The 2nd Inter-Korean Summit Talks:Issues and Prospects ( http://opendata.mofa.go.kr/mofapub/resource/Publication/10352 ) at Linked Data

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  • The 2nd Inter-Korean Summit Talks:
    Issues and Prospects 
    Yu Suk-ryul
    Professor, IFANS
    <>
    The major achievement of the first South Korean-North Korean talks was an agreement by the two countries to solve their problems by themselves and to avoid war. As a result, an atmosphere was created that was conducive to cooperation and reconciliation. Unfortunately, the two countries could not include issues related to establishing peace or building trust in the June 15th Joint Declaration.
    Although a precise date for the second round of talks has yet to be decided, they will be delayed longer than originally anticipated. After the Seoul talks are held, it is expected that North Korea will try to present Chairman Kim Jung-il as the leader of the Korean nation, secure further economic support from the South, elevate its international status, and try to lessen the hostility and vigilance of the South Korean people against North Korea.
    At the Seoul summit talks, both parties will review the June 15th Joint Declaration in terms of whether or not the promises between the two countries have been kept. The two sides will also discuss the mutual easing of tensions and the establishment of trust in defense-related exchanges of information. Also to be discussed are the establishment of a system for maintaining the peace and ways to enlist the cooperation of neighboring countries. 
    I. Evaluation and Results of the 1st Summit Talks
    Achievements of the 1st Summit Talks
    First, the very fact that the two Koreas agreed to pursue peace and avoid war is itself a great success and a very important development. In short, they agreed to cooperate with each other instead of looking for an opportunity to annex each other.
    Secondly, they established an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation. They established a basis for mutual reliance and cooperation by agreeing to resolve humanitarian problems (such as the reunion of separated families) and by agreeing to enhance exchanges and cooperation in economic and social affairs, as well as in cultural, health and environmental issues.
    Thirdly, by agreeing to solve the problem of relations between the two Koreas by themselves, they drew the attention of the United States, Japan and other neighboring countries to South Korea's policy towards North Korea. Issues that could not be discussed during talks between the United States and North Korea were discussed at the South-North Summit; this provided an opportunity for South Korea to later explain the details of the talks to the United States, Japan and other neighboring countries. 
    Fourthly, the talks gave Chairman Kim Jung-il an opportunity reveal himself to the outside world and garner some positive publicity. It is true that Chairman Kim himself did not appear in public, since he wanted to maintain an aura of mystery. Although a public appearance would have boosted his image internationally, it is also true that his charismatic status, in the eyes of his own people, is somewhat diminished if he appears before them too often. 
    Finally, North Koreans could see that President Kim Dae-jung is neither a puppet of the United States, a dictator, nor any of the other pejorative appellations that have been used to describe him. He was polite, calm and diplomatic during the talks. 
    Evaluation of the June 15th Joint Declaration 
    The first item agreed to in the June 15th Joint Declaration is a resolution to solve the problems between the Koreas by themselves, through cooperation. This is a more precise resolution than that of the July 4th South-North Joint Declaration, which focused on the concept of solving the two Koreas' problems without intervention by, or dependence on, foreign powers. Nevertheless, there are still some controversial issues left with respect to the two nations' relationships with neighboring countries. 
    Secondly, the two sides agreed to pursue unification by reaching a compromise between the South Korean proposal for a confederation of the two countries and the North Korean proposal for a lower-level federal government. The lower-level federal government proposed by North Korea is close to the form of a South-North confederation, and suggests a permanent cooperative system between the two sides. The central government would become a symbolic institution, without the power to independently exercise its own decisions. However, the difference between the federalism of the two sides is that the lower-level federal system proposed by the North requires one government, while that suggested by the South is based on the existence of two governments.
    Thirdly, the two sides want to solve the humanitarian problems related to the reunion of the separated families, the return of long-term unconverted spies to North Korea, and other related problems. Reunion of the separated families is what South Korea expects whereas the return of long-term unconverted spies is what North Korea demands. 
    Fourthly, the two sides agreed to balance their economic growth and enhance cooperation and mutual exchanges in the areas of culture and society, sports, health and the environment. Balanced economic growth is desirable in the process of reconstructing North Korea's collapsed economy. However, North Korea did not single out this issue, but rather included it as yet another item among a host of items. It would seem that North Korea wanted to save face by de-emphasizing economic issues. 
