| bibo:abstract |
The ROK-DPRK-US Triangular Relationship:
Its Structures and Prospects
Kim Sung-han
Professor, IFANS
I. After Inter-Korean Summit
The inter-Korean summit meeting provided an opportunity to avoid abnormal circumstances in which the United States and North Korea were involved in the discussions concerning the Korean question and to resolve the Korean issues by direct parties concerned. In particular, the first article of the North-South Joint Declaration of June 2000 created an atmosphere for North-South dialogue and reconciliation by declaring the importance of the “independent” resolution of the unification issue.
Korean peninsula issues can be categorized into two areas: inter-Korean issues and international issues. North-South reconciliation, the separated families issue, and economic cooperation belong to the first category, while the Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD) issue, establishment of a peace regime on the peninsula, and the future status of U.S. armed forces in Korea belong to the second. The United States has always been involved in Korea-related international issues. Therefore, keen attention should be paid to how Washington’s Korea policy evolves in the changing internal and external environment in the Korean peninsula.
The United States and North Korea had issued a joint statement on October 12 heralding an opening of a new chapter in relations between the two countries. The two sides agreed to exert every effort to put an end to the decades-old hostility and to establish a new bilateral relationship. Following which, as a significant step towards improving U.S.-North Korean relations, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il hinted, during the landmark talks with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on October 24th, that North Korea would not carry out further ballistic missile testing.
The delicate “triangular relationship” among the two Koreas and the United States is thus becoming more complicated. To adapt to a new “game,” one must develop fresh ways of thinking. To grasp the nature of these triangular relations and prognosticate their most likely outcome, it is important to understand the interrelationship between two sides of the triangle, namely U.S.-North Korean and inter-Korean relations; and to review changes and tasks in U.S.-South Korean relations.
II. Structure of the Triangular Relationship
Emergence of the Triangular Relationship
During the Cold War, South Korea and the United States maintained a staunch alliance against North Korea’s communist regime. Owing to the very nature of North Korea, neither ally had any reason to doubt the resolve of the other. However, the demise of the Cold War era enabled North Korea and the United States to explore a new relationship very different from the one that had existed during the Cold War.
A new environment has emerged, in which South Korea-U.S. and inter-Korean relations are affected by the changing diplomacy between Pyongyang and Washington. A delicate “triangular relationship” has thus emerged among North Korea, South Korea and the United States, as Washington began to deeply involve itself in the North Korean nuclear question as part of its post-Cold War global strategy.
Policy Structure of Inter-Korean Relations
As seen in Table 1, North Korea’s top priority in its policy towards South Korea is regime survival, which would prevent the deepening economic deterioration from developing into a political threat to the Kim Jong-il regime. In order to achieve this goal, the North Korean regime has set its objective that is to overcome its own economic hardship.
The policy means available to North Korea include North Korea’s reconciliation with South Korea and Kim Jong-il’s improved image through which North Korea tries to maximize the economic assistance from South Korea, as well as the international community. North Korea assumes that the most effective tool is the U.S.-North Korean relationship. North Korea’s discussion with the U.S., regardless of its pace of development, can be regarded as an important means for North Korea, mainly because U.S. recognizes North Korea as a negotiating partner in various kinds of talks at the global, regional, and peninsular levels.
On the other hand, South Korea’s goal in its North Korea policy is to achieve peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas, thereby ultimately reaching peaceful reunification of the peninsula. Thus, the South Korean objective of its North Korea policy comprises the dismantling of the Cold War structure on the peninsula.
The policy means available to South Korea include its economic capability, even if dwindled by its financial crisis, to assist its northern brethren, because South Korea can still provide economic and humanitarian assistance to North Korea. South Korea’s willingness to improve inter-Korean relations and its diplomatic relationship with all of the four surrounding powers can be regarded as another means. And, the South Korea-U.S. alliance itself may be the most powerful means that South Korea has, because North Korea feels the alliance as a big political burden it has to overcome, particularly in negotiating with the U.S.
