| bibo:abstract |
I. Opportunities amid the Agonizing Crisis
II. Public Diplomacy as ‘Recognition-Seeking’in International Anarchy
III. Korea’s Response to COVID-19 Seen through the Lens of Critical Issues in Global Public Health
Ⅳ. Directions of Korean Public Diplomacy on Three Dimensions of Recognition
I. Opportunities amid the Agonizing Crisis
The entire world is now mired in the sweeping COVID-19 crisis. The unfolding calamity, however, presents two potential opportunities for Korea: Seoul has attracted worldwide attention for its early response to COVID-19, which has offered a window of opportunity for the country to translate the short-term attention into desired, positive effects of public diplomacy, and contemplate a new horizon of its public diplomacy. Another opportunity is longer-term in time horizon extending to a post-pandemic world.
Of particular note is the absence of much needed global leadership this crisis has laid bare, as neither the U.S., preoccupied with its domestic problems, nor China busy rebuilding its reputation tarnished by its early dealings with COVID-19 appeared sufficiently equipped for global leadership. Both countries appeared to be more interested in a blame game than providing international leadership. Nor have multilateral institutions demonstrated an alternative leadership so far. Both Washington and Beijing may emerge from this crisis with their prestige significantly diminished while their rivalry continues to widen and deepen. With many countries inclined to go its own nationalistic way, the liberal international order may further weaken, as conflicting interests, values and norms will divide the world into contending blocs. A “Hobbesian anarchy”may ensue, but at the same time, small and middle powers may find new opportunities to take part in and positively influence the reshaping of the already changing global order.
As short- and longer-term potential opportunities present themselves amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, several questions arise: what would and should be the role of non-great power public diplomacy? Is public diplomacy simply an instrument to advance self-centered national interest? Does the COVID-19 provide a window of opportunity to nurture a country’s soft power? What should be the role and direction of Korea’s public diplomacy beyond the “K-response”?
Addressing these questions, this paper, first of all, categorizes different types, or dimensions, of recognition, based on the definition of public diplomacy as recognition-seeking practices, to be used as a new conceptual tool for public diplomacy. It then reconstructs Korea’s response to COVID-19 through the lens of four crucial issues that have been raised by critical scholars and experts in the field of public health and come to the surface for the past two decades whenever infectious diseases spread across the continents. In conclusion, the paper paints a path forward for Korea’s public diplomacy across three dimensions of recognition during and beyond the pandemic crisis.
II. Public Diplomacy as ‘Recognition-Seeking’in International Anarchy
Public diplomacy could be defined as “non-conventional diplomatic practices seeking through communication recognition of a country’s state/national identity, or some elements constituting it, particularly from non-state actors.”Countries seek recognition of their own self-image(self-identification) from others – more often than not, the significant Other – in the international society, and eventually realize their identity by gaining recognition. In this logical stream, their identity is rarely determined just as they originally conceived of; It rather undergoes some revisions in the process of recognition-seeking states’interactions with others, during which the discrepancy is abridged between their own self-image and others’perception of them. A country’s identity thus realized in the international society is an intersubjective social construction.
Recognition refers to “seeing Other as a subject of legitimate social standing in relation to Self,”and have three different types or dimensions as shown in [Table 1].
Identities pursued by countries remain generally state-centric. But countries also seek transnational, inclusionary collective identity by expanding the horizon of their identity beyond state boundaries to gain legitimacy or pursue foreign policy goals that reflect values and norms embedded in their national identity. Doing so is like enlarging the perimeters of “us”by facilitating transnational collective actions involving foreign actors and states, such as forging a collaborative global response to such major crises as a pandemic or climate change. When the scope of national identity is maximally expanded, it is possible to forge an integrative human-centric identity.
When the two – the types of recognition states are seeking in anarchical international society and the scope of collective identity – are combined, there emerge different realms of public diplomacy as illustrated in [Figure 1], in each of which states seek for different types of recognition. Along this analytical framework, we could assess future directions of Korea’s public diplomacy on three dimensions of recognition.
