| bibo:abstract |
I. Introduction
Ⅱ. Current Situation Surrounding North Korea
Ⅲ. Distinctive Features of the Celebration of the 75th Anniversary of the WPK and Chairman Kim Jong Un's Speech
Ⅳ. 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea : Key Issues and Outlook
I. Introduction
On October 10, 2020, North Korea celebrated the 75th anniversary of the Workers’Party of Korea (WPK). The celebration came at a time when the country's economy was ravaged by massive floods as well as border closures with China amid the pandemic. The 7th congress of the Workers’Party of Korea (WPK) was held in May 2016, and North Korea plans to convene the 8th congress next January. As the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the WPK - which came a couple of months before the 8th Congress - was held to review the party's accomplishments since the 7th Congress, it is worth scrutinizing the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the WPK in order to delve deeply into the current situation surrounding and unfolding in North Korea.
This article will first compare the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the WPK with the 70th anniversary celebration held in 2015 to take a closer look at the distinctive features of this year's celebration. And this article will examine the purpose of holding the 8th party congress this coming January, and discuss what will be discussed and announced at the 8th congress. In order to forecast the forthcoming congress, there are some critical questions to be asked: Why did the WPK decide to hold the 8th Party Congress in January 2021? What will Chairman Kim Jong Un include in his newly-announced five-year plan amid economic hardships and how will he achieve the intended goals? Amid stalled nuclear talks between Washington and Pyongyang, will the WPK decide to keep its 'New Strategic Line' unveiled in April 2018 in place or return to the old dual-track known as the 'Byungjin Line'? Will Chairman Kim send messages to audiences both at home and abroad to resume nuclear talks with the U.S. and improve strained inter-Korean ties?
With these questions in mind, this article will provide insights into the key issues that are likely to be discussed at the 8th congress and the implications they will have on South Korea's diplomacy in the coming years.
Ⅱ. Current Situation Surrounding North Korea
Economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations on North Korea have been designed to effectively reduce the size of country's foreign currency reserves since 2017, further aggravating the North's economic malaise. North Korea's exports to China fell sharply from about $26.3 billion in 2016 to about $16.5 billion in 2017 and to about $200 million in 2018, as UN-imposed economic sanctions have focused on reducing or banning the country's exports since 2017.
Despite a sharp drop in its foreign currency reserves, however, North Korea has maintained the level of its imports from China without a significant decline until 2019. Imports from China stood at about $2.2 billion in 2018 and $2.6 billion in 2019.
However, as shown in , the closure of the border between North Korea and China in 2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic reduced North Korea's imports from China, resulting in a 66.8 percent drop in North Korea's imports from China in January-July compared to the same period in 2019. It appears that North Korea has been gradually expanding its imports from China since June 2020 because the decline in imports would cause an economic contraction.
While North Korea has failed to yield progress in its relations with U.S. the since the breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi summit, the regime held the fifth plenary session of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK in December of the same year and vowed to overcome the difficulties it faces both at home and abroad. But COVID-19 has spread from China to almost every region in the world including the North, worsening the situation inside and outside the country. North Korea's efforts at easing sanctions did not come to fruition, and the Supreme People's Assembly held in April 2020 focused only on preventing infectious diseases and handling the economy without sending a message to foreign audiences.
Ⅲ. Distinctive Features of the Celebration of the 75th Anniversary of the WPK and Chairman Kim Jong Un's Speech
1. Distinctive Features of the Celebration of the 75th Anniversary of the Workers’Party of Korea (WPK)
Compared with the 70th anniversary celebration, the 75th anniversary celebration has several features. The features are as follows:
First, the celebration began when the clock struck midnight on October 10, 2020. It was a 'specially-orchestrated' event, as directed by Kim Jong Un, with stunning visual effects. These were the most distinctive characteristics of this year's celebration.
Second, it was a 'no-mask' event, showing that the country is confident in preventing the spread of the pandemic.
Third, this year's celebration, as was in the 70th anniversary celebration held in 2015, involved a massive military parade and there was no mention of nuclear weapons. One notable difference was the display of new, more powerful weapons at this year's military parade which highlighted Pyongyang's progress in its development of new strategic and conventional weapons.
Forth, another feature that caught the eye of international observers was that the North is seeking to shift is focus beyond the Korean People's Army Ground Force, which is the main branch of the North Korean People's Army. The recent reshuffle of key military posts signals that the country is trying to elevate the status of the North Korean People’s Army Air Force and artillery units. Ri Pyong Chol, the former commander of the Korean People’s Army Air Force who also serves as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission was recently named a marshal of the Korean People’s Army, the military’s highest rank, and Pak Jong-chon, the former head of the Korean People's Army Artillery Command was also promoted to Marshal of the Korean People's Army.
Fifth, whereas the 70th anniversary ceremony was attended by Chinese delegates, including Liu Yunshan, a member of China's Politburo Standing Committee, Wang Jiarui, a director of the International Liaison Department, and other delegations from Cuba, Laos and Vietnam, the 75th anniversary ceremony had no foreign delegations due to COVID-19. North Korean state media instead offered an extensive coverage of the congratulatory message sent by President Xi Jinping to highlight the deepening relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang. In his message, President Xi emphasized that the two counties are bound together by a common ideology - socialism - and expressed his commitment towards consolidating bilateral relations. He added that China and North Korea are both 'socialist countries under the leadership of communist parties,' and wished the WPK 'continuous development and the DPRK a flourishing socialism.'