    Finally, the South Korean government and North Korean government have to resume talks in the near future. The two representatives agreed to have higher level meetings and exchange visits between Seoul and Pyongyang. That Chairman Kim Jung-il will visit Seoul in due course is a general commitment. Basically, he made it clear that he would visit South Korea after he sees some evidence of a positive attitude on the part of South Korea toward North Korea, and after further improvement in the political atmosphere and economic cooperation between the two sides.
    Concerns regarding the June 15th Joint Declaration 
    Although the June 15th Joint Declaration is a milestone event in many respects, there are many things that need to be resolved in the declaration. The words "peace and reconciliation" are not included in the joint declaration statement and only the basic issues related to unification of the two countries, as presented by North Korea, are highlighted.
    Also, although the South Korean and North Korean unification formulae and the method of promoting exchanges between the two countries are included in the statement, not included are detailed plans for securing peace and implementing confidence-building measures between the two countries. This implies that the two sides could not reach an agreement to halt the development of nuclear weapons or missiles. Nor did they agree on arms reduction. These issues are very sensitive for North Korea. Furthermore, the two sides could not agree on the withdrawal of the US military from South Korea or the abolition of the National Security Law, the latter of which is a very sensitive issue for South Korea. However, what South Korea wanted from the talks in Pyongyang was to support North Korea's economy and obtain peace on the Korean Peninsula. That a non-aggression pact or a disarmament agreement, which were included in the Joint Declaration in 1992, was not included in the June 15th Joint Declaration, is of concern to South Korea. 
    While South Korea expected to establish some basic guidelines for the exchange of letters and communications between the separated families, the two sides only agreed on exchanging visits between the separated families once, on Korean Liberation Day, and there were only 100 people from each side involved in the exchange. The two sides could not discuss exchanging unconverted spies, POWs and kidnapped people separately, but instead consolidated these issues under the general heading of separated families. 
    Although discussion of economic support to North Korea had to be given priority, it was actually handled at the final stage of the talks, along with other issues. The reason for this was to enable the North Koreans to save face by pretending that there are no economic problems in North Korea. 
    
    II. Prospects for the 2nd Summit Talks 
    Goals and Strategies of North Korea 
    First, it is expected that North Korea will try to highlight the image of Chairman Kim Jung-il as a great national leader and an important international politician who should bring about unification of the two Koreas. Chairman Kim will try to appear charismatic during his visit to Seoul, just as he did at the meetings in Pyongyang, so that he may be revered and respected as a national leader.
    Secondly, the North will try to secure economic support from the South in order to resolve North Korea's economic difficulties. Also, during the meeting in Seoul, North Korea will probably try to establish measures aimed at improving its infrastructure, as mentioned by President Kim Dae-jung in Berlin, in March of last year. 
    Thirdly, North Korea will try to upgrade the status of its foreign relations. It will try to induce economic support from western countries and will try to strengthen its position for future talks with the United States. For North Korea, improving relations with the United States is the most important issue, and the Seoul Summit Talks are the first and most effective step toward achieving this goal.
    Fourthly, it will try to ease the hostility and vigilance of the South Korean people against North Korea by enhancing the atmosphere of reconciliation and cooperation, as well as the spirit of national collaboration, between the two Koreas. This means that it will try to diminish the position of the conservatives and strengthen the position of the progressives within South Korea. By propagating and praising the success of President Kim's "Sunshine Policy", Chairman Kim Jung-il will try to induce continuing economic support from South Korea.
    Finally, Chairman Kim Jung-il will try to give the impression of being a great leader; he will try to lead the meeting and, in turn, secure a position of leadership through it. In an effort to resemble his father, he may demonstrate broad-mindedness through relaxed and liberal gestures. If an atmosphere of cooperation and reconciliation continues between the two countries (even though America's distrust of North Korea may increase), it is expected that the enhancement of Chairman Kim Jung-il's image at the coming meeting in Seoul will be a key to solving North Korea's problems. 
    Timing for the Seoul Summit Meeting 
    Chairman Kim Jung-il has often reconfirmed his intention of visiting Seoul, and in his meeting with the representatives of the South Korean mass media he repeated that he will surely visit Seoul in order to keep his word with President Kim Dae-jung. 
