| bibo:abstract |
IP2020-01E
North Korea’s June Offensive Revisited: An Interpretation from the Perspective of “Delegative Politics”
September 14, 2020
Hwang Ildo
Assistant Professor, Dept. of National Security and Unification Studies
Ⅰ. Introduction
● Following the closed-door briefing by the National Intelligence Service (NIS), South
Korea’s intelligence agency, at the National Assembly on August 20, 2020,
observations and analyses of Pyongyang’s policy-making mechanism emerged as a
major topic of interest at both home and abroad.
There was some confusion initially in the process of communicating and reporting the
content of the briefing, but subsequent discussions have led to a general consensus
among domestic researchers as follows; △ It appears that Chairman Kim Jong Un has
partially allocated responsibilities and authority to leadership figures in charge of areas
such as South Korea & United States, the economy, and the military △ This, however,
did not lessen the absolute power of Kim as the final decision-maker. Thus, a more apt
expression would be “Delegative Politics” rather than a “delegation of power.”
In fact, such a “Delegative Politics” structure has been in place for quite some time in
the economic field after Pak Pong Ju was appointed as the Premier in 2013. It also
received much attention when the role of First Deputy Director Kim Yo Jong of the
Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was officially mentioned during the period of
inter-Korean engagement in 2018 and again during North’s aggression toward the
South in June of this year.
In other words, Pyongyang’s “Delegative Politics” structure is not something
formulated in response to a certain incident or development, but rather, was a practice
that gradually took shape while Kim Jong Un maintained power for a long time and the
internal structure of the political elites was established.
Analysis of the media coverage during the August post-flood recovery campaign
indicates that this structure is strengthening as time passes. At the time, the activities
of Ri Pyong Chol and Pak Pong Ju, who were put in charge of different policies areas
were given extensive media coverage.
● This paper concludes that by studying a number of organizational behavioral
factors manifested during the June anti-South offensive led by Kim Yo Jong, one
can glean insight into certain aspects of how Delegative Politics works.
The recent hostilities against the South started with the June 4 statement published in
Rodong Sinmun, and ended on the 24th of the same month when the preliminary
session of the Central Military Commission of Workers’ Party decided to postpone plans
for military retaliations against the South. The details of the manner in which the
aggression unfolded show a departure from North Korea’s usual policy making
process.
● Thus, this paper will attempt to identify the concrete modus operandi of the so
called “Delegative Politics” by carefully examining these “unusual” characteristics.
By doing so, the author intends to construct a hypothesis1) that Delegative
Politics is structured by utilizing the organizational behavioral tension between
major actors. Therefore, the paper will present the hypothesis that Delegative
Politics could be further strengthened in the future.
● This paper, however, does not claim that the key decisions to commence or
suspend the June offensive against the South was driven by organizational
behavioral factors. Pyongyang probably planned, executed, and suspended the
hostilities based on the highest level of political calculation and strategic thinking.
Nevertheless, a number of unusual characteristics can be observed in the
process. This study is more of an attempt to reinterpret these characteristics
within the framework of Delegative Politics and organizational behavior.
As is well known, various analyses have been done on how the situation developed and
what North Korea’s calculations were. These can summarized as: △ an expression of
dissatisfaction with the South △ an attempt to attract the attention of the U.S. so as to
retain the momentum of and leverage in negotiations △ an act to secure short term
economic assistance from China. In addition, some studies argued that North Korea’s
motives were more internally focused and aimed to △ to strengthen national solidarity
△ to elevate the status of First Deputy Director Kim Yo Jong.
This paper does not intend to dismiss or support any particular analysis. Rather, it
intends to study the unusual characteristics of the June hostilities, which is difficult to
interpret from existing angles, and to provide an explanation based on the Delegative
Politics structure and organizational behavioral factors in each field.
As is implied by terms such as “one-man rule” or “single dictator state,” the influence
exercised by a single leader is absolute under North Korea’s policy making system. In
such a system, it may seem unlikely that organizational behavior or governmental politics factors will surface. However, this paper contends that when an authoritarian
regime becomes extremely bureaucratic, the structural rigidity will amplify
organizational behavioral factors.
In this regard, there is a need to distinguish between △ governmental politics which
presuppose differences in policy lines or policy objectives, and △ organizational
behavioral factors which result from strict Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and
the logic and mindset unique to individual state organs.
As for the governmental politics, it has long been suggested that there are political
factions in North Korea along policy lines, and that certain organizations or its key
members have distinct political leanings (for example, “military hardliner” or a
“reformist economic government figure”). In fact, there have been cases where the
North would imply internal dissent in policy lines and use it as leverage for
negotiations.
On the other hand, organizational political factors refer to the government
organization’s operational mode or patterns that impact the policy making process.
The fact that North Korea’s official literature strongly criticizes “organizational
centrism (similar to the South Korean term, organizational egoism)” is evidence that
such tendencies are common in North Korea.
Ⅱ. Analysis of Characteristic Elements
1. Analysis of Kim Yo Jong’s Statements
2. Emphasis on Procedures In the General Staff Department’s Message
3. Demolition of the Joint Liaison Office and the Scope of Delegation
4. After the Central Military Commission’s Decision to Suspend Military Action Plans
Ⅲ. Policy Implications
1. The Bureaucratic Nature of Sectoral Compartmentalization
2. “Personification of Diplomacy” and Its Relation with “Delegative Politics" Structure
Annex (Major Events and Media reports)
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