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Drone Strikes on UAE Oil Facilities: Overview and Implications 

Drone Strikes on UAE Oil Facilities: Overview and Implications 

Drone Strikes on UAE Oil Facilities: Overview and Implications 

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Ⅰ. Background of the Attacks and Latest Developments
Ⅱ. Yemen Crisis: Why is There a War? Who are the Houthis?
Ⅲ. Implications for the Region’s Political Landscape


On January 17\ 2022\ Yemen’s Houthi rebels attacked the UAE’s Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) oil refinery with drones. Drone strikes were also launched near the Abu Dhabi airport\ but it was the explosion at Mussafah\ near ADNOC’s storage tanks\ that killed three civilians\ including two Indian nationals and one Pakistani. Six others were injured. The rebel group said it targeted Abu Dhabi\ Dubai International Airport as well other sensitive facilities and the Saudi Arabian mainland. Houthi military spokesman Yahya Sarea said the group fired five ballistic missiles and a large number of drones. The UAE defined the attack as a serious incident that cannot be overlooked and declared an attack. On January 18\ Saudi-led coalition forces carried out air raids in the Yemeni capital Sanaa\ which according to the Houthi’s Al-Masirah satellite news channel killed more than 12 people.


Ⅰ. Background of the Attacks and Latest Developments

The recent incident is similar to the 2019 attack on Saudi oil facilities in Khurais and Abqaiq. There were 18 drones and 7 missiles used in the attack to destroy some of Saudi Arabian oil facilities beyond repair. Observers were divided on who was behind the attack; some claimed that Iran was responsible\ while others argued that Houthi forces were the attackers. The Abqaiq-Khurais attack sent shockwaves around the world as it was revealed that the outskirts of Saudi capital Riyadh and key oil facilities were in fact vulnerable to external attacks. The recent attack on the UAE and the 2019 attack on Khurais and Abqaiq are basically similar\ as the attack on January 17 took place near the UAE capital and targeted key oil facilities.
 
Houthi attacks have largely focused on Saudi Arabia\ and since 2018\ the rebel group has rarely carried out an attack on the UAE. This was because the UAE\ which formed a coalition with Saudi Arabia in 2015\ has reduced its military presence in Yemen since 2018. As the UAE   attempted to distance itself from Saudi Arabia over the war in Yemen\ the Houthis and the Emirates have rarely been drawn into direct conflicts.
 
The situation\ however\ has changed since the start of the year. On January 3\ Houthi rebels stoked tensions by hijacking the UAE-flagged Rawabi cargo vessel sailing in the international waters of the Red Sea off the western coast of Yemen on the ground that the vessel was carrying weapons. Since then\ the UAE has shifted its attitude against the Houthis and decided to target the group more aggressively. It mobilized the pro-UAE “Giants Brigades\” composed of Salafist tribal fighters mostly from the south of Yemen. The Giants Brigades have long struggled to regain their influence and districts captured by the Houthis\ and on January 11\ the militia joined forces with Yemen’s government forces and took full control of energy-rich Shabwa province from the Houthis in a battle for control of Shabwa and neighboring Marib. Since the Giant Brigade has been supported by the UAE for a long time\ it is likely that the Houthis had attacked Abu Dhabi to take revenge against the Emirates. The recent attack came as a surprise to many as the UAE and the Houthi rebel forces neither share borders nor are in a state of war\ even though the two sides have seen a recent escalation of tensions. 


Ⅱ. Yemen Crisis: Why is There a War? Who are the Houthis? 

The Houthis is an Islamist political and armed movement founded by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi\ head of the Zaidi Shia sect. The movement emerged from Saada in north Yemen after the country's unification in 1990. After Yemeni soldiers killed Hussein in 2004\ his brother Abdul Malik took over and has led the movement since. The Houthis did not start off as a radical Zaidi Shia separatist movement; it became radical when the group competed against the government led by Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi (hereinafter referred to as Hadi) to secure a larger share of power. Hadi rose to power after the resignation of his predecessor Ali Abdullah Saleh during the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011. 
 
On February 20\ 2014\ the Hadi government finalized and announced its plan to transform the country into a federated state of six regions\ which allows each state to have more autonomy. At that time\ the Houthis\ which represented Yemen's Shia Muslims that accounted for 41% of the total population\ demanded autonomy in at least three states. But when it was concluded that the Houthis could only control Saada\ the group fiercely resisted. In the course of its struggle\ the Houthis deepened cooperation with the regional Shiite superpower Iran. Iran officially denies its ties to the rebel group\ but it is widely believed that Iran and Hezbollah are supporting the Houthi rebels. In particular\ it appears that the Houthis rely on Iranian Burkan-2 ballistic missiles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles. 
 
The Houthis have demanded a greater share of power in the federal government calculated based on the distribution of population and the size of the occupied area\ but the Hadi government rejected it. This had prompted the Houthis to grow more radical\ and the situation in Yemen morphed into a civil war. Since then\ the war in Yemen has spilled out across the broader Middle East as the Houthis and the Yemeni government created a patron-client relationship with neighboring powers. The civil war turned into a proxy war between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis with ties to Iran. Alarmed by the rise of pro-Iranian forces in the region like Hezbollah\ Iraqi militias\ and the Houthis as well as the signing of the Iran nuclear deal\ Saudi Arabia and the UAE intervened in the war in 2015. The situation in Yemen spiraled out of control after their intervention. The international community criticized the coalition led by Saudi Arabia for its role in extremely fatal attacks against Yemeni civilians. Burdened by growing global criticism\ the UAE has chosen to partially withdraw from Yemen. The recent drone attack on the UAE came at a time when the war in Yemen was evolving into a proxy war between the Saudis and Iranians after the UAE’s military drawdown in the country. 
 
