bibo:abstract |
Prospects for
International Relations in 2006
THE INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Copyright???? 2006
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade
Nambusunhwanno 2572, Socho-Gu, Seoul 137-863, Korea
Printed by Hancom Printing.
Publication Date: March 2006
PREFACE
ooking back on the international situation of 2005, we are reminded
that in May the 7th NPT Review Conference ended without any
substantive results and there was little progress made toward the
much-touted UN reforms. Within the broader framework of cooperation
between nations it is obvious that the influence of powerful countries is
growing and the international order is being shaped around national
interests being pursued in a “great game” that is intensifying competition
and containment in international politics. Such developments seem to be
particularly evident in Northeast and Central Asia.
With the U.S. military action taken against Iraq in 2003, the situation in
the Middle East continues to be unstable and with the London terrorist
attacks and riots in France, international terrorism as well as ethnic and
religious conflict are becoming both more diversified and region specific.
Furthermore, natural threats to large populations such as avian flu,
contagious diseases, typhoons and earthquakes are replacing military
conflict as a new major threat to human security in the 21st century.
In Northeast Asia the multilateral six-party talks have been in place to
work out a resolution to the North Korean nuclear problem. The six-party
format adheres to the principle of a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue
and has opened the way to a greater role for South Korean diplomatic
efforts. A nearly one-year lull in inter-Korean relations has come to an end
with renewed dialogue, exchanges and cooperation now being actively
pursued between the two countries. Other positive cooperative efforts
among countries in the region were seen in the inauguration of the first
East Asia Summit (EAS) in late 2005. On the other hand, however, sources
of conflict still exist. Human rights issues and suspected illegal activities
are a continuing bone of contention between the United States and North
L
Korea and are likely to have a negative impact on the six-party process in
the near future. The recent flare up of nationalism in Asia is also expected
to negatively impact cooperation in the region in 2006.
The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) has
endeavored to contribute to the government’s foreign policy–making process by
more promptly and accurately gauging and forecasting changes in international
relations and at the same time enhance the general public’s understanding of
international affairs; the publication of Prospects for International Relations in
2006 is one tangible result of such efforts.
I would like to extend my gratitude to all the research staff who have taken
part in the drafting of this research document. My special note of appreciation
goes to Professor Lee Seo-hang, dean of research, and research assistant Hwang
Sun-hee, who were in charge of editing this volume, for their strenuous efforts.
The IFANS hopes that this publication serves as a useful reference material
for shaping Korea’s foreign policy.
Cho Jung-pyo
Chancellor, IFANS
March 2006
CONTENTS
1. International Politics···························································· 1
1.1 Continued Uncertainty from the Spread of
Terrorism/Violence and Remaining Nuclear Problems ·············1
1.1.1 Regionalization and Deepening of International
Terrorism/Violence···································································1
1.1.2 Negative Repercussions of Delayed Iran Nuclear
Negotiations ·············································································2
1.2 Proliferation of Unconventional Security Threats and
the “Securitization” of Natural Disasters····································3
1.2.1 Proliferation of “21st Century Vintage” Unconventional
Security Threats ·······································································3
1.2.2 Securitization of National Disasters········································4
1.3 Strategic Emergence of India and Central Asia and
the Superpowers ············································································5
1.3.1 Rise of India and Central Asia’s Strategic Importance ···········5
1.3.2 The Start of Great Games among the Superpowers ················6
1.4 UN Reforms in Deadlock ······························································7
1.4.1 Continued Difficulty for the Security Council and
the Secretariat Reform ··························································7
1.4.2 Secretary-General Election Campaign Begins························8
2. International Economy························································ 9
2.1 Continuation of Overall Stable Growth·······································9
2.1.1 Improved Adaptability of the International Economy to
Risk Factors·············································································9
2.1.2 Slow Economic Recovery of Developed Countries ·················9
2.1.3 Continued High Growth Momentum of
New Rising Countries and Developing Countries·················11
2.2 Latent Factors Limiting Growth················································12
2.2.1 Short-term Economic Imbalance between
the United States and East Asian Countries ··························12
2.2.2 Possibility of Continued High Oil Prices ······························13
2.2.3 Remaining Non-Economic Uncertainties ······························14
2.3 Growth of China and India’s Economic and Influence············14
2.3.1 Rapid Rise of China and India’s Esteem in
the World Economy·······························································14
2.3.2 Nations Intensifying Efforts to Access China and India········15
2.4 Difficulties in the Advance of Multilateralism and
the Proliferation of Regionalism ················································16
2.4.1 Expected Difficulty in DDA Negotiations······························16
2.4.2 Proliferation of Regionalism ·················································17
3. Northeast Asia and Regional Cooperation ··················· 19
3.1 Intensification of Strategic Cross-check and Competitive
Relationships between U.S.-Japan and China-Russia ·············19
3.2 Intensification of Conflicts over History-Territorial
Disputes and National Tendencies·············································21
3.3 Intensified Diplomacy and Competition for Resources ···········22
3.4 Continuation of Mediation Phase for Resolving
the North Korean Nuclear Problem···········································23
3.5 Expansion of Regional Cooperation Scope to Cope with
Unconventional Security Threats···············································25
4. The Korean Peninsula and Inter-Korean Relations··· 27
4.1 Strengthening Internal Solidarity in North Korea ···················27
4.1.1 The Military-First Policy Era and Strengthening Solidarity·······27
4.1.2 Continued Pursuit of the July 1st Economic Management
Improvement Measures and Mitigating Adverse Effects ·······28
4.1.3 Solving the Food Problem and Strengthening
Social Control········································································29
4.2 Continuation of North Korea’s Selective Strategy toward
South Korea·················································································30
4.2.1 Priority of Economic Cooperation with South Korea ···········30
4.2.2 Continued Emphasis on National Cooperation·····················32
4.3 Imbalance in Inter-Korean Relations ········································32
4.3.1 Continuation of Non-Linear Development ····························32
4.3.2 Increasing South Korea’s Role···············································33
4.3.3 Expanding Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation··················34
4.3.4 Potential for the Success of the Kaeseong Industrial
Complex·················································································36
4.3.5 Social/Cultural Exchange and Cooperation and
Changes in Humanitarian Assistance····································37
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