| bibo:abstract |
North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Program
and ROK’s Responses
January 12, 2011
YUN Duk-min
Director-General
Dept. of National Security and Unification Studies
Fundamental Re-examination of the North
Korea Nuclear Policy and Information System
North Korea‟s recent revealing
of the uranium enrichment
plant is what the international
society has worried came
true, and showed a limitation on the
nuclear policy and information system
which focused on the Yongbyon plutonium
complex. Also, as evidence of HEU
traffic by North Korea came out following
Libya‟s giving up of nuclear program,
the fact that the ROK and U.S.
intelligence agencies were confused in
assessing the information indicates that
finding out information on the develop-ment of uranium enrichment program
is extremely difficult and the information
agencies are especially vulnerable to North
Korea‟s intent to conceal or cheat.
Blocking International Connection and Illegal
Trafficking
It is believed that international
nuclear black market which links „China-Pakistan-Iran‟ has played a prominent role
in enabling North Korea to possess fairly
advanced uranium enrichment capability.
North Korea tends to develop its nuclear
capability not on its own but on the
basis of technologies that have been
leaked elsewhere. North Korea is making
good use of the „latecomer advantage,‟
who overcomes technological difficulties
with advanced technologies which have
been acquired through overseas network.
Especially, there is a good chance that
technical personnel from China, Russia,
and Pakistan have participated in the
development. The centrifuges North
Korea revealed were not rudimentary
but modern centrifuges imitated from
the European and Japanese models.
The Musudan ballistic missile with a
range of 3,000 to 4,000 km that North
Korea displayed in a military parade on
the anniversary of the Workers Party on
October 10, 2010, is a copy of SSN-6
manufactured by the Makeyev Design
Bureau of the former Soviet Union. It
is presumed that North Korea developed
the Musudan missile using technologies
leaked from Russia, and that technical
experts from the Makeyev Design Bureau
have participated in the development of
the missile. The anti-aircraft missile North
Korea displayed in the aforementioned
parade is in appearance a North Korean
copy of the Russian high-tech S-300
missile or the Chinese FT-2000 missile
system which replicated the S-300. It is
likely that Russian or Chinese technical
personnel participated in its development.
The North Korean case indicates
that there is a critical loophole in the
international endeavors to prevent the
spread of WMD such as PSI (Proliferation
Security Initiative). There is a desperate
need to reinforce the international non-proliferation regime. In particular, Chinese
cooperation is essential with relation to
illegal WMD deals, and diplomatic
endeavors are needed to be strengthened.
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