The International Political Economic Implications of IMF Governance Reform: With A Focus on Quotas and Voting Power ( http://opendata.mofa.go.kr/mofapub/resource/Publication/10535 ) at Linked Data

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  • The International Political Economic Implications of IMF Governance Reform: With A Focus on Quotas and Voting Power
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  • The International Political Economic Implications of IMF Governance Reform: With A Focus on Quotas and Voting Power
skos:altLabel
  • The International Political Economic Implications of IMF Governance Reform: With A Focus on Quotas and Voting Power
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bibo:abstract
  • The International Political Economic Implications of IMF 
    Governance Reform: With A Focus on Quotas and Voting Power 
    January 10, 2010 
    KANG Seon Jou 
    Professor 
    Dept. of Int’l Economy & Trade Studies 
    As part of the outcomes 
    from the three G-20 
    Summit Meetings 
    convened in 2008 and 
    2009 with the purpose of 
    providing solutions to the US-originated global financial crisis, a 
    series of decisions regarding governance 
    reform of the International Monetary 
    Fund (IMF) has been reached. Those 
    decisions reached during the G-20 
    Summit Meetings, without exaggeration, 
    provided a timely opportunity for the 
    IMF to regain its status and importance 
    in the global economy, compared to 
    the last ten years during which it did 
    not receive much attention from the 
    economic circle.
    In contrast to current expectations, 
    however, the adjustment of member 
    countries’ quotas and voting power may 
    result in weakening the IMF’s ability to 
    further prevent crises. That is, the IMF 
    has established a new Flexible Credit 
    Line (FCL) with a view to 
    strengthening assistance for 
    developing countries victimized by the 
    US-originated financial crisis. The 
    FCL, as designed to provide 
    unconditional support to developing 
    countries with sound macroeconomic 
    fundamentals, implies that Western 
    developed countries’ influence on 
    developing countries through the 
    channel of IMF conditionality will be 
    weakened. Also, it should be noted that 
    the weakened conditionality of IMF 
    funds in conjunction with a stronger 
    voice from emerging markets and 
    developing countries within the IMF 
    would lead to moral hazard.
mofadocu:category
  • Past Publications
  • 오럴히스토리총서
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  • "2010"^^xsd:integer
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  • "https://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/eng/pblct/PblctView.do?csrfPreventionSalt=null&pblctDtaSn=10535&menuCl=P09&clCode=P09&koreanEngSe=ENG"^^xsd:anyURI
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  • 기획조사과
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  • "20100129"^^xsd:integer
dcterms:language
  • ENG

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