| bibo:abstract |
Research Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security.
▶Introduction
In February 1993, the elusive North Korean nuclear issue was finally narrowed down to a simple yet critical choice for North Korea whether or not to accept the demand for special inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over its two undeclared sites. Pyongyang has so far managed to evade the demand mostly by creating a series of new crises requiring more urgent attention. The most recent one arose from Pyongyang's refusal to allow IAEA inspection of even its already declared nuclear facilities. As diplomatic efforts to solve a stalemate are just about to exhaust, however, Pyongyang is hard pressed to make a choice between resolving the ongoing crisis peacefully by accepting IAEA full-scope inspections including the special one, on the one hand, and taking the risk of sanctions by resisting the demand for the inspections, on the other. If Pyongyang's leaders have up to now enjoyed the so-called nuclear card, time has come for them to show their cards and reap the spoils. On the other hand, if their motivation has been more serious than that, their resolve, or perhaps rationality, will be put to the test.
With the nuclear negotiations stalemated and the prospect for diplomatic settlement in dark, South Korea is also faced with a difficult policy question of what should be the next step. Should Seoul and its allies stop talking and go for sanctions, as they have repeatedly warned, or had they better roll back and tone down the demand against Pyongyang? While the eleventh hour efforts are currently under way, skepticism grows whether persuasion would ever work. At the same time, concerns run deep about the dangerous repercussions any forceful response might entail.
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to figure out intentions of North Korea behind its deadly game of nuclear weapon development, and to explore policy options for Seoul to cope with such dangerous nuclear challenge. For this, the paper will trace and review what has transpired at negotiations to address the North Korean nuclear issue. Then it will analyze policy objectives and negotiating strategies of both Koreas in the nuclear confrontation. Finally, the paper will assess the relevance and effectiveness of Seoul's policy in tackling the continuing crisis as well as difficulties faced by Seoul's policy-makers.
▶Four Phases of Nuclear Controversies
It was in February 1989 when the Board of the IAEA raised an issue of North Korea's delay to conclude a safeguards agreement that Pyongyang's nuclear program had first become an important policy issue facing South Korea as well as the international community. Ever since, controversies surrounding the North Korea's nuclear weapon development program have gone through the following four phases mainly in terms of the subjects of negotiation and the key questions involved.
The first phase, roughly from February 1989 to August 1991, was a period in which the North Korea's nuclear weapon development had emerged as a major issue between two Koreas as well as in the international community. The key issue at this phase was the fulfillment of North Korea's obligation under the the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The second phase, which covers the period from September 1991 to February 1992, was a stage where the basic approach to, or framework for, the resolution of the nuclear issue was agreed upon between Seoul and Pyongyang. The third phase, spanning from March 1992 to February this year, may be characterized as that of implementation. The IAEA inspections were implemented, and the negotiations for how to implement the South-North reciprocal inspections were under way. However, the inspections did not clear Pyongyang of suspicion that it had been developing a nuclear bomb, but rather confirmed it. The last phase, from March this year on up to now, has been a period of dragging crisis. As last-ditch efforts have been made to settle the dispute peacefully through diplomatic methods, Pyongyang's brinkmanship has found its heyday during this phase.
▶1. First Phase: Nuclear Issue Emerged (1989.2-1991.8)
In December 1985, North Korea joined the NPT, but delayed to fulfill its obligation under the treaty to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. As the IAEA Board of Governors first raised this issue in February 1989, North Korea's failure to comply with its treaty obligation began instantly to draw international attention and suspicion. At the same time, United States and French reconnaissance satellite photographs showed several facilities in Yongbyun that led U.S. intelligence and other experts to conclude that North Korea was developing a plant and equipment that could produce nuclear bombs. The exposure of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program by the IAEA's special inspection mandated by the UN Security Council following the Gulf War further amplified the suspicion that Pyongyang might be doing the same thing. As nuclear non-proliferation became one of the most urgent agenda of the post-Cold War World, North Korea's refusal to receive the IAEA inspection emerged as a major issue confronting international community at large as well as South Korea.
