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CONTENTS
Vol. 20, No. 1 June 2012
The Rise and Demise of North Korean Nuclear Agreements and
the 2012 Leap Day Deal
CHEON, Seongwhun ·········································································· 1
China’s Relations with the DPRK in the Post-Kim Jong-il Era
Xiaohe CHENG ·············································································· 29
Russia and North Korea: New Putin’s Term-Old Policy?
Georgy TOLORAYA ······································································· 53
Formulating Korean Maritime Middle-Power Strategy
YOON, Sukjoon ··············································································· 81
APPENDIX I
Major Issues in and around the Korean Peninsula
January-June 2012 ········································································· 117
APPENDIX II
List of Essential Documents
January-June 2012 ········································································· 123
The Provision of Research Ethics for the IFANS Review ················· 218
Movements to resume the long-stalled Six-Party Talks were very active in
2011, starting with the U.S.-China Summit held in Washington on January
19 that year. They were culminated on the so-called “Leap Day Deal”
simultaneously announced by North Korea and the U.S. on February 29,
2012. While the U.S. says that the deal covers all types of ballistic missiles
including space rockets, North Koreans argue that they only promised not
to launch any long-range missile that are for military purposes, and so their
right to launch satellites into outer space for peaceful purposes remains
intact. They put their rhetoric into action on April 13, 2012, just two days
before the centenary of the late Kim Il-sung, and the missile launch
resulted in nullifying the Leap Day Deal itself. In the mean time, North
Korea revealed in November 2010 that centrifuges were running in
Yongbyon. It was observed that an ultra-modern control room had been
installed, and 2,000 centrifuges had already been constructed and in
operation. The truth is that abandoning nuclear weapons and missiles
would be incompatible with the North’s system of hereditary succession. It
is that very succession itself that makes it impossible for the North Korean
regime to reform or open, and also makes it impossible for them to give up
their nuclear weapons and missiles. Under the initiative that nuclear
weapons should be requited with nuclear weapons, the opinion that Seoul
should develop its own nuclear weapons to counter the North’s nuclear
threats is getting stronger support in South Korea.
Keywords: Inter-Korean Relations, North Korea’s Nuclear Crisis, Leap Day
Deal, Long-Range Missile Launch, Uranium Enrichment Program
Kim Jong-il’s sudden death has triggered the brakes on the development
of the Sino-DPRK relations, which had been gaining momentum during
Kim’s last two years. Through the condolence diplomacy, China had
granted badly-needed support towards Kim Jong-un’s power succession,
but this positive step in the Sino-DPRK relationship faced serious
challenges under the new leadership in Pyongyang, as the North Korean
government announced to launch a satellite in celebration of Kim Il-sung’s
100th birthday. Consequently, the launch’s failure has heightened the
DPRK’s diplomatic isolation and plunged its relations with China into
uncertain waters.
Keywords: China’s Diplomacy, Sino-North Korean Relations, Satellite
Launch, Korean Peninsula
As Russian President Putin’s new term started in 2012 coinciding with
Kim Jong-un’s power succession in North Korea, the Russia-DPRK
relations are bound to be stable, but less cordial. Russian analysts find little
evidence for a prospective collapse of the Pyongyang regime in the
foreseeable future, so this regime, however unpleasant, remains to be an
important partner of Moscow. However, Kremlin also does not want to
tolerate erratic external behaviors from Pyongyang any longer. Although
Russia is much less concerned about the DPRK’s internal policy, including
the human rights agenda, Russia presumes stability in the Korean Peninsula
– including no sudden changes in North Korea – as its utmost political
objective. This is related to Russia’s plans to strengthen its position and
influence in Asia and the Pacific. The impact of the Korean Peninsula in
the implementation of these goals is vital, especially in North East Asia,
where Russia would like to see the evolution of multilateral peace and
security architecture. Russia wishes for reconciliation and cooperation
between North and South Korea, and perhaps the change of government
in Seoul will contribute to this. Russia would exert its influence by keeping
an eye on its unpredictable neighbor being cautious not to alienate it, at the
same time address nuclear non-proliferation agenda. One of the priorities
is the implementation of trilateral projects such as the Trans-Korean gas
pipeline and railroad, which will be important for Russia’s advancement
into Asian markets and the lessening of inter-Korean tensions.
Keywords: Russian Policy in Asia, North Korea, DPRK, Russia-Korean
Relations, Trans-Korean Gas Pipeline, Trans-Korean Railroad
This paper will consider the Republic of Korea (ROK)’s geostrategic
location, interests, and history as well as the dramatic shifts within the
international system in the recent past and the uncertainty of the decades to
come. In this changing maritime security environment, it is imperative to
establish a new concept of maritime strategy to guide the ROK’s national
grand strategy as one of the most important strategic components on its
course into the future. Korea boasts long coast lines surrounded by three
seas – the East Sea, the West Sea, and the South Sea, allowing the nation to
appear and act as a major maritime power in the international community.
As such, to make the concept more widely accessible for the ROK’s
national maritime interests, some definitions are needed to be formulated
for new Korean maritime strategy. In doing this, the proper level of Korean
maritime strategy will become “middle power” status. In security and
defense communities, this term has been used as a wide term generally
understood to encompass what the ROK status should be in regarding
national size, economic strengths, and military capability. Formulating a
Korean maritime middle-power strategy would provide the ROK with new
tasks and missions to cope with the dilemma in the wake of the sinking of
the Republic of Korea Ship (ROKS), Cheonan, which had been a tragic
inter-Korean issue at the regional maritime security level and international
issue at the international strategy level. While new challenges await the
ROK, new maritime middle-power strategy through the first quarter of the
21st century will bring about new answers for what the ROK’s maritime
strategy will be. It will formulate a pragmatic and comprehensive maritime
strategy for the future development of a coherent ROK’s maritime strategy
and its most effective implementation. In short, although this paper intends
primarily for maritime nature per se, it will be of interest to the larger ROK’s
national security and defense communities and to its allies, partners, and
like-minded nations with in terms of national and international security.
Keywords: National Security Strategy, Maritime Security, Maritime Strategy,
Middle Power, Naval Strategy, Regional Maritime Security
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