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I. India and the Quad Summit
Ⅱ. India’s Stance on the Quad
Ⅲ. India and the Future of the Quad
I. India and the Quad Summit
On March 12, 2021, the heads of state of the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, met in a virtual Quad summit. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi struck a positive note of Quad cooperation by mentioning that it will be a new force for global goods and serve as an essential pillar of stability in the Indo-Pacific in the coming years. India also concurred with other Quad countries to meet face-to-face at the second Quad summit later this year, expressing its willingness to participate in the U.S.-led Quad cooperation actively.
However, India was not so optimistic about the idea of holding the Quad summit in the beginning. The four Quad countries had already held a foreign ministers’meeting on February 18, less than a month after President Joe Biden was inaugurated. India was reportedly not so enthusiastic about Washington’s proposal for holding another round of Quad meeting, this time at the summit level, shortly after the foreign ministers met. It seemed that India was very concerned about the possibility of sending out a message to Beijing that it would join the U.S.-led anti-China block by concurring to elevate the Quad to a summit level gathering. It is true that India indeed agreed to bolster measures to keep Chinese assertiveness in check in the wake of the border disputes over the line of actual control (LAC) in Ladakh of the Himalayas in June 2020. However, that does not necessarily mean that India is fully committed to joining the U.S.-led anti-China bloc and ready to challenge China in the security and military spheres.
On the contrary, India is not in a position to openly antagonize China because it is far behind China in its comprehensive national power in military, diplomatic, economic, and technological terms. Also, geography renders India very vulnerable to China’s incursions, as the recent incidents of the border dispute in the Himalayas vividly show. Nevertheless, India eventually changed its initial position and agreed to participate in the Quad summit. It seemed that the U.S. and other Quad countries managed to accommodate India’s concern: in setting the agenda for the summit, they deliberately refrained from voicing outright criticism or negative comments on China.
Rather than focusing on China, the four countries came up with a new partnership in which India will play a key role in expanding the production of COVID-19 vaccines that would be distributed for free to developing countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The Quad vaccine partnership would finance the expanded manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines at facilities in India and provide logistical support for the distribution of Indian vaccines to developing countries. In this way, the Quad vaccine partnership not only alleviated India’s concerns over getting on China’s nerves but also provided active diplomatic as well as economic incentives for India to make essential contributions to fighting the COVID-19 pandemic as a “pharmacy of the world.”
In addition to shared actions to expand safe and effective COVID-19 vaccinations, the Quad countries aimed to foster more comprehensive cooperation on multiple fronts by facilitating cooperation in critical and emerging technologies and addressing climate change. In a press briefing after the Quad summit, Jake Sullivan, U.S. National Security Advisor, underscored that ‘the Quad is not a military alliance, and it is not a new NATO either.’He added that the Quad is ‘an opportunity for four democracies to work as a group and with other countries on fundamental issues of economics, technology, climate, and security.’The U.S. defines the nature of the Quad as an “informal grouping”of like-minded democracies intent on tackling various regional issues in the Indo-Pacific, going beyond the pursuit of narrow military and security interests. Of course, promoting maritime security in the Indo-Pacific to check a rising China is one of the Quad’s major agendas, but the U.S. also emphasizes that security issues are not the only agenda and that the Quad is not something that just focuses on a particular country. It appears that the U.S. intends to ease the diplomatic burdens of Quad partners such as India by mitigating the perception of the Quad as an anti-China security consultative body and securing rooms for the future participation of regional partners such as ASEAN member states which are reluctant to be lumped into the “anti-China”group. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Modi seems to have agreed to elevate the Quad to the summit level and enhance cooperation with the Quad partners, emphasizing that the Quad is a new mechanism for public goods that would contribute to promoting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
Ⅱ. India’s Stance on the Quad
Since President Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in 2011, China’s growing assertiveness and aggressive foreign policies aimed at realizing the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese people”have gradually heightened India’s threat perceptions toward China. In particular, India seems deeply concerned that China may seek to establish a “unipolar Asia”by subjugating all Asian countries one way or another into China’s sphere of influence. With a growing gap between India and China in their comprehensive national power, India has been feeling increasingly threatened by China’s aggressive expansion in the Indian Ocean, its revisionist attempts to change the status quo in the South China Sea, and the outright encroachments into the Indian border regions in the Himalayas. Aside from Pakistan, India’s long-time archenemy, China is now increasingly seen as the biggest national security threat in India’s strategic community. For this reason, India’s China strategy seems to have shifted toward more hardened balancing acts from its traditional approach of cooperation and hedging.