The main issue at this phase was focused on the fulfillment of North Korea's obligation under the NPT. According to the NPT, North Korea was required to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA within eighteen months after it became a member. Thus Pyongyang's refusal to conclude the agreement amounted to the breach of its treaty obligation. During this period, North Korea's position was to link this matter with its demand for the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons allegedly deployed in the South. For instance, North Korea expressed on several occasions that unless and until all the U.S. nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the territory of South Korea, it would not sign the safeguards agreement. On the other hand, South Korea and the United States took the view, rightly, that the conclusion of a safeguards accord was essentially a matter of North Korea's treaty obligation, and as such could not be linked with such extraneous factor as the pullout of the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea. As no prospect for accommodating both claims was in sight, North Korea's nuclear issue became the subject of growing international concern and misgivings.
▶2. Second Phase: Basic Framework Agreed (1991.9-1992.2)
The second phase can be characterized as a period in which the basis for the resolution for the nuclear issue was laid as a result of a dramatic turnaround in the strategic thinking of the United States and South Korea. This was possible first with President Bush's nuclear weapons initiative of September 1991. The Bush initiative, which would unilaterally withdraw from abroad all of the U.S. nuclear artillery shells and short-range missiles and warheads, had a substantial implications for the U.S. military and security role in Korea and Northeast Asia.
Responding promptly to President Bush's initiative, President Roh of South Korea then opened a possibility for the resolution of the nuclear issue by announcing the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in November. According to the declaration, South Korea would not produce, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. This pledge, if implemented, would in fact amount to virtually satisfying the preconditions which North Korea had stated for allowing the IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities. Moreover, the Declaration made a unilateral commitment not to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, obviously aiming at eliciting the same response from the North.
Its rationale for refusing to sign a safeguards agreement taken away, North Korea had little choice but to announce that it would sign the safeguards accord if indeed, and as, the United States began to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the South. In addition, it suggested the additional simultaneous inspection of its nuclear facilities and the U.S. nuclear weapons in the South to verify the U.S. pullout. In December, two Koreas signed the monumental agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, and exchange and cooperation at the sixth inter-Korean prime minister's talks. During this talk, the South indicated that it was prepared to accept the North's proposal for a simultaneous, mutual inspection, and even went further by proposing to conduct a simultaneous trial inspection by the end of January 1992.
This dashing turn of events in the latter half of 1991 eventually brought about two profound developments related to the nuclear negotiations. First, the South-North Joint Declaration on Denuclearization was adopted at the last day of 1991. The Joint Declaration provided, inter alia, for the renunciation of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities and the South-North reciprocal inspection. Second, President Roh announced in December 1991 that there existed no nuclear weapons in the soil of South Korea at the time of the announcement. This was subsequently confirmed by President Bush. Pyongyang was no longer able to find any excuse to delay the acceptance of the IAEA inspection as its stated conditions for allowing the international inspection were all satisfied. As a result, in January 1992, North Korea eventually signed the long-delayed safeguards accord with the IAEA. Moreover, it came under the additional obligation of reciprocal inspection, which none other than itself had proposed.
With Pyongyang signing the Joint Declaration as well as the IAEA safeguards accord, a basic framework for the resolution of the nuclear issue was agreed upon. This framework, consisting of two systems of inspections, that is the IAEA inspection and the South-North reciprocal inspection, was designed to enhance transparency over North Korea's nuclear programs. In particular, the reciprocal inspection was intended to complement the widely acknowledged shortcomings of the IAEA inspection that the IAEA, inspecting only the declared nuclear facilities, was not very effective in deterring covert activities. The framework was thus hailed as a thorough safeguards mechanism that, if implemented fully, could detect any clandestine nuclear ambition of North Korea.
