외교안보연구소 발간자료

The 2022 Iran Nuclear Talks in Vienna: Recent Developments and Outlook

The 2022 Iran Nuclear Talks in Vienna: Recent Developments and Outlook

The 2022 Iran Nuclear Talks in Vienna: Recent Developments and Outlook

이란

미국

Ⅰ. Washington and Tehran’s Approaches to Nuclear Talks
Ⅱ. Key Issues in the Resumed Talks 
Ⅲ. Outlook and Implications 


Ⅰ. Washington and Tehran’s Approaches to Nuclear Talks

1. Washington’s Approach to the Nuclear Deal: Paving the Way for the U.S.’ Exit from the Middle East

The Biden administration’s willingness to resume nuclear talks with Iran can be seen as a balancing act and part of its exit strategy from the Middle East rather than an attempt to reflect the region’s strategic importance. The Middle East used to be one of the main destinations of the U.S.’ core strategic assets. However\ as U.S. foreign policy priorities are focused on leveraging against China\ it is inevitable for Washington to recalibrate its strategies in the Middle East. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) and the Abraham Accords are two overarching frameworks for such change. The JCPoA is designed to prevent an enmity between the pro-Iran and anti-Iran blocs from erupting into conflict by joining hands with the P5+1 - the U.S.\ UK\ France\ China\ Russia\ and Germany while the Abraham Accords aim to put an end to the Arab-Israel conflict.
 

2. Tehran’s Approach: How to Rebound from the Economic Crisis and Address Threats to Regime Security

The crippling economic sanctions led by the U.S. and the COVID-19 pandemic have gradually fueled the Iranian public’s resentment toward the government\ so Tehran is keeping a watchful eye on such public grievances. However\ it is critical to explore ways to lift sanctions to make tangible breakthroughs. Under President Biden\ the U.S. has veered away from the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy and sought to salvage the nuclear deal by resuming talks with Iran which seemed optimistic about the resumption of the talks to help lift the U.S.-led economic sanctions. However\ the Iranian government’s desire to save its face has stunted progress in the negotiations\ and any final deal still looks far off. Therefore\ Tehran is keen to find ways to save its face and verify the lifting of post-2018 sanctions simultaneously. 
 

3. Developments: Iran’s Advancing Nuclear Capabilities and the U.S.’ Adherence to the Existing Principles Stunting Progress

The U.S. and Iran concur that the nuclear talks should be resumed. However\ domestic and international observers are quite sharply divided over the prospects for the resumption of the nuclear talks. With the election victory of Ebrahim Raisi\ a key conservative hard-line figure in Iran’s presidential election held in June 2021\ Iran set up a more advanced centrifuge and began enriching uranium above the JCPoA standards to clarify the new administration’s position and seize the upper hand in the negotiations.
 
The U.S. and Iran entered the eighth round of the nuclear talks on December 27\ 2021\ but had a brief break with the beginning of a new year. The talks\ which resumed on January 3\ 2022\ are in progress\ with European parties vowing to make last-minute arbitration due in early February.
 

Ⅱ. Key Issues in the Resumed Talks 

1. Issues in Focus 

(1) Iran’s Advancing Nuclear Weapons Capabilities and the Issue of Extending its Breakout Time (BoT)

Breakout time (BoT) refers to the timeframe estimated for Iran to produce enough weapons-grade enriched uranium fuel for a single nuclear weapon. Iran has advanced its nuclear weapons capabilities since the Trump administration’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPoA\ and its breakout time is now estimated to be a month or a few weeks. The U.S. is demanding that Iran roll back its BoT in compliance with the 2015 accord for a joint return to the JCPoA. However\ Iran seems to be only intent on making concessions on halting highly enriched uranium (HEU) exports\ for instance\ to Russia\ arguing that it is unacceptable to deteriorate its technical competencies by dismantling the existing advanced centrifuges as demanded by the U.S. Iran could continuously refuse to dismantle the centrifuges. However\ observers view that the breakout time can be extended to six months given the time needed to dismantle and then re-operate nuclear-related facilities and devices.
 

(2) Issues Related to the Lifting of Sanctions

If an agreement is reached at a certain level with Iran regarding the BoT issue\ how much and at what speed the U.S. will take steps to lift sanctions will also be critical. Iran makes it clear that it will not take any preemptive measures without adequate compensation for damages caused by the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. and lifting full sanctions. The U.S. also maintains that sanctions will not be lifted if Iran does not make the first move by formulating and implementing specific measures to roll back its nuclear capabilities\ which have been rapidly advanced since 2019. 
 