    The exact timing of the visit is not yet known; North Korea has not informed South Korea about when the North Korean leader would like to come to Seoul. However, considering previous events in South Korean-North Korean relations, this is hardly surprising. It is therefore probable that this reciprocal visit to Seoul will be delayed even further.
    
    III. Issues to be discussed during the 2nd Summit Meeting 
    As previously indicated, the issues for the Seoul Summit Talks will be: (a) to review the June 15th Joint Declaration, in terms of whether or not the promises between the two sides have been carried out; (b) to discuss the easing of tensions and the establishment of trust through exchanges in defense-related information; and (c) to establish a system for promoting peace and enlisting the support of neighboring countries. All of these were items not discussed during the meeting in Pyongyang. 
    Concerning (a) above, North Korea questions the concept of independent solutions related to United States-South Korean cooperation and the presence of the US military in South Korea. It will try to exaggerate or 're-interpret' the meaning of the word "independence" stipulated in the title "Independent Solution" for unification in Article 1. Considering this, it is necessary that the concepts and meanings of the relevant issues should be clearly defined and explained, in order to avoid any possible arguments. 
    The purpose stipulated under Article 2 of the declaration (concerning recognition of common elements in the reunification formulae and the resulting inclination toward unification), is to politically systematize the coexistence of the two countries on peaceful terms. However, as this will probably not happen, it is necessary to inform North Korea that South Korea will establish a "Unification Research and Consultation Committee" to solve the problems, should North Korea (in an effort to strengthen its position) bring up the issue again. 
    The purposes of Articles 3 and 4 are to allow citizens of each country to visit the other whenever they wish and to exchange letters without any restriction. These items are also intended to establish permanent meeting places, although only limited meetings between the separated families have been permitted until now. In order to realize these goals, the two sides need to establish relevant regulations and laws to secure economic cooperation. An example of this would be the introduction of South Korean investment capital to North Korea to develop its social infrastructure.
    Meanwhile, the two sides may have to try to find points of agreement concerning the easing of tensions and confidence-building measures involving defense issues. These issues were not mentioned in the June 15th Joint Declaration. To ease tensions and to build trust and confidence, both sides need to re-commit themselves to carrying out certain measures that were previously agreed upon, but never acted on by North Korea. Among these (from the South Korean-North Korean Basic Agreement) are a non-aggression pact, gradual arms reduction, installation of a military hotline, operation of a military cooperation committee, exchanges of high-ranking military personnel and observation of military exercises by each side. All of these points are designed to establish a permanent peace and terminate the cold war on the Korean Peninsula. 
    The two Koreas will also have to agree to replace the armistice treaty with a peace treaty. The two leaders should try to conclude a peace treaty during their meeting in Seoul. Since understanding from neighboring countries is necessary to establish peace on the Korean peninsula, the two sides will also have to devise methods to obtain support and cooperation from their neighbors. 
    Another important issue is the resumption of talks between South Korea and North Korea, as indicated in Article 5 of the June 15th Joint Declaration. At the summit meeting in Seoul, the parties need to make an agreement to hold future summit meetings, as well as other related talks, on a regular basis. They may also have to consider enacting a South Korean-North Korean Joint Charter and establishing a South-North Summit Council, a Minister-level Council and a National Assembly Council as South - North joint organizations. 
    
    IV. Policy Measures for the 2nd Summit Meeting 
    Because the timing and issues of the 2nd summit meeting are as yet undecided, it may not be easy for anyone to present detailed plans for the meeting. However, South Korean preparations related to the meeting may be divided into three time frames: before, during and after the summit meeting.
    Measures before the Summit Meeting 
    Measures on North Korea 
    South Korea may have to notify North Korea through formal and informal channels regarding the doubts and concerns discussed during the South Korean-United States summit meeting. The South may need to persuade the North that there will be no way for it to solve its problems except by easing tensions and establishing trust between the two Koreas, and between the US and North Korea. Considering its economic situation, North Korea desperately needs the South to supply it with electric power; however, South Korea needs to continue discussing the method of that support on a long-term basis, considering the objections from the United States and the currently unstable economic conditions in South Korea. 