▶3. Third Phase: Implementation and Exposure (1992.3-1993.2)
Reciprocal Inspection Frustrated
According to the Joint Declaration, the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) was set up in March 1992 to work out the details for the South-North reciprocal inspection. Until its last meeting took place in January 1993, the JNCC held thirteen plenary meetings and eight working-level contacts. Yet little progress was made due mainly to disagreements over such issues as the modality of inspections and necessity of challenge inspections. For instance, while South Korea wished to inspect any facilities, both civilian or military, on a reciprocal basis, thus leaving no "sanctuary" or a hiding place, the North insisted on the right to inspect all U.S. military facilities in the South in return for allowing Seoul to inspect its Yongbyun facilities only. The South also believed that in addition to regular inspections, special or challenge inspections were essential in ensuring meaningful verification. Such inspections would allow either side to inspect any suspicious sites, declared or not, at short notice. However, North Korea opposed this proposal, contending that such inspections would go beyond the scope of the Joint Declaration. Pyongyang's dubious and reluctant attitude shown throughout the JNCC meetings was more than enough to increase Seoul's suspicion that North was simply stalling for time to enable itself to develop nuclear weapon capabilities.
IAEA Inspection Worked
It is ironic that the nuclear issue was brought to a head from the IAEA inspection, the value of which Seoul had somewhat discounted due to its well-known shortcomings. In April 1992, North Korea ratified the long-delayed safeguards agreement, and subsequently submitted to the IAEA a report on its nuclear facilities and materials. Based on the report, the IAEA conducted six ad hoc inspections until February 1993.
However, the inspections did not clear Pyongyang of suspicion. On the contrary, and perhaps as expected, the reality of Pyongyang's nuclear ambition began to surface as a result of the inspections. IAEA technical experts detected discrepancies between radioactive content of a small amount of plutonium produced by North Korea, and material which was described as the waste products from its manufacture. The discrepancies raised the issue of whether the North had reprocessed more plutonium than it had disclosed. Since September 1992, IAEA asked Pyongyang for clarification on this, and then in February 1993, demanded an unprecedented special inspection of two suspected sites which were believed to store nuclear wastes. Perhaps North Korea did not realize how sophisticated the IAEA's sample analysis could be, and thought that it could keep the inspectors in the dark. At any rate, a basic framework designed to enhance transparency about Pyongyang's nuclear program worked, and spotted the evidence of Pyongyang's cheating.
▶4. Fourth Phase: Crisis and the Impasse (1993.3-Now)
As the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution urging North Korea to accept its special inspection, North Korea responded to the demand with a stunning decision to withdraw from the NPT regime altogether. Then the IAEA, in accordance with its Charter and the safeguards accord with North Korea, referred the matter to the UN Security Council. The situation suddenly escalated into a major crisis. In May 1993, the Security Council adopted a resolution which, among other things, called upon North Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the NPT and respect its non-proliferation obligations. The resolution also urged all member states to encourage the North to respond positively to the resolution.
Apparently in response to this call, two rounds of high-level talks were held between the United States and North Korea. The fact that such meeting took place was in itself a big concession from Seoul since Seoul had always opposed to a direct bilateral negotiation between Washington and Pyongyang in the absence of Seoul. At the first round held in New York in June, Pyongyang decided to suspend the effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT as long as it considered necessary. In return, Washington confirmed that some of the well-established principles of international relations, such as non-use of force including nuclear weapons, respect for sovereignty and non-interference with internal affairs, were equally applied against North Korea. However, it should be pointed out that a true concession Washington made at the talk was not the confirmation of such principles per se, but that it decided to continue the talks despite the fact that Pyongyang neither unambiguously reverted its decision to withdraw from the NPT nor gave any positive answer to the IAEA special inspection. It had been widely expected that the U.S. would stop the talk and adopt a harder line on Pyongyang if it did not accept those demands.
The progress was also painful at the second round talk held in Geneva in July. North Korea promised to begin consultations with the IAEA on safeguards issues and to resume inter-Korean talks on bilateral issues including nuclear one. The United States in return reaffirmed its commitment to the above principles. Washington also expressed its intention to support the conversion of the North Korean nuclear reactors from the current graphite moderated to light water moderated ones. Then it was implicitly understood that the third round would follow in two months' time if progress were made on the inspection issue as well as in the inter-Korean talks.
