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Ⅰ. The ROK-U.S. Alliance: Stable Management of the Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula
II. The ROK-U.S. Alliance: Expanding Strategic Cooperation between the New Southern Policy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy
Ⅲ. Policy Considerations
Joe Biden of the Democratic Party was elected the 46th president of the United States. The dawning of the Biden era has been raising expectations for a more active U.S. global leadership and a more predictable and stable relationship between South Korea and U.S. It is expected that the solidarity of the ROK-U.S. alliance will likely remain robust in the Biden administration, taking into account that South Korea and the U.S. have common interests in curbing North Korea’s provocations and maintaining U.S. leadership in the region.
Ⅰ. The ROK-U.S. Alliance: Stable Management of the Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula
South Korea’s strategic interests hinge on stably managing the Korean peninsula’s security situation and maintaining a power balance in East Asia. Amidst the escalating security threats posed by North Korea, the ROK-U.S. alliance has been functioning as the linchpin of the Korean peninsula’s peace and stability. Moreover, South Korea and the U.S. have been communicating continuously and cooperating closely to manage the Korean peninsula’s security situation stably.
With the advent of the Biden administration, it is anticipated that South Korea and the U.S. will negotiate and make compromises on major agendas related to operating the ROK-U.S. alliance. First of all, with President Biden taking office, it was expected that the two sides could break the impasse in stalled negotiations and reach a reasonable conclusion on the issue of burden-sharing. With South Korea’s rapidly growing economy, the U.S. requested that South Korea take defense cost-sharing. In 1991, Seoul and Washington signed the first Special Measures Agreement (SMA) on burden-sharing. Since then, South Korea has paid a large portion of the cost for stationing U.S. troops in South Korea (USFK). South Korea also paid 92 percent of the relocation costs ($10.8 billion) of the Pyeongtaek base and provided USFK with free land and facilities and tax and utility cost exemption. During the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign, Joe Biden criticized President Trump for extorting South Korea with reckless threats to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea under the situation where its ally was facing a severe nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. He also mentioned that, as president, he would stand with South Korea and strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance to safeguard peace in East Asia. Therefore, it was anticipated that burden-sharing negotiations between Seoul and Washington would make a reasonable compromise in the Biden administration. And recently, the prolonged burden-sharing negotiations reached a conclusion, and it is perceived positively as a meaningful compromise to strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance.
Meanwhile, it is expected that the two sides will be able to make progress on transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) based on the conditions-based approach. The three stipulated conditions for the transfer of wartime OPCON include: the Korean military’s acquisition of key capabilities; development of the ability to counter the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles; and fostering the security environment suited for the transfer of wartime OPCON around the Korean peninsula. The first condition requires the three-staged verification process consisting of initial operating capability (IOC), full operational ability (FOC), and full mission performance (FMC). The U.S. and South Korean governments jointly approved the first phase (IOC) in 2019. However, the second phase (FOC) has yet to be completed in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. As a result, there is a possibility that the overall verification process could be delayed, and some view that Washington is now reluctant to transfer wartime OPCON because the regional security environment is getting unstable due to the intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition. However, considering that the Obama administration, whose vice president was Joe Biden, agreed to move forward with the transfer of wartime OPCON and that South Korea is determined to resolve the issue, it is anticipated that the two sides will be able to make progress through negotiations.
II. The ROK-U.S. Alliance: Expanding Strategic Cooperation between the New Southern Policy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy
The strategic competition between the U.S. and China is an irreversible trend associated with changes in power balance. The gap in economic power between the U.S. and China was narrowed from 8.5 to 1 in 2000 to 1.5 to 1 in 2019. Moreover, in terms of military power, China has been catching with the U.S. in precision strike and air force capabilities by modernizing its military. With China’s national power rapidly expanding, Beijing has become more assertive in advancing its interests and increasing influence. Faced with China’s growing assertiveness, the U.S., which seeks to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon as its strategic goal in Asia, has placed its priority on checking China’s rise. Unless there is a sudden change in the balance of power, it is expected that U.S.-China strategic competition will persist in the Biden administration.