    Measures Related to Foreign Countries
    It is unrealistic for South Korea to expect absolute reciprocity from North Korea, considering that South-North relations are still in their initial stages. Therefore, South Korea needs to ask the United States to accept the theory that South Korea will gradually increase its expectations regarding the level of reciprocity, as relations with North Korea improve. Regarding North Korean intentions and capabilities, differences of opinion between the United States and South Korea should be narrowed down based on a rigorous analysis of facts. In particular, South Korea needs to ask the United States to provide detailed information related to the current status of North Korean capabilities, and must make an attempt to persuade the Americans that Seoul is more capable of analyzing North Korea in that regard.
    Chairman Kim Jung-il's visit to Korea for the coming Seoul Summit Meeting has great symbolic and historic meaning. Accordingly, South Korea needs to emphasize that historical significance to its neighboring countries and the United States, and ask for their support so that the meeting may be held as soon as possible. 
    Domestic Measures
    Although the South Korean government cannot reveal the agenda or schedule for the meeting before it is held, it must inform representatives of its two major political parties and the press about the meeting in a way that will induce support and cooperation from the Korean people. 
    Matters to be considered during the Meeting 
    First, clear and firm strategic goals and negotiation principles should be established. South Korea needs to negotiate with its counterpart based on its own agenda. It should not accept any unexpected proposals or actions that are incoherent or unrelated to its goals and principles. 
    Secondly, South Korea needs to convince North Korea into agreeing on the easing of tensions and the establishment of trust between the two sides. By developing the spirit of cooperation and reconciliation of the June 15th Joint Declaration into actual practice, trust on the exchange of military information should be achieved; this would go a long way toward dissolving the doubts and concerns of the United States about North Korea. Easing tensions and building confidence between the two countries should be carried out with respect to reaffirming the relevant stipulations of the South-North Basic Agreement, specifically: non-aggression, step-by-step arms reduction, installation of a military hotline, operation of a joint military committee, exchange of high-ranking military personnel and observation of military exercises by the two sides.
    Thirdly, South Korea needs to prepare itself for any unexpected agendas put forth by North Korea during the meeting. It should inform North Korea that any agendas or proposals that were not previously agreed upon will have to be dealt with at the next meeting. North Korea may be aggressive about proposals that they might use to manipulate the meeting for their own benefit and which would be unacceptable to the South. In particular, North Korea may propose a drastic reduction in the number of North Korean soldiers, and a corresponding reduction in the number of US soldiers stationed in Korea. This would result in a minor reduction in overall North Korean forces, but a major cut in US forces, since the latter are a mere fraction of the former. The purpose of this would be to weaken the security relationship between South Korea and the United States. South Korea should be aware of this possibility and prepare for it in advance. 
    Since the South Korean people have not yet decided whether they support a confederation or a federation, making a declaration about this particular issue will merely increase internal conflict and split public opinion. Therefore, it is advisable that South Korea should avoid mentioning this issue during the meeting.
    Consideration after the Meeting 
    There will be both negative and positive results of the Seoul Summit Meeting. Although it may be necessary to emphasize only the positive aspects for the sake of the Korean people, the South Korean government should also tell its people about any potential negative results from the meeting, so that they do not blame their government later. The South Korean government may have to tell to its people about these negative aspects of the meeting in such a way that both the government and the people feel that they must work together to solve the problems.
    In terms of economic South Korean support for North Korea, such support should be on a long-term basis, to encourage North Korea to reduce tensions; furthermore, the support should be somewhat limited, considering the current economic situation in South Korea. Moreover, economic aid should not be initiated until a system for economic cooperation has been put in place. Because the key to the success of economic cooperation depends on South Korea's ability to finance it, South Korea may have to ask for economic support from the United States and Japan, which are the most influential powers in international financial organizations. In particular, South Korea may need to enlist Japan's support by suggesting that Japan's compensation for North Korea be related to South Korea-Japan economic cooperation.
    If the relationship between North Korea, the United States and Japan does not improve, North Korea will encounter difficulties in carrying out any promises made during the Seoul Summit Meeting. Therefore, South Korea may have to act as a mediator between the three parties. South Korea may have to create conditions for North Korea that will facilitate the process of fulfilling any promises. This may include allowing North Korea to maintain its current foreign relations with the EU countries and other Western countries, and supporting North Korea's efforts to expand its diplomatic relations with other foreign countries.
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