| bibo:abstract |
Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: A South
Korean Perspective
저 자 명 : Kim Eun-seok
날 짜 : 1999.06
Conclusion
Multilateral security dialogue can provide an important vehicle for ensuring long-term
peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Such a dialogue, by its mere existence, will be a
significant confidence-building measure for regional countries, as it will increase mutual
understanding and confidence and, in turn, reduce distrust and miscalculation. It will
facilitate the improvement of bilateral relations among nations which at times find
themselves unable to arrange bilateral meetings. The dialogue will also allow voices of
medium-power countries like South Korea to be heard on discussions of important
regional security issues. It is critical for the long-term security of the region that lesser
powers also participate in regional security discussions with the major powers.
However, a multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia continues to remain elusive
despite the increasing awareness of the need to create such a forum and its potential
benefits. It remains a long-term proposition at the moment, largely due to China's
reluctance and North Korea's refusal to participate.
The improvement of inter-Korean relations may make North Korea more responsive to
the multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia. The comprehensive approach
undertaken by South Korea, the US and Japan might encourage the North to see a
benefit in joining such a dialogue. In particular, the normalization of North Korea's
relations with the US and Japan will provide grounds for changing its negative attitude
toward security multilateralism.
Multilateral dialogue in Northeast Asia is not complete without the participation of North
Korea. Nevertheless, no one should beg the North to accept the proposal. That will only
make North Korea demand more incentives and put unreasonable conditions for
accepting what is essentially in its own interest. For example, when asked to clarify its
position on the ARF membership, North Korea cites the lack of diplomatic relations with some members of the ARF, including the Philippines, as being a hurdle. The process
leading to the convening of the Four-Party Talks is another demonstration of such
tendency of the North. The North should realize the benefit of the dialogue by itself.
Successful implementation of the South's engagement policy might bring positive
influence in that regard. In the meantime, the North should be left alone to make its own
judgement.
China, while participating in track two activities such as the NEACD and the JapanAmerica-China
conference, has maintained a wait-and-see attitude toward the track
one security dialogue in the region, citing North Korea's refusal to participate. But the
real reason for China's lukewarm attitude does not come from its concern of North
Korea but has to do with its preference for a multilateral paradigm which will replace
existing bilateral security arrangements in the region.
At the March 1997 ARF Inter-sessional Support Group on CBMs held in Beijing, China
pressed hard to include in the chairman's report, a language about "the need to cultivate
a new approach to regional security and a new regional order based on the rich
diversity in the region," while denouncing bilateral security arrangements as a Cold War
thinking and running against the trend of times. The Chinese proposal was met by
strong opposition from the US and its allies. At the end of discussions which continued
well into early morning of the final day, all that was finally agreed was to delete most of
the relevant paragraph of the report and replace it with a general statement on
principles of the UN Chapter, peaceful coexistence and amity and cooperation. China's
preference for a new cooperative security arrangement was professed again by
Defense Minister Chi Haotian during his November 1998 visit to Singapore. In his
speech to a group of security specialists, the Chinese Defense Minister emphasized the
"imperative need to cultivate a new concept of security and seek a new way to
safeguard peace" in the Asia-Pacific.
It is obvious that China's concept of multilateral security cooperation is different from
South Korea's or the US. However, it should be noted that China has never completely
rejected a track one security dialogue, saying that it needs to see the result of the
NEACD for a while before making its decision regarding the official process. At the
closure of the 1997 Beijing ARF ISG, the Chinese co-chair confessed to the meeting
that there was clearly a limit to how much the host country could push its perceptions
on regional security discussions. As a matter of fact, China must have understood long
ago that it has to live with the US-led network of bilateral security arrangements, at
least for the time being. Many security experts believe that the Chinese are privately
satisfied with the current American military deployments in the region, as they help restrain Japan's ambition for remilitarization and regional hegemony. China should
understand that the breakdown of bilateral alliances will create an enormous vacuum of
power in the region, which will render the regional security environment extremely
volatile and uncertain.
Given its strong advocacy for a multi-polar world, China could begin to cast more
positive light on a multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia in an attempt to
curtail US capacity for unilateral maneuver. If China has a genuine concern that the US,
Japan and South Korea are establishing an Asian version of NATO, although it should be
abundantly clear that a NATO type alliance does not simply apply in Northeast Asia, a
multilateral security consultative mechanism will be all the more in China's interest.
Such a mechanism will help China counter the formation of the trilateral alliance.
Under the circumstances, there is no sense of urgency for a multilateral security
dialogue among the Northeast Asian countries. However, the sooner the dialogue is
established, the better the long-term prospects for regional security. It should be noted
that China holds the key to the establishment of a multilateral security dialogue in the
region, because, without China, it will be a meaningless exercise. In contrast, without
North Korea, the regional dialogue may not be complete but will certainly be workable.
Therefore, South Korea should continue to present its case for the multilateral security
dialogue in the region, emphasizing, in particular, a step-by-step approach and benefits
for promoting regional confidence-building measures.
Should China change its attitude and decide to participate in the governmental security
forum, we must not continue to wait for North Korea. We should go ahead and launch an
official dialogue for regional security and cooperation, while reserving an empty seat
for North Korea. We find in the NEACD an archetype for multilateral security
cooperation in Northeast Asia. As a first step, the five countries can arrange a separate
meeting of governmental officials during a NEACD plenary session or using such
occasions as ARF-SOM and the ministerial meeting and consider forming an expert
group to agree on the modality and agenda of the dialogue.
|