(Table 1: Inter-Korean Policy Structure)
____________________________________________________________________________
North Korea’s Policy to the South South Korea’s Policy to the North
____________________________________________________________________________
Goal Regime survival Peaceful coexistence
____________________________________________________________________________
Objective Overcoming economic hardship Dismantling Cold War structure
____________________________________________________________________________
Means Inter-Korean reconciliation Economic superiority
Kim Jong-il’s new image Diplomatic relations with four powers
US-North Korea Relations ROK-US Alliance
____________________________________________________________________________
Policy Structure of U.S.-North Korea Relations
The U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula in general and North Korea in particular is part of a larger framework of global strategic interests. In other words, the U.S. deals with North Korea in such terms to maintain its leadership role in the post-Cold War era. In order to protect its leadership as the sole superpower, the U.S. must prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction among the nations, which do not possess them already. Thus, the U.S. policy towards the North Korean nuclear problem and missile export is basically premised on this global strategic view. Under this global strategic consideration, U.S. has been implementing the engagement policy to North Korea.
In contrast with geopolitical interests of the United States, the primary task facing North Korea is to maintain its state system. Concrete policies must be implemented to maintain the North Korean socialist system. Thus, most of all the North Korean authorities seek improvement in its relations with the U.S. in order to make the Kim Jong-il regime durable by resolving its current economic difficulties.
(Table 2: U.S.-North Korea Policy Structure)
____________________________________________________________________________
US policy to North Korea North Korean Policy to US
____________________________________________________________________________
Goal WMD nonproliferation & Regime survival
Northeast Asian order
____________________________________________________________________________
Objective Engagement of North Korea Normalizing relations with US
____________________________________________________________________________
Means Food assistance WMD card (missile moratorium)
Lifting economic sanctions Observing Geneva Agreement
Eliminating North Korea from Inter-Korean talks
terrorism-sponsoring list (“independent resolution”)
____________________________________________________________________________
In dealing with the nuclear issue, U.S. realized the necessity to prevent nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia that would threaten the regional order. This requires the expanded the U.S. influence over North Korea. Thus, the engagement policy of the U.S. government toward North Korea is arrived.
As shown in Table 2, the U.S. has various means to achieve its goals and objectives of the North Korea policy. Among others, providing food assistance to North Korea is regarded as a meaningful one, since North Korea is suffering from a serious food shortage. In addition, the policy means include lifting sanctions against North Korea, which indicate the removal of North Korea from the list of terrorism-sponsoring countries.
For North Korea, on the other hand, the primary means available is to utilize the WMD “card” that includes observing the Geneva Agreement. In addition, North Korea could emphasize “independent” resolution of the Korean question with South Korea when its negotiation with the United States reaches a stalemate.
Policy Structure of ROK-US Relations
As seen in Table 3, the strategic interests of South Korea and the United States in the post-Cold War era converge mostly over the issue of establishing a new order in Northeast Asia. South Korea and the United States both desire a stable power balance in the region. It is against this backdrop that the United States describes its participation in bilateral or multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia as a “stabilizing force.” This may well be akin to the United States performing the role of a “balancer” between China and Japan. South Korea does not want another hegemon than the United States to emerge in Northeast Asia.
(Table 3: R.O.K.-U.S. Policy Structure)
____________________________________________________________________________
US Policy to South Korea South Korean Policy to US
____________________________________________________________________________
Goal Maintaining Northeast Peace on the Korean
Asian order Peninsula
____________________________________________________________________________
Objective Deterring North Korean Maintaining U.S. leadership
threat to the region (ROK-US alliance)
____________________________________________________________________________
Means ROK-US alliance Success of democratization
Military capability Geopolitical location
Economic capability Good relations with China
____________________________________________________________________________
The interests of the United States as a superpower are in line with those of South Korea as a semi-developed country, seeking to prevent North Korea from remaining a threat to the region and thus to engage North Korea as a responsible member of the world community.
Policy means available to the United States include military and economic capability, while South Korea is seen to have geopolitical importance because it is located between China and the United States. In addition, if anti-American sentiment is exacerbated in South Korea, it could become a political burden to the United States since South Korea is a “proud” example that has achieved democracy and economic development under the security umbrella of the United States.
III. Perceptions and Prospects of the Triangular Relationship
Perceptions of Triangular Relationship
How does the United States currently perceive North-South relations? Right after the inter-Korean summit, the United States perceived North Korea-U.S. negotiations as having been replaced by direct dialogue between North and South Korea, and that it could lose its leadership role on the Korean issue. Under the situation in which the United States tries to improve its relationship with North Korea, South Korea-U.S. relations could thus come under stress if South Korea and the United States compete in fostering relations with North Korea.
Then, how do South Koreans perceive North Korea-U.S. relations? It is quite a relief that North Korea, which has not spared any effort to alienate South Korea for so many years, has now recognized the importance of South Korean participation in efforts to solve outstanding inter-Korean issues. South Korea sees North Korea’s economic problems as unsolvable without improvement in overall North-South relations. South Korea, however, might find it difficult to engage with the North if North Korea-U.S. relations remain stagnant due to a deadlock in North Korea’s WMD-related negotiations with the United States.
