. Therefore\ it is forecast that Japan will advance discussions to clearly distinguish its enemy base strike capability from pre-emptive strike capability by refining related concepts and clarifying its intention. However\ the acquisition of offensive weapons could ultimately empower the JSDF to launch a preemptive strike even if the Japanese government limits enemy base strike capability to counterattacks.   
      
Recently\ the Japanese government has been ramping up investments in augmenting the JSDF’s stand-off defense capabilities for islands defense. For instance\ efforts are underway to advance the Type 12 Surface-to-Ship Missiles into long-range stand-off cruise missiles. Moreover\ the Japanese government signed a contract with Norwegian defense contractor Kongsberg to equip the JSDF’s F35A fleet with the Joint Strike Missiles (JSMs) and procured the JASSM-ER from the U.S. for its F15 fleet. It is also accelerating efforts at developing high-speed gliding bombs\ a new generation of precision-guided anti-ship missiles\ and hypersonic guiding projectiles. It should be noted that the JSDF could potentially  transform its stand-off defense capability into striking enemy bases in the future. This means that the JSDF can launch a strike on enemy bases\ although the Japanese government has not officially declared that it has acquired enemy base strike capability. Therefore\ at the core of the ongoing debate lies the issue of whether the enemy base strike capability will be established as a security policy with an operational system.  
     
Considering Japan’s investments in enhancing the JSDF’s stand-off missile capabilities\ observers view that attacks on the adversary’s ground facilities would be realistic options for Japan. It is widely held that it costs too much and time for Japan to acquire and operate advanced reconnaissance satellites\ unmanned ground surveillance aircraft\ and an information-sharing system with Special Forces required to launch attacks on mobile missile launchers. If the concept of counterattack is applied\ Japan’s enemy base strike can for the first attack respond with an interception\ and subsequently respond by targeting the adversary’s ground bases. Therefore\ Japan’s enemy base strike option can complement the attacking role of the U.S. And it is forecast that Washington and Tokyo will work on policy coordination to deploy Japan’s enemy strike capability within the existing alliance framework for effective alliance interoperability. In light of all these issues\ Tokyo will likely deepen its strike capability discussions around the Upper House election in July.   
    
The policy implications drawn here are that if the Japanese government adopts enemy base strike capability hammering out a new direction in the revised NSS\ Tokyo’s defense officials would have to redefine the JSDF’s exclusively defense-oriented policy to establish a commensurate defense posture. This is because packaging enemy base strike capability\ which Tokyo wants to distinguish from pre-emptive strike capability\ within an exclusively defense-oriented posture means that the JSDF will be equipped with offensive capability for minimum and necessary self-defense\ although it will likely focus on the defense-oriented policy after the acquisition. Moreover\ given the nature of enemy base strike capability\ it is anticipated that Japan will gradually take on the spear role in the U.S.-Japan alliance\ and the role of the JSDF will be in more sync with that of U.S. Forces Japan. Japan’s possible security situation caused by the military activities of North Korea and China can be associate with emergencies on the Korean peninsula or in Taiwan. Therefore\ the acquisition of enemy base strike capability could significantly alter Northeast Asian security dynamics by expanding Japan’s military role in the region\ accelerating arms race among regional players. It should also be pointed out that although  Prime Minister Kishida who is the leader of LDP’s liberal group took power in Japan\ a hawkish posture that seeks additional military acquisitions and Japan’s expanded military role in the region still dominates Japan’s foreign policy.      
South Korea should be receptive to Japan’s acquisition of enemy strike capability as it can collide with Korea’s national security interests in the midst of security issues facing the Korean peninsula. Therefore\ it is crucial that Korea\ the U.S.\ and Japan forge close cooperation regarding the issue. Security talks between South Korea\ the U.S.\ and Japan will be instrumental as a platform to assure transparency in Japan’s security policy in acquiring enemy strike capability and effectively communicate South Korea’s stance with the U.S. and Japan to reflect better its security interests in future developments. 


* Attached the File

IFANS  FOCUS

"2022"^^xsd:integer

"https://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/kor/pblct/PblctView.do?csrfPreventionSalt=null&pblctDtaSn=13953&menuCl=P07&clCode=P07&koreanEngSe=KOR"^^xsd:anyURI

윤석정 일본연구센터 연구교수

윤석정

"20220228"^^xsd:integer

2021-26E

KOR