However, it is anticipated that the U.S.- China relationship could be more manageable in the Biden administration. If the two countries continue their conflicts over almost all areas, including military, security, economy, technology, and ideology, as they did toward the end of the Trump presidency, it will be inevitable that they could get damaged irreparably. Above all, China does not want to make the U.S.-China relationship get worse because it is relatively weaker in power competition with the U.S. Of course, the Chinese government will likely maintain its strong responses for its domestic audience when conflicts with the U.S. occur over issues related to China’s core interests such as Hongkong, Taiwan, and its ethnic minorities. However, China is likely to willingly make concessions to manage its overall relationship with the U.S. by taking a more flexible stance in its trade with the U.S. - purchasing more American products to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with China and negotiating with the U.S. about reforming its state-owned companies to meet the international norms. Meanwhile, considering the impact of the current U.S.-China trade disputes on the U.S. economy and industries, it would not be easy for the Biden administration to let the current level of conflict over trade issues last long. Additionally, the Biden administration’s need to concentrate on tackling urgent domestic issues such as the spread of COVID-19, economic recovery and social integration indicates that Washington would manage its relations with Beijing by employing pragmatic and result-oriented diplomacy.
U.S.-China conflicts in the Biden administration will likely be highlighted around high-tech industries, where the U.S.’relative advantages could be most threatened by China, while U.S.-China trade disputes will be more manageable. Besides, it is anticipated that the Biden administration would likely refrain from direct military confrontation with China, in which the U.S. still maintains a relative advantage over China, and prefer to prioritize maintaining the balance of power. Meanwhile, the two sides are willing to cooperate to cope with urgent global issues, such as COVID-19, climate change, terrorism, and nonproliferation.
Taken together, it is likely that the two global powers do not want to go extreme in their relations. They are deeply interrelated, and they still need to work together for their national interests. In addition, it is expected that the Biden administration’s policy on China will be more stable and predictable than that of his predecessor. Accordingly, it is anticipated that U.S.-China strategic competition will persist, but their relations could be more manageable in the Biden administration than they did during the Trump presidency.
Washington expects the ROK-U.S. alliance to play a more active role in coping with China’s rise. South Korea’s official stance on regional cooperation is to welcome major regional countries’plans, such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the U.S.’Indo-Pacific Strategy, and India’s Act East Policy, with an open mind and to actively cooperate with them by seeking a link between these plans and South Korea’s New Southern Policy. Specifically, South Korea has been pursuing regional cooperation by promoting coordination and cooperation among regional countries’plans and projects based on the principles of “openness, transparency, and inclusiveness,”with the New Southern Policy at its center.
With regard to cooperation between South Korea and the U.S., South Korea has promoted cooperation between the New Southern Policy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy based on universal principles. Their cooperation has been mainly focused on economic agendas, such as energy, infrastructure, and the digital economy. Such efforts can be positively evaluated to expand the bilateral cooperation and strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance.
Considering South Korea’s strategic interests, expanding cooperation with the U.S. also needs to be focused on the issues of economy and non-military security - health, climate change, disaster relief, and counterterrorism. Exploring ways to expand cooperation on economic and non-military security issues based on the universal principles reflects South Korea’s core interests of maintaining a strategic balance between the U.S. and China. Additionally, South Korea can secure its diplomatic space by actively exploring ways to promote international cooperation on non-military security issues because the U.S. and China have common interests in coping with the global challenges and can work together.
Ⅲ. Policy Considerations
With the intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China, it seems that the U.S. wants South Korea to play a more active role in maintaining U.S. leadership and the balance of power in the region as its core ally. In particular, it is expected that the Biden administration would request its regional allies and partners, including South Korea, to join multilateral consultative bodies among democratic countries in the fields of cutting-edge technology, strategic industries, and maritime security.
In its pursuit of maintaining the strategic balance between the U.S. and China, South Korea needs to closely observe changes in power balance between them and develop its strategic responses. As mentioned above, U.S.-China conflicts are expected to be highlighted around high tech industries in the Biden administration, and thus, it would be inevitable for them to compete fiercely in the related fields.
South Korea needs to establish principled diplomacy centered on its national interests based on the principles of “openness, transparency, and inclusiveness”to maintain its strategic value between the U.S. and China. When necessary and inevitable, South Korea needs to clarify its position on the issue and deliver it with consistency while making diplomatic efforts to maintain its relationship with the counterpart. Furthermore, South Korea should galvanize support for its strategic choices by playing a more active role in expanding multilateral cooperation with major middle powers in the region - ASEAN, India, Australia, and Japan. When South Korea continues developing and expanding various forms of cooperation with regional players based on universal principles, it will safeguard its national interests and preserve its strategic value as a core middle power in the region.
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