III. Korea’s Response to COVID-19 Seen through the Lens of Critical Issues in Global Public Health
Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, security discourse has emerged in the field of global public health to prevail and eventually take root in the current global health governance by the early 2000s that revolves around the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Health Regulations (IHR), most recently revised in 2005. Security discourse of global public health highlights the importance of the international community collectively responding with extraordinary measures to the outbreak of Emerging Infectious Diseases (EIDs) that pose grave threats to national and international security. Particular emphasis is placed on establishing a global system of prevention, surveillance, preparedness, immediate response and containment that goes far beyond the old system of quarantine of pathogens in the originating country and border control.
Against the securitization of global public health, however, critical issues have been raised as in [Table 2], which have been brought to the surface over the past two decades whenever infectious diseases spread across the globe.
Seen from the standpoint of these recurrent critical issues, Korea’s early response to COVID-19, as well as its potential soft power assets revealed in the process, could be summarized as in [Table 3].
Korea has been complying with the core rules of the IHR particularly in terms of immediate response and information sharing, since the country reported its first confirmed case in January. Among the notable features of Korea’s early response to COVID-19 is the government’s aggressive and proactive measures characterized by so-called three Ts – test, contact tracing, and treatment. As of May 10, conducting over 660,000 tests, Korea’s broad and intensive test was widely considered as a “gold standard,”which was conducted in tandem with contact tracing and treatment system centering around screening clinics and exclusive hospitals designated for COVID-19 patients. Also, Seoul has been transparently releasing information on disease spread and government policies twice a day through regular briefings by the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasure Headquarters and the Central Disease Control Headquarters.
The Korean government has strived to strike a balance between its aggressive response to COVID-19 and its trade and travel restrictions. Korea imposed neither broad export control nor complete border shutdown even in early May, when 93% of world population lived in countries with travel restrictions and three billion resided in countries that enforced complete broader shutdown. Despite relatively massive collective outbreaks in Daegue, a southern Korean city, Korea chose to minimize workplace lockdown and mobility restrictions without imposing nationwide lockdown. Instead of complete border shutdown, moreover, the Korean government introduced a Special Entry Procedure that combines partial control of entry with screening and quarantine, taking into account the intensity of COVID-19 outbreak and spread in different countries and regions.
As of April 25, 122 new export regulations were imposed across the globe that include outright prohibition to exclusive domestic priority to proportional limit, while 75 countries including Korea imposed export controls on Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) and 35 countries on agricultural products and foods. Seoul toughened export regulation on medical masks by replacing a 10% production limit with all-out prohibition by late March, but allowed export for humanitarian purposes in early May, and by early June, up to 10% of production capacity.
As for health inequalities, Korea is poised to share its relatively successful experience in flattening the COVID-19 curve with the international society and developing countries in particular. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a special task force under the direction of the Vice Minister to facilitate export and support of medical equipment and response experience sharing. The task force has been organizing a series of virtual conferences and meetings including the Korea Special Webinar 2020, as well as sharing through a dedicated website information on key strategies, test, tracing, treat, immigration and port management, and export regulations.
The Korean government earned trust from Korean people with its early aggressive and transparent responses, which led to voluntary civic participation and cooperation. The majority of Koreans have voluntarily engaged in campaigns of social distancing and self-quarantine, as well as mask wearing. Civic participation also took the form of volunteering in the places of collective outbreaks and helping socially vulnerable, illegal immigrant workers. Test kits and some innovative measures were the outcome of public-private cooperation. Right after the first confirmed case, the Korean government met with experts from medical companies to develop test kits, supply of which was made possible in two weeks. The medical sector brought up the idea of drive-through and walk-through screening stations, as well as distribution of medical masks through nationwide pharmacy stores equipped with a networked database system. Thanks mostly to social trust, Korea was able to hold the 2020 general election in April with over 66% voting rates, the highest in recent national elections, without additional confirmed cases.
Ⅳ. Directions of Korean Public Diplomacy on Three Dimensions of Recognition
Assessed through the lens of the critical issues recurrently arising for the past two decades, the Korean government demonstrated relatively good performance in its response to the COVID-19 crisis in all four issues, despite some drawbacks including encroachment on privacy through its aggressive data collection in contact tracing. Beyond immediate early responses, and beyond a state-centric understanding of its response, however, it is now time to contemplate on how to reflect the merits of its early responses in public diplomacy and further develop them. This is not simply to enhance Korea’s reputation in international society, but more importantly to contribute to jointly forging global cooperation, particularly in the face of a global leadership vacuum. In this light, Korea could consider, for the future directions of its public diplomacy, the path as shown in [Figure 2] on the three dimensions of recognition introduced earlier.