India’s changing strategies toward China have been the main factor shaping its changing stance on the Quad. This is clearly illustrated by India’s response to Quad 1.0, which emerged in 2007 and disappeared immediately, and Quad 2.0, which the Trump administration revived in 2017. India initially maintained a passive stance on the Quad but gradually changed its stance and opted for active participation eventually. India’s growing threat perception toward China has been a critical factor along the way. For example, then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh showed little interest in participating in Quad 1.0 in 2007, and when Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was elected in December 2007, Quad 1.0 was immediately disbanded.
The main reason why India agreed to participate in Quad 2.0 in November 2017 was closely related to India’s renewed sense of ‘China threat’caused by the Doklam standoff, a border dispute with China that occurred in June of the same year. However, even if India decided to participate in Quad 2.0 in November 2017, India tried to keep friendly and cooperative relations with China. For this reason, India has maintained a very “low-key”attitude toward the Quad. For instance, India has never issued an official statement since the Quad’s first high-level meeting in 2017. However, India’s stance on the Quad has rapidly shifted in the wake of border dispute in the region of Ladakh in June 2020. This is why Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar decided to participate in the Quad Foreign Ministers’meeting held in Tokyo on October 6, 2020 even under the severe restrictions on international travel amid the COVID-19 pandemic, and agreed to elevate the Quad’s consultative body to the ministerial level and to deepen cooperation with Quad partners. And in November 2020, India invited Australia to join the Malabar naval exercise, a trilateral naval exercise involving the U.S., Japan, and India. This stands in sharp contrast to India’s previous decision to decline Australia’s request to participate in the Malabar out of concern for straining relationship with China.
India’s shift away from earlier reservations on the Quad seems to be driven by the recently intensified perception of ‘China threat’caused by the Ladakh standoff in June 2020. China’s deliberate attempts to upend the status quo along the Himalayan border fundamentally changed India’s strategic perception of China and the nature of security threats it poses. It is true that India still maintains a cautious diplomatic stance toward China: it does not intend to join the anti-China bloc or to show direct hostility toward China. However, India is diligently ramping up efforts to advance security cooperation with the U.S., Japan, and Australia at bilateral and trilateral levels, especially with the U.S., by actively participating in the Quad to improve its military preparedness and strategic leverage against China.
Ⅲ. India and the Future of the Quad
India is likely to continue its efforts at fostering close cooperation with members of the Quad in the foreseeable future. The four Quad countries are expected to widen areas of cooperation even further beyond the currently agreed working groups regarding advanced technologies, climate change responses, and the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. However, India’s move toward the Quad should not be viewed as an attempt to forge a military alliance with the U.S. or participate in anything quite like an Asian version of NATO. India is likely to remain the weakest link of the Quad in the future as it has been in the past.
India’s stance toward the Quad will be primarily shaped by the extent as well as the nature of security threats China poses, and also in part by how China manages its relations with India in the future. As Washington under President Biden accelerates efforts at consolidating its ties with Quad partners, China started to make some counteracting diplomatic moves to erode cooperation among Quad countries by strategically targeting India as the weakest link of the Quad. China is now steering away from its earlier stance toward India by adopting a more appeasing and conciliatory approach to salvage its relations with India that have aggravated since the Ladakh standoff. Recently, China unilaterally decided to withdraw it military forces stationed near Pangong Tso in the Ramallaya region, and Beijing is resorting to negotiations to make diplomatic reconciliation with India. Beijing also indicated that it would support India’s bid to chair the BRICS summit this year and is reportedly considering the possibility of President Xi Jinping’s visit to India during the summit. China is also offering some economic enticements to India with some large-scale investment proposals.
However, despite these short-term attempts at diplomatic rapprochements with some conciliatory measures, India is likely to continue its active participation in the Quad and shore up diplomatic and security efforts to balance against China. Moreover, as seen from China’s frantic diplomatic reactions to the Quad Summit and its recent shift to a conciliatory stance on India, the Quad now emerged as India’s new strategic asset and leverage against China. In this regard, it is highly likely that India will actively utilize the Quad as new strategic leverage in dealing with China in the coming years.
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