2. Distinctive Features of Kim Jong Un's Speech at the Military Parade Celebrating the 75th Anniversary of the Founding of the Workers’Party of Korea
Chairman Kim Jong Un candidly acknowledged the economic difficulties faced by North Korea, and blamed his country’s continuing economic hardships on external factors like international sanctions, the coronavirus crisis and a series of damaging typhoons and floods. This was part of an effort to justify the moves to bolster internal unity, such as ordering a '80-day battle' to push for economic development ahead of the 8th party congress.
Another major distinction is that while Chairman emphasized 'people' and 'youth' in his speech delivered at the 70th anniversary ceremony in 2015, he hailed the 'people' and the 'army solders' in this year's speech.
Kim specifically mentioned the U.S. in his 2015 speech to assert the need to build war deterrence against Washington, but this year, he did not mention the U.S. and clarified that North Korea's war deterrence is being developed in order to defend the country, not to aim at others.
Moreover, Kim articulated his commitment to increasing investment in the development of strategic weapons both in 2015 speech and this year's speech. One notable difference was that in this year's address, Kim said the weapons will never be abused or used as a means for preemptive strike, which appears to an initial step to stably manage Pyongyang's relations with foreign powers in the coming years.
Lastly, unlike 2015, Kim Jong Un sent his 'warm wishes to dear fellow countrymen in the South' to express his hopes for improved bilateral relations. This could be seen as an attempt to prevent the inter-Korean relationship from getting worse.
Ⅳ. 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea : Key Issues and Outlook
1. The Purpose of Holding the 8th Party Congress
It is observed that the primary goal of holding the 8th Party Congress in 2021 is to acknowledge the failure of the five-year economic development plan and decide on a new five-year plan. As a matter of fact, when the WPK decided at the 6th Plenary meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Party to hold the 8th party congress, Chairman Kim admitted that his country had been 'unsuccessful in accomplishing the economic breakthroughs he promised,' and vowed to 'unveil a new five-year plan.'
North Korea's 7th congress of the Workers' Party was held after a gap of 36 years, but the 8th congress is set to be convened after a brief 6-year hiatus. This indicates that the WPK is trying to hold the party congress on a regular basis and restore its function as a political gathering that crafts the Party's path forward. Moreover, the WPK's decision to convene the 8th congress in January 2021 reveals its intention to adjust its approach to the U.S. according the U.S. presidential elections results.
2. Key Issues and Outlook
What will be brought into sharp focus at the upcoming party congress will be the contents of the newly announced five year economic plan and ways to achieve its intended goals. The North is expected to increase government intervention in the economy to some extent while maintaining the 'Socialist Corporate Responsible Management System.'
Another critical issue to be discussed at the forthcoming political gathering is whether or not to retire the “new strategic line,”which focuses the nation’s resources on rebuilding the country's economy, and return to Chairman Kim's 2013 signature policy, known as the 'Byungjin Line.' Kim Jong Un's 'frontal breakthrough' drive against U.S.-led sanctions may resemble the 'byungjin line' in that it simultaneously pursues economic growth and military prowess, but it is better to interpret the drive as a modified version of the 'new strategic line.' This year's military parade displayed not only the largely expected new strategic weapons and but also an array of new conventional weapons systems, so Kim's declaration of a 'frontal breakthrough' does not necessarily fit the broader definition of the 'byungjin line.' It is therefore anticipated that the North will keep pursuing its “new strategic line”with some revisions made to it.
Against the backdrop of stalled nuclear talks, whether Kim Jong Un will send a message to the U.S. at the 2021 8th party congress will be the key issue of the upcoming congress. North Korea might revert to 'low-intensity' provocative acts around the time of the 8th congress to send an indirect message to U.S. officials.
When it comes to inter-Korean relations, North Korea is expected to insist on implementing the April 27 Panmunjom Agreement and the September 19 Pyongyang Joint Declaration, and propose inter-Korean talks to implement the agreements.
And given that Chinese President Xi Jinping had sent a congratulatory message to mark the 75th anniversary of the WPK and wish North Korea success in opening the 8th congress and producing outstanding achievements, high-level exchanges between the two sides are expected before and after the forthcoming party congress. North Korea needs to coordinate its economic and foreign policies with China in advance because the 8th party congress will likely shape the direction of the regime's policies going forward. High-level interactions are also important for China in order to build more influence over North Korea.
| mofadocu:relatedCity |
|
| mofadocu:category |
|
| mofa:relatedPerson |
|
| mofa:relatedEvent |
|
| foaf:isPrimaryTopicOf |
|
| mofa:yearOfData |
|
| mofapub:dataURL |
"https://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/eng/pblct/PblctView.do?clCode=P11&pblctDtaSn=13670&koreanEngSe=ENG"^^xsd:anyURI "https://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/eng/pblct/PblctView.do?csrfPreventionSalt=null&pblctDtaSn=13670&menuCl=P11&clCode=P11&koreanEngSe=ENG"^^xsd:anyURI
|
| mofapub:hasAuthor |
|
| mofapub:hasProfessor |
|
| mofapub:pubDate |
|
| mofapub:pubNumber |
|
| dcterms:language |
|
본 페이지는 온톨로지 데이터를 Linked Data로 발행한 것입니다.
|
