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Amidst the global resurgence of COVID-19, China has come up with a relatively quick response to the domestic situation. And Beijing is continuously employing its experience and know-how to improve China’s influence and its global image. In particular, Beijing appears to seek to enhance its soft power by sharing the results of China’s response to the pandemic, providing masks, and medical equipment and supplies, and saying that if China succeeds in developing vaccines, they will be declared “global public goods.”
With the U.S.-China strategic rivalry intensifying over the past years, two competing blocs taking sides with either Washington or Beijing have come into being, and they have been increasingly pitted against each other. Against this backdrop, China’s aspiration for building a robust anti-U.S. alliance has been growing. Moreover, it appears that China seeks to salvage its global image as a nation which has been continuously worsening and even demonized since the 1980s. And another urgent task ahead for China is to establish its own core values that would be essential when it assumes the role of a global leader. This is attributable to the fact that even countries with somewhat ambiguous stance due mainly to their economic dependence on China have taken side with the U.S. when it comes to universally upheld values such as democracy and human rights.
President Xi Jinping and the 5th generation leadership have underscored that China needs to create and foster a favorable environment for its development by delivering “China’s story,”and inducing the international community to better understand China’s position. Beijing also reflected on the fact that China’s public diplomacy in the past was confined to promoting its cultural assets, so should redefine the goal of public diplomacy to establish a new world order and culture. In particular, Beijing focuses on sending out the message that “China’s rise is in the interests of the world”through the linkage between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and public diplomacy.
Amid the COVID-19 pandemic that swept the world in 2020, China actively pursued health diplomacy seemingly in the hope that it would achieve tangible results in public diplomacy. In general, health diplomacy aims to enhance a country’s image by directly reaching out to the citizens of recipient countries - the main target audience of public diplomacy, and by advancing the donor country’s national security and economic interests. Traditionally, the health & medical sector has been recognized that it should be seen from a humanitarian perspective beyond political interests. And health cooperation, dispatching medical volunteers, and medical support projects are the core means of public diplomacy.
Since the outbreak and global spread of SARS in 2003, China has been aware that public health issues are important in terms of advancing national security interests, development, and its global image. Since then, Beijing has endeavored to deepen cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO), and has expanded its influence within the WHO, particularly by providing large-scale grants since the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 2009. Furthermore, Beijing anticipated that it can implement effective public health diplomacy by utilizing the know-how accumulated through its aid to Ebola-hit Africa in 2014.
Moreover, the Trump administration’s “America First”vision and the global spread of COVID-19 created a vacuum of international leadership. And China has come to view the pandemic as a great opportunity to promote its system and values. Therefore, Beijing presented the “Health Silk Road (健康丝绸之路)”and “Global Human Health Community (人類衛生健康共同體)”as alternatives to the current world order.
The problem is that some of China’s claims are quite different from the international community’s views. First of all, Beijing argues that China is not the first epicenter of COVID-19 and is not responsible for the global spread of the virus. China also claims that the authoritarian political system under the Chinese Communist Party and a socialist culture putting a higher priority on the collective interests of a group over individual freedom interests have been effective in combating COVID-19. And on September 8, 2020, Beijing even celebrated beating COVID-19. However, it is faced with the resurgence of the virus.
Meanwhile, it is a still widespread view in the international community that China is responsible for the spread of COVID-19. And the international community led by Western developed countries have been discussing Beijing’s hidden intentions, which means that China’s achievements in health diplomacy has been limited. China’s pursuit of assertive policy, such as “wolf-warrior (戰狼) diplomacy,”also contributed to the expansion of negative global views of China.
Domestically, however, China appears to have achieved tangible results to some extent. In particular, China was the only country in the world that recovered its pre-COVID-19 economic growth rate in the fourth quarter of 2020. This boosted the Chinese government’s confidence in its political system internationally, and helped secure the regime’s legitimacy domestically. When there was a steep rise in the curve of confirmed COVID-19 cases in China, outside observers anticipated that Chinese intellectuals and civil society would become increasingly distrustful of President Xi Jinping and the leadership, ultimately leading to the Chinese people’s political awakening. However, as the COVID-19 curve in China flattened while a growing number of Western countries struggled with the rapid spread of COVID-19, Beijing has capitalized on the pandemic as leverage for the consolidation of favorable domestic public opinion in response to external challenges.
In 2020, the Chinese government delivered the message of “a wise leader and a successful political system in the combat against the COVID-19 pandemic”through health diplomacy by implementing “mask diplomacy”when China’s situation stabilized and overseas situations began to exacerbated, and implementing “vaccine diplomacy”after joining COVAX on October 8, 2020.
Such attempts have come to fruition with China’s growing influence through its BRI amid the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, bridge-head countries for China’s BRI were on top of Beijing’s priority list in providing medical supplies, human resources, and vaccines. Prior to the U.S.’development of the first COVID-19 vaccine, China planned to foster its image as a global information and technology powerhouse and promote its soft power by providing vaccine aid before the U.S. and Western countries do. The target regions selected by Beijing include (1) Southeast Asia, the core of the BRI’s maritime route, and (2) Latin America, where Chinese money is currently heavily invested.
Numerous experts say that a leadership vacuum left by the U.S. in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic has been an underlying factor that inspired China’s active pursuit of health diplomacy. It seems that China modelled on the U.S.’leadership demonstrated in the past global health crises, and will likely endeavor to take the lead in international aid and propaganda activities in COVID-19-hit countries. However, it is highly likely that the U.S. and China will be vying for assuming the leadership role in global health cooperation after 2021 as the Biden administration is anticipated to endeavor to close the gap created by the previous administration.
On November 25, 2020, Sinopharm, China’s state-owned pharmaceutical company in coronavirus vaccine development, filed an application seeking the National Medical Products Administration (NMPA: 国家药品监督管理局)’s approval of its COVID-19 vaccines. This could be interpreted as China’s challenge posed to the international standards and institutions represented by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This means that China’s national goal of “tech rise”has begun to be applied to the health & medical sector.
Recently, the Chinese government has been working toward internal consolidation by projecting a strong, capable image of China. With the centennial anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021, the emphasis on the political philosophy of socialism and the legitimacy of the communist rule will gradually deepen. As the competition between the U.S. and China is expected to intensify in the coming years, it is likely that the Chinese leadership, which is aimed at internal consolidation, will further enhance nationalist and patriotic sentiment. In the process, China may spark controversy over history, territory, and traditional culture, and it is necessary to carefully pre-examine Korea’s position on related issues.
With the U.S.-China strategic rivalry intensifying in the coming years, it is also anticipated that Washington and China will be increasingly pitted against each other in addressing various global issues including public health cooperation. Therefore, the Korean government needs to consider the possibility of a conflict between the U.S. and China over such issues. With the recent authorization of COVID-19 vaccines for emergency use, discussions on the need to introduce a “vaccine passport”have been drawing attention. And some argue that countries need to be allowed to require individuals entering their borders to prove that they are vaccinated by the product they prefer. Even if such view takes shape as real actions, it would be difficult to assume that Beijing could attempt to oust the existing international standard - e.g., FDA approval. However, we still can’t rule out the possibility that Beijing would persuade the international community to accept Chinese vaccines - e.g., approved by the NMPA (国家药品监督管理局). Furthermore, the Korean government needs to develop a detailed forecast in mapping out its cooperation with China’s BRI as the U.S.-China rivalry will likely bring sensitive issues such as the rivalry between competing blocs and national security issues to the current picture.
* Attched the File
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