In August, according to the agreement of the second round talk, consultations were held between North Korea and the IAEA, yet there was no progress about the special inspection issue. The second consultation, planned in October, was called off by Pyongyang in protest over the IAEA Board of Governor's decision to put the North Korea's nuclear issue on the agenda of its annual conference. Likewise, inter-Korean talks went nowhere as North Korea demanded that in order to negotiate with the North on nuclear issues, the South cease "nuclear war exercises" with the U.S. and end cooperation with other governments on nuclear questions. The situation was further aggravated by North Korea's interference with the routine maintenance of inspection equipments, which resulted that batteries and film which kept IAEA surveillance cameras working at Yongbyun nuclear sites had run out in October. As the continuity of IAEA safeguards emerged as a more urgent issue, heated discussion as well as much confusion ensued as to how to handle the ongoing crisis before President Kim of South Korea and the U.S. President Clinton agreed to maintain a firm stand against Pyongyang in their November summit talks.
The fourth phase may be characterized as one of dragging crisis and the impasse. The long-running nuclear saga was finally narrowed down to the question of the acceptance of the IAEA special inspection. Pyongyang's nuclear intention is bound to be reflected in its response to this question. However, Pyongyang has still been able to evade the demand for special inspection mainly by exploiting Seoul and its allies' concern that a tough response may make matters worse. Moreover, Pyongyang refused even to allow full-scope inspection of its already declared facilities. With the nuclear negotiations stalemated and the prospect for diplomatic settlement in dark, Seoul and its allies are faced with a serious question on what should be the next step.
Analysis and Assessment of North Korea's Policy Regarding the Nuclear Issue
▶1. Incompatible Policy Objectives
It is by now undoubted that North Korea has been, and is developing nuclear weapons, although it is difficult to assess accurately the current status of its nuclear weapon development program. In fact, North Korea is believed to have been seeking nuclear weapons for long, arguably since the early 1960s. Moreover, it is not particularly difficult to figure out what motivated Pyongyang to develop nuclear weapons.
Politics of Atom Bombs
Its first, and foremost, reason for acquiring nuclear bombs may be a classical purpose of deterrence. Pyongyang has perceived the U.S.-South Korea alliance and their military capabilities, including American nuclear weapons allegedly deployed in the South Korean territory, as a serious threat to its security. By having its own nuclear weapons, Pyongyang apparently believed, it could not only bolster deterrence against the U.S.-South Korean military strength, but also obtain more leeway in taking political and strategic options against the South. The urge to acquire nuclear weapons was made firmer as the North was gradually loosing its superiority against the South in conventional arms due to deteriorating economic situations.
The almost total isolation of Pyongyang was another important factor in its preoccupation with nuclear weapons. The end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet empire took away from Pyongyang the protective nuclear umbrella of its former ally. Moreover, the collapse of communism around the world revealed Pyongyang that it might meet the same fate which befell its former allies in Europe. This sense of crisis hardened Pyongyang's resolve to get something with which it could bite at those who would try to meddle with its affairs. Thus it came to see the nuclear weapon program as a key to its very survival. Moreover, nuclear weapons would compel other governments to give more attention to Pyongyang and its interests. Even at home, the status of nuclear weapons would provide Kim Il-Sung regime more strength and security, and thus facilitate the impending power succession.
Taking theses factors into consideration, Pyongyang's leaders found developing nuclear weapons as an option that made perfect sense to them, and, have thus been pursuing it as the foremost goal of their country.
Nuclear Card or Nuclear Bomb Plus Something Else?
How does this finding go along with North Korea's recent moves? After all, Pyongyang has recently shown a clear sign of changes in its long-held ideological and strategic posture. For instance, the North decided to adopt the Basic Agreement embodying a notion of coexistence and cooperation with the South, which it had for long rejected as perpetuation of division of the Korean peninsula. It also seriously explored the possibility to improve relations with its principal enemies, the United States and Japan. More importantly, Pyongyang finally decided to receive IAEA inspections as well as the South-North reciprocal inspection, which could expose any clandestine nuclear program Pyongyang was believed to have been developing.
Then one may wonder whether such Pyongyang's recent moves indicate a reversal of its previous policy including the nuclear one. It was suggested in this context that Pyongyang, hard pressed by economic crisis and diplomatic isolation, after all could not afford to continue past intransigence, and intended to prepare itself for modification of its Korea and foreign policy. According to this view, its nuclear weapon program is thus not an end itself, but rather means or a "card" in order to win needed economic and political concessions from its adversaries and perhaps to strengthen its leaders' internal grip on power.
