| bibo:abstract |
I. Four Approaches
Ⅱ. Perspective on the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election
Ⅲ. “Swinging Pendulum”between Washington and Beijing: A Re-emerging Strategy
Ⅳ. Unexpected Irony
North Korean politicians and diplomats assigned to steer the nuclear negotiations would be the keenest readers of John Bolton’s memoir, “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir,”published on June 23. In the chaotic aftermath of the Hanoi Summit, they must have struggled to probe the real intentions of President Trump, and figure out why the summit ended without any deal. Bolton’s book is teeming with what they want to know, though fragmented, and Pyongyang seems to attempt to sort out and piece together from fragmented information.
Then, the question is, what did they think about Bolton’s rendering of his days around the Oval Office? How will their thoughts affect future nuclear negotiations? And how will Bolton’s memoir reshape Pyongyang’s calculus and attitude when Washington and Pyongyang resume stalled nuclear negotiations?
I. Four Approaches
After President Trump left Hanoi with no deal, observers around the world seemed eager to understand what was the White House’s logic in steering the nuclear talks with Pyongyang. And there have been competing views on why something went wrong. Some argue that Stephen Biegun, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Sate and Special Representative for North Korea, and President Trump were quite willing to embrace an “action for action”or “phased”approach at first. They assume that Trump changed his mind at the last minute due to John Bolton’s opposition and domestic political calculations facing Michael Cohen’s hearing in Congress. Others insist that North Korea’s proposal for closing part of its Yongbyon nuclear complex in exchange for the lifting of all U.N. sanctions was unrealistic in the first place. They believe that the Summit was bound to end in disarray as long as Kim Jong-un sticks to his proposal.
Assessed through the lens of politics, the former is rooted in an organizational or bureaucratic politics perspective whereas the latter is based on the premise of efficient functioning of rational choice within the White House. To be more specific, the former views that every decision the White House under Trump makes is a result of power game. In contrast, the latter presumes that there is still a functioning interdepartmental mechanism for self-reflection withing the White House. In other words, two different frameworks have been competing to gain currency amid stalled nuclear talks.
In the memoir filled with his determination to expose the utter incompetence of President Trump and the White House, Bolton argues that the former is true. According to Bolton, the U.S. Department of State led by Biegun was set to offer a package deal that practically accepts Pyongyang’s phased approach. Bolton insists that Biegun’s team did this without due consultation with himself and the National Security Council (NSC). And Bolton credits himself with his decision to intervene and efforts at scrapping the deal by capitalizing on Trump’s domestic political calculations. That is, his memoir debunks assumptions that the Hanoi Summit’s breakdown was inevitable after thorough review and consideration of the White House.
[Table] Summary of Different Stances in North Korean Nuclear Talks
On the surface, different stances between Trump and Pyongyang, and between Biegun and Bolton, look complicated. However, two factors can clarify this seemingly complicated picture. One is “comprehensiveness of an initial agreement,”and the other is “the sequencing of denuclearization measures.”The Table above summarizes major stances shown in North Korean nuclear talks based on these factors. Pyongyang was standing on Matrix 1, and Trump did not want to accept such stance, which resulted in the breakdown of the Hanoi Summit. From Bolton’s stance, summarized in Matrix 3, Biegun’s package deal would seem no different from Matrix 1 although some might argue the deal seems close to Matrix 2. And that’s probably why Bolton talked President Trump out of the Summit.
After the summit’s breakdown, international experts and commentators have pointed out that both Bolton’s “Libya model,”and Pyongyang’s proposal for closing its Yongbyon nuclear complex without an initial reporting in exchange for the lifting of all U.N. sanctions, are not feasible. This means that Matrix 2 and 4 are realistic alternatives to Matrix 1 and 3. With an analysis of media reports after the Summit, it appears that Seoul and Washington have come to form a consensus on the necessity of mediation for more feasible plans. For this reason, a revised version of the deal centering around “a comprehensive agreement and a phased implementation plan”has drawn much attention, with a spike in the number of experts in the U.S. arguing for a mandatory initial reporting while considering phased implementation measures.
The problem is Biegun’s stance is closer to Matrix 2 although Bolton argues otherwise in his memoir. He seems to firmly believe that Trump and the Department of State would have accepted Pyongyang’s proposal for the lifting of sanctions in exchange for dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear plant if he had not intervened. And if Pyongyang buys Bolton’s argument, Seoul’s assertion that “a comprehensive agreement and a phased implementation plan”are the most reasonable options available would lose ground thoroughly. When decision-makers firmly believe that their plan will work, they tend to become too blinded to see more realistic approaches.
