The Biden Administration’s Return to Iran Nuclear Deal: Outlook ( http://opendata.mofa.go.kr/mofapub/resource/Publication/13729 ) at Linked Data

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  • The Biden Administration’s Return to Iran Nuclear Deal: Outlook
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  • The Biden Administration’s Return to Iran Nuclear Deal: Outlook
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  • The Biden Administration’s Return to Iran Nuclear Deal: Outlook
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  • Ⅰ. Background
    Ⅱ. A Path Toward Rejoining the Deal
    
    
    The Biden era dawns, and the key elements of former President Barack Obama’s stance toward the Middle East will likely form the basis of the new Biden administration’s policy toward the region. Under Biden’s watch, the U.S. is expected to maintain a certain level of engagement with a greater emphasis on values and justifiable cause, instead of reducing its intervention in the Middle East. 
    
    The contour of Obama-era policy toward the Middle East was quite similar to that of President Trump’s policy toward the region, as both administrations sought selective intervention and reduced engagement. But one defining feature of Obama’s policy was his Middle East “balancing act”performed with the aim of normalizing Iran, and the Biden administration is likely to take a similar path when crafting its own policies toward the Middle East. 
    
    
    Ⅰ. Background
    
    1. Policy Objectives
    
    Founded on his pledges to “elevate diplomacy,”“return to a sense of coherence”and “restore and reimagine partnerships”, President Joe Biden would look to lay out finely-crafted Middle East policies. As part of an effort to restore coherency, Biden’s foreign policy team - packed with Obama advisers - will initiate efforts to continue 
    
    Obama-era Iran policy. In terms of elevating diplomacy, the new administration will likely adjust the scope and level of military intervention and take an alliance-based, multilateral approach that puts development and diplomacy at the center. And in order to restore partnership, the new administration would seek to manage the sharp conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran - the two powerful neighbors locked in a fierce struggle for regional dominance – and seek balancing in the region to pave the way for American re-engagement.
    
    
    2. Possibility of a Conditional Return 
    
    Considering his own remarks and his foreign policy team’s analysis and opinions, Biden’s foreign policy posture toward Iran is less likely to deviate much from that of Obama, and he might seek to re-enter the 2015 Iran nuclear deal after renegotiating and revising some clauses. Biden once slammed his predecessor's Iran strategy, calling Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 deal a non-strategic decision and a self-inflicted disaster. Biden is expected to make efforts to rejoin the pact as the Iran nuclear agreement is deemed as the crowning foreign policy achievement of the Obama administration. 
    
    But as Secretary of State Tony Blinken said in his confirmation hearing, the Biden administration is 'a long way' from executing its plan to return to the Iran nuclear deal. A slew of issues portend a rocky road ahead - the Biden administration’s commitment to not allowing Iran to possess nuclear weapons; negative views of the nuclear deal in Washington; issues surrounding Israel; and Iran’s growing influence and presence in the Middle East. And should Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) use Hezbollah to stir unrest in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, how the U.S. responds to such provocation will affect the prospects for a return to the deal. Given Biden’s commitment to renew U.S. alliances, his administration is likely to reach out to the E3 group of France, Germany, and the UK to seek cooperation. 
    
    
    3. Emphasis on Multilateralism
    
    Foreign policy and national security advisers of the Biden administration are likely to reactivate the principle of international cooperation to devise a formula similar to that of 2015, which allowed the parties to enter the deal. They will focus on the revival of U.S.-Iran bilateral negotiations based on this principle. Efforts to re-enter the deal will involve multilateralism, but the U.S. and Iran might also consider holding secret working-level negotiations that helped both parties seal the deal in 2015, and it remains to be seen what role Biden's National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan will play in the years ahead. 
    
    The E3 - the UK, France and Germany -  would act as mediators in the process of writing a draft of a renegotiated deal, and during this process, negotiators will try to coordinate their stances on a wide array of issues including: the suspension of Iran's conflict-inducing actions in the Middle East; disclosure and suspension of Iran's missile development; and expansion of military facility inspections. 
    
    
    4. Challenges Ahead: Iranian Presidential Election Outcome and Opposition from Regional Actors 
    
    The biggest obstacle to renegotiation will be the election of a hard-line, conservative Iranian president less willing to negotiate with the United States. This could create another leadership mismatch in bilateral relations, as was the case during Trump's presidency. With the Trump administration's withdrawal of the 2015 agreement and re-imposition of sanctions against Iran, anti-U.S. sentiments as well as the internal outcry over the failure of the nuclear deal are growing in Tehran. But as sanctions continue to cripple the country's economy, internal voices urging the Iranian leadership to resolve the deadlock in U.S.-Iran relations are increasingly becoming prevalent as well. Against this backdrop, it remains to be seen what Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei  has in mind; a lot depends on whether he would view Biden's commitment to re-enter the 2015 deal as a positive signal and choose to back a relatively centrist presidential candidate.  
    