The pro-UAE local militias’ Shabwa offensive launched on January 3 seemingly triggered retaliation by Houthi militants. However\ there is no evidence that Iran approved or implicitly supported the drone attacks. There is a high possibility that the Houthis voluntarily launched the attacks. Amid the recently created mood for dialogue and cooperation between Iran and the Gulf states\ some observers view that the attacks were launched as a political maneuver to stir up discord between the two sides. Various motives are complicating the political picture\ escalating tensions in the region.
 

Background and Characteristics of Houthi Rebels

• In reverence of Zayd ibn Ali\ the 5th Imam and Hussein’s grandson

• In 740\ Zayd bin Ali led an uprising against the Umayyad Empire in 740 (as the legitimate succession of Ali’s lineage and opposition to a corrupt government\ incompetence\ and injustice)

• Founded in 893 in northern Yemen and survived until the 1962 Republican Revolution.

• Until now\ the Zaydis still live isolated in northern Yemen.

• Zaydiyyah\ one of the Shi’a sects owing allegiance to Zayd ibn Ali\ can be classified as a moderate branch with similar tenets and traditions with Sunni sects. 

• Zaydiyyah is different from mainstream Twelver Shi’ism of Iran and close to Sunnism.

• In 2004\ the Houthi family in Sada began to participate in politics.

• Initially\ it sought to break away from isolation and alienation but began to demand a stake in power after the Arab Spring.

• Despite the sectarian differences\ signs of solidarity with Iran have become more evident over time.
 

Ⅲ. Implications for the Region’s Political Landscape

If Houthi rebels continue to build up their offensive against the Gulf Arab states\ the following implications can be drawn from future developments for the region’s political landscape.
 
First of all\ gloomy prospects could loom large for the Iran nuclear deal. The Houtis’ drone attacks could drive a wedge between Washington and Tehran\ steering the ongoing negotiations for the Iran nuclear deal\ which resumed in Vienna\ Austria\ from January 3\ 2022. Washington will likely urge Tehran to fight down the pro-Iran forces’ offensive in the region to reflect more of its demand in the negotiations. However\ since Iran seemingly wants to confine the scope of negotiations only to nuclear issues\ it is forecast that Tehran will deem Washington’s demand difficult to accept in the process. 
 
Secondly\ there is a possibility that Houthi rebels will sabotage dialogue between the Gulf states and Iran. With the Biden administration’s apparent desire to extricate the U.S. from the Middle East\ the Gulf states concerned about the eroding U.S. security umbrella appear to be tepid about holding security talks with Iran which has been posing the biggest security threats in the region. In particular\ Prince Shaikh Thnoun Zayed al-Nahyan\ the UAE’s national security adviser and a heavyweight in the defense and intelligence sectors\ visited Tehran on December 6\ 2021\ and discussed the region’s security affairs with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. The meeting seems to have deepened the Houthis’ anxiety\ prompting them to thwart efforts to improve relations between Iran and the Gulf states.
 
Thirdly\ the Houthis sent out negative narratives about Arab countries cooperating with Israel to the local public. For instance\ after the drone attacks\ Houthi spokesman Mohamed Abdulsalam disparaged the UAE as “a small state of the U.S. and Israel desperate to serve them.” His message is to criticize UAE’s anti-Palestine stance\ which has deepened cooperation with Israel since the Abraham Accords\ by sowing the seeds of anger across the Arab world to consolidate the Houthis’ position in the region. And this is why Lebanon’s Hezbollah focuses on the fight with Israel as much as its domestic power struggle.
 
Fourthly\ regional players’ concerns over the facilities vulnerable to foreign attacks are prodding them toward military build-ups. The attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 and the drone attacks in Abu Dhabi this year clearly show that major Arab Gulf states’ national infrastructure and air defense systems in metropolitan areas are highly vulnerable to foreign attacks. Therefore\ governments in the region will likely speed up efforts to expand the existing air defense systems and reinforce missile defense systems as oil facilities\ desalination plants\ royal palaces\ pipelines\ and transportation networks\ including airports\ are not safe from foreign airstrikes. 
 
Fifthly\ given the characteristics of the Gulf Arab monarchies\ outright retaliation will likely mark a dangerous turning point by reigniting civil war in the region. The political legitimacy of the Gulf monarchies based on tribal culture derives from military prowess and valor. Therefore\ the UAE is likely to retaliate against the drone attack by any means. The day after the attack\ Saudi-led coalition forces launched an airstrike. However\ in the future\ more active interventions will likely occur in response to the Houthis’ position and attitude as the royal family values honor and reputation while seeking to prevent internal division.
 
As mentioned above\ it is difficult to conclude that the Houthis launched drone attacks by colluding with Iran. Instead\ it is more likely to be Houthi rebels’ political maneuver to separate Iran from the Gulf states. Nevertheless\ the risk of escalation and instability will loom large in the region if the international community leaves the insurgences of the pro-Iran militias unabated in the coming years. Therefore\ it is critical to bring the Houthis to the negotiation table. Now\ the ball is in Iran’s court\ and Iran should note that there is practically nothing to gain from unsettling political and military developments.


* Attached the File

IFANS  FOCUS

걸프협력기구(GCC)

아부다비 국영석유회사(ADNOC)

아시아

예멘 내전(2014)

후티 반란(2004)

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인남식 아프리카중동연구부장

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