Although this is the version of events that holds out some hope of an eventual happy ending to the North's dangerous nuclear sage, such sanguine view is hardly warranted. The truth may be that such recent moves are not the sign of Pyongyang's readiness to transform itself, but the reflection of its another preoccupation, that is its desire to improve relations with the United States and Japan. In particular, the improvement of relations with the U.S. has long been the most vital policy objective of Pyongyang for various reasons. From Pyongyang's standpoint, it would significantly reduce a threat against its security. In addition, the improvement of its relations with Washington would provide Pyongyang with an opportunity to drive a wedge in U.S.-ROK alliance, which has so far substantially restricted its political and strategic options against the South. In order to achieve this long-held policy objective, it was necessary for Pyongyang to create an appearance that progress was being made in inter-Korean relations, in general, and in nuclear negotiations, in particular. This may be a real intention behind some of Pyongyang's recent reconciliatory moves.
Thus Pyongyang is seeking two policy objectives that contradict each other. On the one hand, it seeks to develop nuclear bombs for no more complicated purpose than to defend its increasingly rickety regime with it. On the other, it attempts to improve relations with its opponents, inter alia, the United States and Japan, only if to escape international isolation and lessen its economic hardship. More importantly, despite the repeated, unambiguous admonition to the contrary from Seoul and its allies, Pyongyang still believes it possible to achieve both policy objectives at the same time. In fact, it was this dangerous and contradictory ambition that has made Pyongyang's intention to appear incomprehensible.
▶2. Negotiating Strategy and Tactics
Thus Pyongyang's strategy at the nuclear negotiations up to now was essentially to develop a negotiating formula with which it could attain both policy objectives. To improve its relations with the United States or Japan, on the one hand, Pyongyang was required to create an impression that it was willing and ready to resolve the nuclear issue. In order to complete its nuclear weapon development program, on the other, Pyongyang's concession should fall short of something which could virtually block the possibility of clandestine nuclear weapon development. In short, Pyongyang's strategy was indeed to dance on the tightrope. Trying to find a razor-thin spot on which it could stand, the North has employed the following tactics throughout the four phases mentioned above.
Delaying Tactic
First, throughout the nuclear negotiations, North had been consistent in attempting to delay inspection as much as possible. For instance, it took more than six years for the North to decide to receive the IAEA inspection although it was required to do so within eighteen months. Even after its condition for the acceptance of the IAEA inspection was met, Pyongyang tried to delay it further by raising a new condition of mutual inspection. Similarly, North had been obviously stalling in the JNCC negotiation to work out the details of reciprocal inspection.
Neutralizing Tactic
Secondly, when it was difficult to delay any longer, the North tried to make inspection as loose as possible so that it could get away with it. Thus Pyongyang accepted the IAEA inspection, since it believed that the IAEA inspection was easy to get by as it inspected only the designated facilities. On the other hand, in the negotiation for the South-North reciprocal inspection under the Joint Declaration, North strongly opposed the idea of special or challenge inspection, which would leave no sanctuary immune from inspection. The reciprocal inspection without such teeth as challenge inspection was believed to be hardly different from the IAEA inspection. Given this, it was ironic that a specific clue for Pyongyang's covert program was found through the IAEA inspection. Moreover, having found such a clue, the IAEA greatly surprised the North by demanding an unprecedented special inspection.
Tactic of Brinkmanship
Despite the above tactical manoeuvres, in case that evidences which could expose its nuclear program were caught, the North's tactic was to push an already dangerous situation further to the limit. Such tactic was intended to weaken and confuse the opponent's resolve by creating a sense of crisis. The North then manipulated the ensuing panic to turn the situation in its favor.