(3) Iran’s Demand for Legal Guarantees to Prevent Another Withdrawal from the Deal and Re-imposition of Sanctions

The Trump administration scrapped the Obama administration’s JCPoA agreement. Iran wants legal guarantees from the U.S. to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents in the future. Considering anti-Iranian sentiment in the U.S.\ it is unlikely that U.S. Congress will provide backing for the JCPoA and ratify legal measures to prevent the breakdown of the accord. Moreover\ it would not be easy for the Biden administration to find another solution. Iran would also be aware of the situation\ so it appears that Tehran is using this issue as leverage to secure concessions in other agendas.
 

(4) Other Issues: Destabilizing Activities of Iran’s Proxy Groups in the Region and the Sunset Clause

The JCPoA deliberately set forth that the deal’s scope is confined to nuclear-related issues without addressing Iran’s destabilizing activities in the Middle East\ which led to a backlash from countries with an anti-Iranian sentiment. Moreover\ the sunset clause in the JCPoA means that once key nuclear restrictions expire in 10 or 15 years\ Iran is legally free to build up nuclear capabilities. And there is a significant difference in threat perception between Iran’s neighbors and the U.S. and the West regarding the clause. 
 
The sunset clause in the JCPoA is also one of the unresolved challenges\ and it seems complicated to extend the 10 to 15 period reflecting the additional four years since the Trump administration’s reimposition of sanctions. Moreover\ as hard-liners have seized power under President Raisi\ there is a growing skepticism over whether Tehran will concede to Washington’s demands even if the two sides return to the deal.
 
Meanwhile\ Iran has established the so-called Shiite Crescent\ backing Iraq’s Shiite insurgents and militias\ Syria’s al-Assad regime\ Lebanon’s Hezbollah\ and Yemen’s Houthi rebels\ and posed the biggest security threats to Saudi Arabia\ the UAE\ and Israel. With Houthis’ drone attacks on Dubai International Airport\ Abu Dhabi\ and oil facilities on January 17\ 2022\ it is forecast that the U.S. will pressure proxy groups in Iran\ which is likely to affect future negotiations negatively.
 

2. Positions and Strategies in Steering the Negotiations: The U.S. vs. Iran

(1) The U.S.: Seeking to Abide by the Existing Principles

The U.S. has been pushing for resuming the nuclear talks with Iran for a mutual return to the JCPoA as part of its exit strategy from the Middle East\ while Iran seeks economic recovery\ which will likely give Washington the upper hand in the resumed talks. The U.S. seems poised to make the most out of this strategic advantage to abide by the principles stipulated in the JCPoA. Growing fatigue among Americans with the United States’ 20-year involvement in the Middle East and West Asia has forced Washington to withdraw from the region\ leaving the country with few choices. But the U.S. may have an edge over Iran in negotiations\ as Iran is viewing the nuclear deal issue as a way to address the country’s economic woes deeply threatening the regime’s stability and a way to salvage Iran’s reputation.

Nevertheless\ the possibility of the Middle East entering a state of war cannot be ruled out if Iran’s nuclear weapons development takes place along with a nuclear domino effect in the Middle East\ Israel’s unexpected actions\ and severe responses from Saudi Arabia and other Sunni kingdoms. Iranian nuclear program is a highly critical issue as it could lead to the end of the NPT regime itself. For this reason\ Republican politicians in the U.S. insist on continued intervention in the Middle East and support the idea of putting intense pressure on Iran.

The Biden administration’s approval rating is falling due to the administration’s controversial response to domestic issues like soaring inflation and the Covid-19 pandemic as well as the crisis in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This has undermined the administration’s momentum towards reviving the nuclear deal. If the Biden administration fails to make Iran give in and grants major concessions to Tehran\ it will face a backlash from the politicians and the public alike and see another drop in approval ratings. The administration is likely aware of the fact that a large drop in approval for the president could adversely affect the results of the upcoming mid-term election. Thus\ it is expected that the administration will try its best to lay out tough demands for Iran.


(2) Iran: Exploring Alternatives while Promoting a “Resistance Economy” 

The Iranian economy is crumbling after years of sanctions\ and the coronavirus pandemic has created a public health crisis. The grim situation in Iran continues to pose a threat to the Iranian regime’s stability\ as economic and public health crises tend to morph into political crises. For this reason\ Iran’s conservative politicians are desperate to find a way to alleviate public discontent as they are becoming increasingly wary of what will happen if Iran’s 81-year-old Supreme Leader becomes too ill to rule\ or dies.

In the second half of 2021\ Iran’s inflation rate hovered above 50 percent and surged close to 60 percent (average annual inflation rate 45 percent). About half of the entire population are now living in extreme poverty as food prices have risen by some 70 percent and Iran’s exchange rate has been depreciating with strong volatility in recent months. The severe depreciation of Iranian currency came at a time when the ban on Iranian oil sales have blocked its key source of revenue and frozen its overseas assets\ further battering the already reeling economy.