    What matters more is the position and response of such countries as Israel and Saudi Arabia, who are opposed to the idea of resuming negotiations with Iran. The Israeli government appears to be launching a series of provocations with the aim of inducing Iran's symmetrical response. Israel's actions included the murder of an Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakrizadeh - allegedly an attack by Israel's intelligence agents - and an air attack against Iranian-linked targets in Syria.  
    
    President Biden's foreign policy and national security teams are expected to start reaching out to Iran in the near future to communicate the new administration's intentions and inform Tehran that America will pivot back to Obama's Iran policy. However, many variables could be at play as Secretary Blinken announced at the hearing he would work with U.S. allies and partners to reach a strong long-term agreement that builds on the JCPOA to cover a broad array issues like Iran's nuclear and missile programs as well as its support of terrorist groups in the region.  At the same time, the new U.S. adminstration has to assure traditional allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia that its Iran policy will never harm the security of pro-American countries in the region. 
    
    
    Ⅱ. A Path Toward Rejoining the Deal
    
    1.  Key Sticking Points
    
    The Biden administration looks set to return to the 2015 nuclear accord and address the more comprehensive set of outstanding issues such as: Iran's  ballistic missile program, which is discouraged but not prohibited by the 2015 deal; adding provisions to halt Iran's aggression and provocation in the region; and changing the existing sunset clause. 
    
    Despite America's unilateral withdrawal from the deal, as of January 2021, it is still a legally valid agreement. The P5+1, except for the U.S., still remain committed to the framework of the agreement, so the key lies in whether or not the current deal will be repaired. The relationship between Washington and Tehran continues to remain tense as Iran announced its plans to start enriching uranium to 20% to, while the U.S. has brought the Iranian missile issue starkly to the fore. And as the 2015 deal's sunset clause has been under fire, the Biden administration could consider giving more incentives to Iran in exchange for extending the sunset provisions or eliminating the provisions and compensate Iran in return. 
    
    The U.S. has retained its leverage over Iran by unilaterally strengthening or easing economic pressure. Washington, even if it lacks justification to pressure Tehran owing to Trump's unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal, is less likely to forgo its leverage over Iran as it still remains the only country in the world capable of pressuring sactions-hit Iran. Sanctions can be used as a means of controlling Iran when the country raises issues or initiates a provocation, and  'Secondary sanctions' primarily targeting non-U.S. persons conducting business with Iran can effectively squeeze Tehran's economy as well. And when it comes to lifting sanctions on humanitarian grounds, what matters the most is Washington’s decision. Taken together, the U.S. is capable of gaining an upper hand in negotiations with its carrot-and-stick method. 
    
    Despite the economic  leverage the U.S. has built up over the past years, the Biden administration might face a tough road ahead. Prospects for negotiation will depend largely on the situation in Iran as well as the political climate surrounding the Middle East. And above all, the window of opportunity for President Biden will likely be narrow since he took office in January 2021; it remains unclear whether Iran will actively engage in negotiations ahead of the June presidential election, and a lot will depend on how Iran's political situation would unfold in the coming months. Iran says the U.S. has to lift sanctions first before holding any nuclear talks, and on top of that, it wants Washington to pay for the billions of dollars in economic losses it incurred when Trump pulled the United States out of the deal and reimposed sanctions. The Biden administration is willing to immediately reverse Trump's withdrawal and declare its return to the deal, but the administration would find it difficult to lift sanctions on Iran without a justifiable reason as it could draw public criticism and may not be in the strategic interests of the United States. Moreover, defusing anti-Iran sentiment in Washington is no easy task, and there is also a problem of persuading the “anti-Iran front”in the Middle East comprised of countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel. 
    
    The sustainability of any future agreement would be questionable without support from  major U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East and domestic bipartisan support. Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear accord was not just a decision guided by his personal taste; it was driven by a complex set of factors such as congressional opposition, resistance from Israel, and the Gulf monarchies' opposition. To navigate its path forward, the Biden administration will have to persuade and win the support of many actors, specifically the anti-Iran bloc of Republican hawks in Washington. 
    
