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After Shinzo Abe, Japan’s longest-serving Prime Minister, stepped down, Yoshihide Suga was elected as the country’s new prime minister and launched his cabinet on September 16, 2020. This article aims to explore the political implications of Prime Minister Suga’s rise to power, make predictions of the Suga cabinet’s domestic and foreign policies as well as Japan’s political landscape in his era, and examine policy implications.
Just he did in 2007, Abe stepped down as prime minister, citing his chronic condition of ulcerative colitis. But deep down inside, Abe’s resignation has more to do with the Japanese public’s growing grievances sparked by a series of political scandals hitting the Abe cabinet and policy miscalculations, and a lame duck status caused by Abe’s long-term seizure of power.
Fumio Kishida, Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Diet Affairs Committee,and Shigeru Ishiba, former LDP Secretary-General, also ran for the LDP leadership election to replace Abe. But Prime Minister Suga scored a landslide victory.
The election result shows the voting patterns of the LDP members with vested interests who want to maintain the status quo.
Looking at how Prime Minister Suga filled the key LDP posts, it turned out that familiar faces from the Abe cabinet came to stay in office, which means that he is putting a high priority on stably steering state affairs rather than implementing reform. It appears that Prime Minister Suga will continue to pursue most of Abe’s policy directions and ideas while avoiding political risks emanating from the issues including the tampering of public records, abuse of power for personal interests, and illegal political funds.
Throughout Abe’s days in office, his political maneuver sparked controversy because many viewed that the prime minister’s office formulated and implemented policies in somewhat arbitrary way. This led to the relative decline of the Diet’s power at some point. And the Abe cabinet used to get bad press for its high-handed attitude toward Japanese media outlets. It is possible that the Suga cabinet will follow suit of the Abe cabinet. But it is anticipated that the Suga cabinet will encourage active government-party consultation in steering state affairs, and the Komeito Party will enjoy a better status as one of the pillars of the ruling coalition. It is also forecast that the Public Security Intelligence Agency and foreign ministry officials will exert greater influence in formulating foreign and national security policies in the Suga era.
Suga’s inauguration as prime minister can be seen as tantamount to government turnover, and innately a transitional period during which the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Komeito Party (KP) hold an overwhelming majority as the ruling coalition while changing their leaders after Abe resigned a year earlier before his term ends. Japan’s political landscape will likely be shaped by the dissolution of the House of Representatives in October and the general election. Therefore, it seems inevitable that the Suga cabinet should steer state affairs in line with considerations regarding the general election.
A top priority, and the most challenging task of the Suga cabinet would be resuscitating the country’s sluggish economy with the implementation of effective responses to the COVID-19 pandemic without stifling economic activities. So, even if fails to flatten the COVID-19 curve, the Suga cabinet would have to actively implement economic policies to stimulate the economy. As part of its regional revitalization strategy, the Suga cabinet proposed policies to promote exports of local agricultural products, to support the tourism industry through the “GO TO campaign,”and to stimulate regional vitality through the nationwide expansion of minimum wage hikes.
The Suga cabinet’s basic stance embedded in its macroeconomic policy is to succeed Abenomics, and to reinforce structural reform to make up for the shortcomings of Abenomics. In other words, the strategy aims to break down the “tatewari (縦割り) administration,”which implies the vertical, top-down handling of work within government agencies, and push for thorough regulatory reform to overcome the limitations of Abenomics.
On the diplomatic front, Prime Minister Suga is also suggesting that he will fully succeed the Abe cabinet’s policy line based on the U.S.-Japan alliance, vowing to work toward the strategic pursuit of “a free and open Indo-Pacific”strategy, maintain stable relations with neighbors, resolve the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea, and to push for revision of the constitution. With regard to relations with Washington after the U.S. presidential election, it is anticipated that the Suga cabinet will endeavor to maintain friendly and cooperative relations established between Abe and Trump. In terms of China-Japan relations, the Suga cabinet will likely maintain its goal of “building a strategic, mutually beneficial relationship”that was also pursued in the Abe era. But as the U.S.-China strategic competition intensifies, formulating and implementing an effective China policy are expected to be the biggest task for Suga’s diplomacy. Prime Minister Suga’s position is that he will strive to resolve the Northern Territories dispute and the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea in line with Abe’s “complete settlement of postwar diplomacy.”However, it is unlikely that he will yield concrete results anytime soon. It is also anticipated that Suga will be passive in addressing sensitive issues such as constitutional amendment and historical issues compared to Abe.
In handling Korea-Japan relations, it is unlikely that Suga will make concessions, deviating from the Japanese government’s previous position on historical issues at the risk of facing opposition from Japanese conservatives. However, he seems to be aware of the negative impact of confrontation of the two countries on the U.S.-Korea-Japan relations as well as Japanese diplomacy in the long term. Therefore, it is forecast that Korea-Japan relations will be managed stably for the time being. In other words, unless there is any urgent problem regarding the issue of Koreans conscripted as forced labor such as demand for the sale of Japanese companies’assets in Korea before the general election scheduled in September next year, Suga would prefer the status quo with Seoul rather than full-fledged actions toward the improvement of Korea-Japan relations or the other way around.
Considering the continuing COVID-19 pandemic, Japan’s political culture marked by preference for stability over change in times of crisis, and the dwindling presence of the opposition party, it is also possible that the Suga cabinet will demonstrate its own characteristics, differentiated from those of the Abe cabinet, more conspicuously within a year. It seems necessary to restore and expand Korea-Japan cooperation on various issues - China and North Korea issues, the alliance with the U.S., the international economy, the environment, non-traditional security, and preventive measures against pandemics, and to recognize the importance of Korea-Japan cooperation as the region’s public goods through strategic communication.
As the issue of Koreans conscripted as forced labor before and during World War II is currently the thorniest issue complicating the two countries’relations, it is necessary to negotiate alternatives with Seoul to avoid the sale of Japanese companies’assets in Korea, preparing simultaneously for a scenario in which the South Korean court orders the sale of the assets. Remedying the situations is eventually up to the political decisions of the two countries’leaders. The two sides and related companies should continue their efforts to iron out differences and find an acceptable agreement through dialogue between the leaders as well as diplomatic authorities. The Korean government should also be aware that the Japanese government is willing to take retaliatory measures if the South Korea court orders the sale of assets of Japanese companies in Korea, and needs to prepare countermeasures.
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