But Iran faces a dilemma as its leadership is too proud to succumb to the pain caused by America’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal. The country is reportedly promoting a ""resistance economy"" centered on self-sufficiency and seeking support from the two powers attempting to fill the vacuum left by the West – China and Russia. With the U.S. maintaining its tough stance\ Iran has ramped up their conditions for a return to the deal at the seventh round of talks\ demanding changes to the requirements for Iranian crude oil exports and foreign exchange transactions. But at the same time\ Tehran agreed to let U.S. Atomic Agency reinstall cameras at the Karaj facility and said it has no plans to enrich uranium beyond 60 percent. Iran’s confusing approach appears to be a strategy aimed at gaining an upper hand in the negotiations. 


Ⅲ. Outlook and Implications 

1. Outlook: Possibility of a ‘Small Deal’

Currently\ all parties involved hope to conclude the JCPoA negotiations\ but  the U.S. and Iran are not engaging directly and neither of them is willing to give in or make concessions. 

Given the recent developments\ it is highly likely that the two countries will agree on a ‘small deal’ rather than a comprehensive agreement after the eighth round of talks\ using the salami tactic in which Washington and Tehran discuss issues piecemeal\ one-by-one\ to  generate momentum for negotiations. If talks break down and Iran officially declares its willingness to advance its nuclear capabilities\ the Biden administration will eventually be left with very few options like ramping up “maximum pressure” on Iran or taking military action. Therefore\ there is a possibility that the U.S. and Iran will continue to maintain the status quo to a certain extent and hold a meeting if necessary to avoid carrying too much burden. 


2. Implications

(1) Domestic Politics: Obstacle to Progress

The U.S. and Iran both have incentives to negotiate\ but political situations on both sides remain precarious. In particular\ the Biden administration is struggling to push full steam ahead with the negotiations with Iran as the political situation in Washington continues to deteriorate. U.S. service members were killed by the Kabul airport attack amid chaotic Afghan withdrawal due to intelligence failure. Public opinion on the Biden administration’s foreign policy soured accordingly\ making it even harder for the administration to concede to Iran. While Iran is desperate to accomplish something through nuclear talks\ it is difficult for the Iranian regime to make concessions to the U.S. because doing so would hurt its pride and reputation alike. Amid the deepening economic crisis\ Iran is caught in a dilemma of choosing between survival and pride. Although the U.S. and Iran can calculate the benefits of reaching an agreement\ domestic politics are holding the two sides back from making progress. With neither of the two parties willing to make concessions\ talks to revive the Iran nuclear deal remain stalled.


(2) The U.S. Shifts away from the Middle East to Counter China

The U.S. shale revolution allowed the country to cut its dependence on oil imports\ and the Cold War rivalry between the East and West blocs came to an end. The U.S. started to see little value in actively solidifying its presence in the Middle East. Washington\ therefore\ has put its strategic resources toward its rivalry with China. With the U.S. set to redeploy its military to the western Pacific region and shift its diplomatic\ scientific\ technological\ and economic focus and resources to competing with and pressuring China\ efforts should be made to reassess Beijing’s recent attempts to ascertain its influence in the Middle East. 

Even if negotiations break down and Iran decides to explicitly cement its tilt toward China\ realistically\ it would be difficult for the U.S. administration to return to active intervention in the Middle east. Washington is willing to stabilize the Middle East and revert to the policy of “offshore-balancing\” but given its track record\ it is expected that the U.S. will not actively intervene in the Middle East for the sake of the region’s stabilization. 


(3) Regional Players Attempting to Navigate Their Path Forward

The Gulf monarchies\ just like Israel\ see Iran’s rise as one of the biggest threats to their national and wider regional security. But as they are becoming increasingly skeptical of America’s security guarantees\ it appears that these monarchies are trying to hedge risks by improving relations with their biggest rival Iran while maintaining security cooperation with the United States. And a recent series of events including the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan as well as the recent talks to revive the Iran nuclear deal has induced a reshaping of regional dynamics. Against this backdrop\ countries in the region could seek a modus Vivendi with an adversary if necessary. Therefore\ it is safe to say that Washington’s recent approach toward the Middle East has already begun shifting the regional landscape regardless of the revival of the Iran nuclear deal.


* Attached the File

IFANS  FOCUS

아시아

북아메리카

공동행동계획

아브라함협정(Abraham Accords)

중동출구전략(Middle east exit strategy)

"2022"^^xsd:integer

"https://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/kor/pblct/PblctView.do?csrfPreventionSalt=null&pblctDtaSn=13942&menuCl=P07&clCode=P07&koreanEngSe=KOR"^^xsd:anyURI

인남식 아프리카중동연구부장

인남식

"20220209"^^xsd:integer

2022-02E

KOR