    Any kind of diplomatic process around regional disagreements with Iran is likely to be much more complicated, and a negotiation on nuclear issues will be a time-consuming affair. To break the current deadlock, the Biden administration could choose to approach Iran with the following road map. 
    
    
    2. Possible Option: A Small Confidence-building Deal 
    
    The Biden administration is likely to seek a “small deal,”which pursues a more limited first step that freezes Iran’s nuclear program or rolls it back slightly in exchange for some partial sanctions relief. The deal could be similar to some of the proposals presented to the Iranians and the Trump administration, such as the one French President Emmanuel Macron attempted to broker in 2019.  The administration could first consider a process in which Iran agrees to limit uranium enrichment to 3.67% and its nuclear Research and Development activities in exchange for allowing the country to export about 1 million barrels per day. 
    
    A small confidence-building deal would allow the U.S. to maintain its leverage over Iran without lifting economic sanctions altogether, and help Washington pressure and wield control over Tehran already reeling from deep economic woes. It would also get the Israelis and Saudis not to object and could build bipartisan support. Making a small deal would also demonstrate the Biden administration’s commitment toward  maintaining the coherence of U.S. foreign policy while reversing Trump’s policies. It could also assuage anti-Iran sentiment in the U.S. and revive the meaning of the nuclear agreement, all of which could make the deal more sustainable in the long run. And from Iran’s perspective, agreeing to this approach would buy the country more time and space to take a closer look at its new counterpart. 
    
    The Biden administration is  likely to gradually move forward with a small deal, but Iran's presidential election results could act as a variable, because there might be a change of course in the middle of negotiation if a more hard-line Iranian government is projected to take power. And if the small deal process faces a deadlock, this could put a strain on the Biden administration. Furthermore, President Biden’s broader effort to repair transatlantic ties may hit a roadblock if a slow progress in the small deal process generates frustration among America’s European allies. 
    
    The Biden administration could consider rejoining the JCPoA immediately in case its small deal approach fails to deliver meaningful results. But it might attempt to revise the sunset clause – the main concern with the content of the JCPOA -  even if it decides to rejoin the pact. Iran, for its part, wants to leave the clause the way it is under any circumstances. Owing to this difference in expectations, the negotiations will essentially boil down to the issue of resetting the clock on the sunset clause. The U.S. will likely try to reset the clock to begin anew on the date of agreement, and the key is whether or not Iran would agree to it. Coaxing Iran to accept this proposal would require the U.S. to provide a more significant economic incentive. 
    
    This option would get the highest level of restraint on Iran’s nuclear program in the shortest time and create a pathway for America’s return to the deal. It will allow the new administration to concentrate its efforts on more crucial and pressing issues, so it may have greater support from regional players and the Hill than a return to the original deal. But critiques may argue that it would fail to address Iran’s ballistic missiles and provocative actions in the region. 
    
    
    3. Outlook
    
    The Biden adminstration has about four months to achieve a major breakthrough with Iran, as Iran will hold its presidential election in June 2021. It will be difficult to conclude renegotiation within the next four months, but if Biden and his team manage to take advantage of this four-month “golden time”to build a negotiating structure that both countries find meaningful, it will be possible to keep the momentum for negotiation alive and create an atmosphere more favorable for future talks. 
    
    While the U.S. has made clear its intention to renegotiate, Iran has shown a seemingly ambivalent posture which alternates between welcoming the inauguration of the Biden administration and demanding compensation and apologies from the U.S. for the losses incurred by economic sanctions and America’s withdrawal from the 2015 deal. 
    
    The two sides might engage in a tense battle of nerves for a while, but Iran is expected to seek an agreement in the near future as its struggling economy, known to be in a state of near collapse, could push the Iranian regime to the edge of the cliff in the years ahead. 
    
    Rather than immediately returning to the original deal or renegotiating from scratch, Washington and Tehran are expected to initiate negotiations to revise some elements of the deal. And as the Biden administration looks set to address more comprehensive set of issues (sunsets, missiles, and regional issues), efforts should be made as soon as possible to rebuild mutual trust by taking early confidence-building measures. It is forecast that the two sides will first focus on dealing with the sunset provision. 
    
    But a rocky road awaits as the anti-Iran front the in Middle East, formed by countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, may oppose or even attempt to obstruct the negotiation process. Moreover, the situation in Iran should be closely monitored as Tehran’s hard-line and conservative forces might suddenly act on their own and create unforeseen problems. 
    
    
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