Ⅱ. Perspective on the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election
The horizontal axis of the [Table] plainly shows the stark differences of the Democratic and Republican parties in their perspectives on national security in the post-Cold War era. Democratic administrations focused on advancing America’s national security interests in a relative, realistic way. “It’s better to do something than nothing”seems to be the penetrating idea behind democrats’foreign policy moments. That’s why they opted for phased, and sometimes partial options in tackling challenges. One example of this is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), otherwise known as the Iran deal, signed during Barrack Obama’s administration. In contrast, Republican administrations tend to believe that the maxim that “no deal is better than a bad deal”makes perfect sense. This explains why Republican administrations have withdrawn from major arms control accords, judging that those frameworks failed to exercise effective control over the nuclear capabilities of Russia and China. And Bolton took such stance to extremes around the Hanoi Summit.
The different perspectives on national security also explain why experts who lean toward the Democratic Party and former government officials have been galvanizing support for phased approaches shown in Matrix 1 and 2 after Hanoi. From their perspective, lifting some sanctions on conditions of dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear facility will not be a bad start if Pyongyang agrees to submit an intial report. And that’s why the Korean government’s backing for “a comprehensive agreement and a phased implementation plan”has gained a lot of support from many Democrats.
If the White House under Trump remains reluctant to adopt a phased approach to North Korea’s denuclearization, Pyongyang might think that it would be much easier to resume nuclear talks with a Democratic administration. It appears that a North Korean objective in the denuclearization process is to maintain ambiguity about its nuclear capabilities to maximize its bargaining power. In other words, Pyongyang and Washington under a Republican president and hawkish officials are likely to point in the opposite directions. And this means that the election of a Democratic president would not be a bad option for Kim Jong-un despite his encounters and “friendship”with Trump.
With a slight twist of the way we look at the situation, however, Bolton’s memoir might have insinuated different possibilities into the minds of North Korean officials. Before Hanoi, it is likely that Pyongyang focused on Trump’s personal traits and tendency to be motivated by domestic political issues. In a similar vein, Pyongyang, whose stance was shown in Matrix, 1 expected Washington to accept its somewhat radical proposal. And this is probably why Kim Jong-un decided to adopt a top-down approach through summit meetings with Trump without sufficient, preliminary working-level negotiations. Trump in Bolton’s memoir perfectly matches what Pyongyang thinks of him. Therefore, it is possible that the Kim regime would not deviate much from its stance and strategies in the coming years.
It is also worth noting that Bolton consistently depicts Biegun’s team as a group of bureaucrats seeking their self-interests by glossing over mere progress in negotiations. Such depiction could complicate the picture by shaping Pyongyang’s strategic calculus based solely on Bolton’s own prism.
Bolton’s account of his interactions with Japanese officials gives North Korea another reason to believe that its assumptions were true. North Korean state media has blasted Bolton, portraying him as “Japan’s puppet.”Pyongyang seems to believe that Bolton had hindered successful U.S.-North Korea negotiations and the string-puller was Prime Minister Abe. And as Bolton revealed that he had closely communicated with some key Japanese officials who were on the same page with him whenever the U.S.-North Korea negotiations entered a decisive phase, Pyongyang now has more than enough reason to believe that it was right.
So from Pyongyang’s perspective, the most realistic path forward would be reviving the negotiations with the Trump administration, but without having to dramatically revise the quadrant 1 proposal, especially now that Bolton is out of the picture. This means giving up on the idea of negotiating with a Democratic administration that shows less aversion to a step by step approach. Under such a scenario, Pyongyang will find no reason to cross the “red line”by restarting testing of nuclear weapons and ICBMs and hurt Trump’s reelection chances when the U.S presidential election is less than four months away. North Korea could deliberately take a hostile turn to get attention if a Democratic candidate looks certain to win the U.S. election, but this option will be off the table if Pyongyang chooses to resumes talks with the Trump administration with the hope of extracting maximum concessions at the lowest cost.
Ⅲ. “Swinging Pendulum”between Washington and Beijing: A Re-emerging Strategy
According to Bolton’s book, since Trump views the U.S.-North Korea talks through the lens of U.S. relations with China, what appears on the surface to be a negotiation with Chairman Kim, from Trump’s perspective, is actually a game he plays with President Xi. In his memoir, Bolton claims that President Trump, although he denies it, has always been wary of China’s significant influence over North Korea.