Lastly, North Korea’s perception of South Korea-U.S. relations is complex. North Korea, which had branded trilateral South Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation on North Korea policy a collaboration of foreign powers, is defensive about South Korea-U.S. cooperation aimed at stopping the North’s development of weapons of mass destruction. North Korea will focus efforts on improving relations with the United States for the time being and hopes that the South will be instrumental in blocking U.S. pressure that might rise during North Korea-U.S. negotiations. North Korea thinks that it need not raise its voice against U.S. forces stationed in South Korea, which might help South Korea and the United States reaffirm the necessity of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. It may be to the North’s advantage to have an increasing number of “anti-American activists” in South Korea speak on its behalf. North Korea may also think that its charm offense will adversely affect South Korea-U.S. cooperation on the North Korean WMD issue.
Prospects of the Triangular Relationship
Before the inter-Korean summit meeting in June, the two Koreas appeared to be competing against each other to form a coalition with the United States. The United States, on the other hand, was tempted to form coalitions with both North and South Korea. South Korea’s Kim Young-sam administration (1993-1998) thus made it clear that progress in North Korea-U.S. relations should not hinder South Korea-U.S. relations in any way. This was an effort to deter the creation of a “double coalition” by the United States with the two Koreas.
The Kim Dae-jung administration, in contrast, signaled its intention to play a leading role in inter-Korea relations. It emphasized the abnormal aspects of North Korea-U.S. relations, which created problems such as the WMD issue, had a negative impact on South Korea-U.S. relations as well, and the normalization of U.S.-North Korean relations was thus essential. Strange as it may seem, North Korea agreed to the summit talks due to South Korea’s efforts to normalize inter-Korean relations.
However, the triangular relationship began to take new shape after the summit meeting. South Korea and the United States started to compete to reach North Korea. The South Korea-U.S. relationship could be under stress if South Korea and the United States compete to maintain the leadership role in resolving the Korean question. Accelerated progress either in inter-Korean relations or in U.S.-North Korean relations may thus become a burden on South Korea-U.S. relations, unless they are mutually harmonized.
Thus, the three players in this triangular game should be able to achieve so-called “Pareto optimality” by searching for ways to ensure that bilateral relations within the larger triangular game are not harmed. Whether such bilateral relationships can progress without damaging each other will depend on North Korea. If the North does not change, domestic support for relations with North Korea both in South Korea and in the United States will definitely wane.
The so-called “comprehensive and integrated approach” (or the Perry Process) toward the North aims at gradually reaching a win-win solution through some concessions from each party: the United States lifts sanctions and normalize its relationship with North Korea; North Korea ceases to engage in the WMD program by being assured of its system survival; and South Korea takes the initiative for cooperation with the North that would lead to peaceful coexistence.
In the short term, however, there is not much possibility that each player will voluntarily weaken its policy options that were listed in Table 1 and 2. International conditions necessary for a win-win game include trilateral cooperation among China, Japan, and the United States, which cannot be executed in the short run either. In this respect, there are numerous obstacles that need to be overcome for the normalization of triangular relations, and prospects for resolution of North Korea’s WMD program is still unclear. Therefore, the realization of a win-win game involving North and South Korea and the United States might be a long-term task.
IV. Conclusion
The goals and strategies of the comprehensive approach should be pursued on three levels - the South-North, the U.S.-North Korea high-level talks and the four-party talks - so that a “synergistic effect” may be achieved among the three channels. However, the tripartite policy coordination among South Korea, Japan, and the United States should be maintained to prevent North Korea from taking advantage of South Korea to create favorable conditions for its negotiations with the United States and Japan.
In addition, South Korea, the United States, and Japan should welcome China and Russia’s help to work out problems on the Korean peninsula, while maintaining the tripartite policy coordination as the central mechanism. In particular, Beijing finds itself in a rather unique position with respect to the Korean question. China has studiously cultivated good relations with the two Koreas on both the military level as well as the political level. The recent movement of Russia and China towards the North could play a positive role in North Korea’s reform and openness, and to dilute its hostile attitude towards South Korea. Thus, it is recommended that South Korea, the Untied States, and Japan take advantage of the Sino-Russian strategic cooperation in gaining North Korea’s cooperation. Such help could remove barriers to the comprehensive approach towards North Korea.
|
