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The most important foreign policy objective of the new Biden administration is to maintain the U.S.-led international order by frustrating China's attempt to become a global hegemon. In this respect, it appears that the Biden administration and the Trump administration essentially share the same strategic goal, but the new administration is expected to use different methodologies and implementation measures. President Trump, with his “America First”doctrine and unilateral approach to foreign policy, has launched indiscriminatory attacks against China. But the new administration is anticipated to make a clear break from its predecessor; it will strengthen U.S. alliances, multilateralism and promote democracy to formulate a new China strategy aimed at keeping Beijing in check.
In response to the challenges posed by China, the new Biden administration is likely to adopt a more richly detailed and finely-crafted measures to pressure China, rather than Trump's go-it-alone, indiscriminatory all-out offensive that puts America at a disadvantage and hurts the country’s interests. Underpinned by Biden’s new foreign policy vision, the course of the new adminitration’s ASEAN policy will be set toward restoring President Obama’s foreign policy efforts to focus on the region, doubling down on checking China and promoting democracy and human rights.
The new Biden administration will definitely consider joining the ASEAN-led multilateral cooperation initiatives in which U.S. allies and partners participate. It will at least consider restoring, succeeding or further strengthening the Obama administration's efforts to focus on the region. It is forecast that Biden will attend the East Asia Summit and other summit meetings attended by ASEAN leaders in 2021, and he is expected to attend these events every year unless there is a good reason not to do so. The Biden administration will reaffirm the United State’s commitment toward regional security by constantly engaging in ASEAN’s regional affairs and further strengthen its role as a regional stabilizer.
The U.S. is expected to take a wide range of measures to contain China’s growing economic and military influence in Southeast Asia, as the region is is becoming a major battlefield of the strategic competition between Washington and Beijing. The U.S. will likely seek ways to offer economic incentives that are different from those provided by China. China is currently increasing its presence in the region with its Belt and Road Initiative and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, both of which are designed to connect China to Southeast Asian countries. But reorganizing the regional trade order in a way that places the U.S. at the center would be a more effective way to counter China’s rising economic clout in the region than providing direct economic incentives. The U.S. is thus expected to consider the following three options in the coming years to respond to the formation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a mega trade bloc comprising 15 countries led by China.
For starters, the Biden administration could consider rejoining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which was signed by the remaining 11 countries after the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP in 2017 and came into effect on December 30, 2018. Secondly, after rejoining the CPTPP, the Biden administration could negotiate a revised version of the accord that places further emphasis on labor and environment, which are two of the new Democratic administration’s top priorities. Third, the new administration may create a new U.S.-centered trade order in Asia by seeking a completely new trade agreement. It bears noting that all of these three options will prove an effective way of containing China’s growing economic clout in Southeast Asia.
The Biden administration is expected to continue Trump’s tough policy on South China Sea. The new administration looks set to expand the number of and beef up the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) to challenge and invalidate China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. At the same time, the U.S. under Biden’s watch will shore up its support of Taiwan, a country bordering on the South China Sea. The new U.S. administration will continue selling advanced weapons system to Taiwan and support the island’s efforts to beef up national security, as Beijing has constantly threatened Taiwan of invasion and escalated military pressure on the island in recent years.
What will be different from the past is that Biden will actively attempt to curb China's military expansion with a broader array of options. For starters, based on the rationale that the U.S. 7th Fleet (headquartered at U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka, in Yokosuka) is insufficient to cover the entire Western Pacific, the new administration may establish a new fleet to counter Chinese naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific. The revival of the 1st Fleet, possibly based in Singapore, could be discussed and pushed forward by the Biden administration down the road. Secondly, by rotationally deploying and redeploying U.S. military forces specifically in Asia, the new administration will seek to address the shortcomings of permanent deployment. The new adminstration might choose to deploy U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia on a rotational basis after careful consideration as part of an attempt to contain China's military expansion in the region.
Under the Biden's administration, the common agenda between the U.S. and its allies and partners will likely be the promotion of democracy and human rights. The Biden administration is expected to emphasize democracy and human rights more than any other U.S. administration. However, putting democracy and human rights at the core of US foreign policy might inject uncertainty into the future relationship between the U.S. and ASEAN, because democracy and human rights issues can be a double-edged sword in the U.S.-ASEAN relationship. Therefore, regarding democracy and human rights issues, the new administration is expected to take cautious steps in the coming years.
Many ASEAN countries, for their part, might have mixed feelings about the direction of the Biden administration's policy toward the bloc; they might not be entirely comfortable with the future steps Biden will take. To be sure, America's efforts to focus more on ASEAN is clearly a desirable direction that meets the expectations of many ASEAN countries, but it also might put more pressure on the bloc to join a U.S.-led coalition against China. The Trump administration did not clearly articulate ASEAN's strategic importance, so there was no strong pressure on the bloc to join U.S.-led efforts aimed at containing China. On the other hand, the Biden administration, as it upholds U.S. alliances, partnerships and multilateralism, is likely to call for stronger joint actions to keep China in check. Moreover, some ASEAN countries might have to go through the hassle of dealing with their own human rights and democracy issues at home to keep their pace with Biden's efforts to center U.S. foreign policy on human rights and democracy.
This suggests that ASEAN might face a scenario it wants to avoid at all costs: Being trapped in a dilemma where it must choose between the U.S. and China. The U.S. will shore up joint efforts to counter China under the pretext of placing strategic importance on ASEAN. Beijing will try to persuade the countries in the bloc and draw some to its side by offering some incentives in return, while threatening to retaliate if they participate in U.S.-led efforts to pressure China.
Most ASEAN countries, to a greater or lesser extent, have been seeking a strategic balance between the U.S. and China where they rely upon Washington for security and Beijing for economy. But ASEAN’s efforts to maintain “equidistance”between contending powers will become less viable as the downward spiral in U.S.-China relations is expected to pick up speed in the years ahead. In other words, ASEAN countries will eventually have choose between the two great powers.
As ASEAN member states find themselves increasingly caught between the two great powers, this issue is likely to serve as a variable that will rupture ASEAN's solidarity and deepen internal conflict. As a matter of fact, some ASEAN countries are complaining about how Cambodia and Laos openly align themselves with China and defend Beijing’s position. Some members have not spoken publicly but even want Laos and Cambodia to be expelled from the regional grouping. The expulsion of these two nations, of course, is impossible, but it can be said that the “China variable”has already created a serious internal rift within the bloc. The problem is that the more intense the competition between the U.S. and China becomes, the more likely the Southeast Asian countries are to be torn apart. Rather than forging a joint response centered on ASEAN to navigate their path forward, the countries in the region will eventually act according to their own interests and strategic decisions to maximize the chances for their own survival.
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