A closer look at the tactics that have been used by North Korea reveals something interesting: Pyongyang’s thoughts on Trump’s perception of the U.S.-North Korea nuclear talks actually coincide with that of Bolton. North Korea appears to believe that the more it shows off its close relationship with China, the more eager Washington becomes to participate in nuclear negotiations. Or maybe it is seeking to extract more concessions from the U.S. by giving a misleading impression that it could someday become a pro-American nation, a tactic designed to take advantage of Trump’s burning desire to win the game against Xi.
North Korea, as a matter of fact, has a long history of swinging between its major-power backers, often referred to as 'pendulum diplomacy.' Pyongyang pursued 'pendulum diplomacy' to swing between Moscow and Beijing during the Cold War to maximize its strategic interests. It is a strategy that allows the regime to survive by securing significant economic gains and security guarantees from both sides while maintaining a certain degree of independence.
Pyongyang had adopted a similar strategy in the early days of the nuclear negotiations in 2018. Chairman Kim met President Xi before his summit meeting with President Trump, a calculated maneuver by Pyongyang to stoke Chinese fears of a summit outcome that could hurt Beijing’s national interests, and take advantage of Trump’s desire to claim victory over his Chinese counterpart. And the ever-intensifying rivalry between Washington and Beijing will make it easier for Pyongyang to get what they want by swinging between the two great powers.
Recently, North Korean has diligently carried on its state media public statements and remarks made by Chinese officials to push back against Washington’s criticisms of Beijing’s dealings with human rights issues in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Xinjiang. And Pyongyang has moved one step further by publicly siding with the Chinese government. On May 5, a spokesperson of North Korea's foreign ministry backed China's controversial security legislation for Hong Kong, and the country’s Foreign minister Ri Son Gwon expressed support for China’s measures in Hong Kong on June 6. Rodong Sinmun, the North's ruling party mouthpiece, carried an article on June 7 to voice support for China’s national security law. This is to show the world that North Korea and China are bound together by a common ideology, as they both adopt socialism and uphold Communist party rule, as well as to communicate the message that the two countries will suffer the same faith in the standoff with the United States.
Looking at Bolton’s revelations must have made North Korean policymakers proud of the strategic decisions they have made over the past several years. They must be thinking that they were correct about Trump’s intentions, patting themselves on the back for a job well done. North Korea, therefore, is expected to continue pursuing pendulum diplomacy in order to extract political and economic benefits from the two great powers.
Ⅳ. Unexpected Irony
As aforementioned, the inner workings of the White house described by Bolton were not so much different from what Pyongyang had previously imagined. Amid all the controversy surrounding its contents, Bolton’s book has revealed an interesting irony: Bolton and North Korea’s negotiators, who never seemed to get along, were actually on the same page. This ironic situation will make Pyongyang adhere more strongly to the stereotype it holds of Washington, which is likely to have more influence on the regime’s behavior at the negotiation table down the road.
North Korea is probably aware that Bolton’s book contains purported, maliciously told anecdotes from his time in the White House, many of them unflattering toward the president. And the regime is probably going through an arduous process to discern facts from exaggerated falsehoods. But North Korea has long had a tendency to interpret information in a way that supports its preconceptions – also known as confirmation bias. In his memoir giving a behind-the-scenes glimpse of Washington’s dealings on foreign affairs, Bolton recalls that all of Trump’s decisions were improvised, not strategically calculated, and that the president almost had accepted Pyongyang’s proposal to close down its Yongbyon nuclear complex in exchange for lifting almost all of U.N. sanctions without Pyongyang providing an initial declaration or an agreed-upon denuclearization road map. His book also reveals how Trump feels about China’s significant influence over the North. Bolton’s revelation, therefore, are likely to provide North Korea some compelling evidence that would re-confirm the regime’s already strong stereotype about the White House.
But the question is, does Pyongyang’s belief about Washington reflect the true reality? As aforementioned, what Stephen Biegun’s team had in mind before and after the Hanoi summit was negotiating a deal with North Korea in which Pyongyang agrees to provide an initial declaration and a concrete road map. So even if Bolton is now out of the picture, Washington is unlikely to accept a proposal not much different from the one Pyongyang had offered in Hanoi. But if Bolton’s book has really given North Korea confidence to move forward without changing its demands, the second round of nuclear negotiations, just like the first one, will eventually be locked in a stalemate – a scenario where Bolton and his contempt for nuclear negotiations ironically becomes an unwitting obstacle to future U.S.-North Korea nuclear talks. This is something that even Bolton himself would have never imagined when he wrote this tell-all memoir.
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