On the dimension of emotional attachment, Seoul may take a public relations approach, focusing on soft power assets showcased in its early response to COVID-19 – cultural assets of social trust, civic participation and public-private cooperation; policy assets that include key strategies, immigration and port management, and export regulation; and knowledge assets of innovative test, treat, and contact tracing utilizing information technology [realm I in Figure 2]. A step further to expand the scope of identity [realm II in Figure 2], it would be desirable to take a public goods approach to Korea’s response by not using the prefix K as in “K-Pop.”The prefix K would be of use in “projection public diplomacy,”which is focused on informing of “Who We Are.”In the case of “advocacy public diplomacy,”however, that aims at disseminating “What We Stand For”in the international society, this may bring about unintended negative consequences by narrowly confining the identity scope to “Korea”and “ourselves.”
On the dimension of legal and political recognition, Korea’s experience is meaningful in its compliance with global public health regulations and norms of the WHO and IHR [realm III in Figure 2]. A new light may be cast on the Korean case to establish it as a voluntary compliance case. The first focus in expanding the scope of identity would be multilateral diplomatic activities [realm IV in Figure 2]. It is important to make a firm collective voice against “voluntary non-compliance”of the rules and regulations, particularly when those regulations lack strictly binding power. Together with this normative disciplining, Seoul should also be active in improving on the limits and problems plaguing the WHO and IHR that include their political neutrality and financial deficiency that lie behind their ignorance of health capacities of the developing member countries.
Further, Korea’s public health diplomacy could be linked to international development cooperation. This means that in the framework of development cooperation, Seoul may devise policy and knowledge sharing programs vis-a-vis developing countries, just like the extant Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) and Development Experience Exchange Program (DEEP), and go further to address the issue of “non-voluntary non-compliance”of the IHR, mostly on the part of developing countries, due to their lack of “core capacities for surveillance and response”to diseases.
Last but not least, on the dimension of social esteem, assessment of distinctive attributes or contribution of a subject is based on an evaluative standard shared by the members of collective community. Seen from this light, global public health is a realm in which people and states alike could set common values and goals. Members of collective community, in this case, the international society, could consolidate solidarity among themselves, faced with a common global crisis like pandemic and expanding the scope of collective identity.
While the pursuit of state-centric national security interests has been dominant in the field of global public health, the human-security approach focuses on the recognition of the dignity of individuals and communities. When the boundaries of identity are widened beyond national identity to include individuals, supranational responsibilities and duties to take care of health of foreign publics are legitimated. In this light, it is suggested that Korean public diplomacy uphold advocacy of human security over national security, and considering the notion’s conceptual comprehensiveness and ambiguity, concentrate in particular on health inequalities [realm VI in Figure 2]. Infectious diseases do not respect national borders, but their effects are discriminative: As already revealed in the COVID-19 crisis, socially vulnerable people suffer triple discrimination: they are more vulnerable to infectious diseases due to their dire living conditions; they are more susceptible to negative socioeconomic impacts; and ethnic minorities and immigrants often and easily become a target of blame as a source of disease outbreak and spread. Health inequalities could be combined with the value and norm of ‘positive peace’ to constitute principles underpinning Korea’s public diplomacy. The notion of positive peace overlaps to a considerable degree with human security, and they share commonality as a norm constituting identities and regulating behavior.
Public diplomacy is a process of caressing and winning people’s hearts and minds, not simply to exert influence on them, but further to create shared values and norms with them. Korea may move forward to normative public diplomacy, which is based on normative soft power besides culture, knowledge and policy soft power. Multilateral coalescence with states and non-state actors alike is requisite for creating “collective soft power”beyond individual state-centric soft power. Transnational norm advocacy through multilateral coalitions could be formalized as international law and institutions and, eventually play part in reshaping the international normative order. Once Korea’s normative public diplomacy could gain wide empathy and contribute to creating collective soft power, it would serve as a countervailing force against great-power realpolitik.
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