Pyongyang has been at the zenith of its brinkmanship since March 1993. Pressed hard by the IAEA to accept the special inspection of undeclared sites, Pyongyang still managed to strike back with a threat to withdraw from the NPT altogether. Amidst the following commotion, Seoul and its allies had little choice but to shift a focus from the special inspection issue to how to get Pyongyang to remain in the NPT regime, as the latter was a more urgent issue. This gave Pyongyang not only a breathing space in which to explore the next move, but more importantly an advantage in its negotiation with Seoul, which it hardly deserved. Thanks to this tactic, Pyongyang was able to make a false impression that it did make a concession when it announced to suspend its decision to withdraw from the NPT. However, what it did was in fact nothing more than resolving the crisis it itself created. It was also typical of the tactic of brinkmanship that North Korea refused to allow IAEA inspectors to service the routine maintenance of cameras which the IAEA had installed in the Yongbyun nuclear facilities during inspections in 1992. This act brought about the much more urgent issue of the continuity of IAEA safeguards, thus again diverting attention from the special inspection issue.
There is no indication yet that North Korea has given up pursuing the incompatible two policy objectives simultaneously. In the last two rounds of high-level meetings with the United States and thereafter, North seemed to continue to employ its long-held tactics; stall, neutralize, and create a panic by stretching a danger to the brink. Apparently Pyongyang still believes that it can work out a "magic formula" which could at the same time achieve its two foremost policy goals, that is the acquisition of nuclear bombs and normalization of relations with the United States.
Analysis and Assessment of South Korea's Policy Regarding the Nuclear Issue
▶1. Policy Objectives and Basic Approach
The ultimate goal of Seoul's policy regarding the nuclear issue has been, and continues to be to deter North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and thus secure the nuclear-free Korea peninsula. To do so, it is essential to make Pyongyang to realize that developing nuclear weapons is neither feasible, physically and politically, nor necessary. Therefore, the resolution of nuclear issue requires not only inspection, be it international (IAEA) or reciprocal, which is designed physically to block the progress of nuclear weapon development, but also the reduction of tension and building of confidence between two Koreas. It may be difficult to expect that inspections alone, no matter how well devised and implemented, would once and for all resolve all suspicions. In other words, while inspections are definitely a necessary condition to the settlement of the nuclear issue, it may nevertheless prove to be less than a sufficient condition. More economic and other ties will foster mutual confidence and enhance a sense of security, the lack of which is in fact an important cause of Pyongyang's desperate bomb program. Therefore, efforts to address the cause of tension should be recognized as an important factor in resolving the nuclear issue.
However, what is important is a timing of applying a particular option. Given the fact that Pyongyang already came close to acquiring nuclear bombs, and that time is limited to deter this from happening, a priority should inevitably be placed on inspection rather than tension reduction and confidence building, which by nature require patient and steady efforts over the long period of time. Therefore, it has been a sound approach for Seoul to define the settlement of the nuclear issue mainly in terms of the implementation of inspections. After securing transparency over the nuclear program through inspections, and only after then, inter-Korean confidence building measures, in particular economic exchanges and cooperation, can come into play to make Pyongyang's will to go nuclear unnecessary and largely irrelevant. For this reason, the more immediate policy objective of Seoul was to get Pyongyang to accept the IAEA inspection and implement the South-North reciprocal inspection as agreed in the Joint Declaration. Throughout the four phases of nuclear negotiations, Seoul's efforts had mostly been focused on achieving this policy objective.
▶2. Negotiating Strategy
Stick-and-Carrot Approach
To this purpose, Seoul's strategy has been to employ a mix of inducements and pressures to persuade North Korea to change its positions. First, South Korea has made some material concessions to induce the North to give up its nuclear weapon program. For instance, it was acknowledged, though implicitly, in 1991 that American nuclear weapons deployed in the territory of South Korea was removed. The annual Team Spirits military exercises were cancelled for 1992. Furthermore, such costly price as the unilateral commitment not to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities was paid to induce the same commitment from Pyongyang. South Korea even allowed the US-North Korea direct negotiation, which it has long objected as a North Korean attempt to drive a wedge in ROK-US relations.
At the same time, South Korea has also attempted to put pressure on Pyongyang. Seoul made it clear that unless and until the North clears itself of all the suspicions by way of inspections, there should be no progress in inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation. The United States and Japan, in close consultation with Seoul, have set the same conditions to improving their relations with Pyongyang. The Team Spirits military exercises, which Pyongyang vehemently denounced as "nuclear war games" were resumed in 1993.
Such strategy of pressure and concession, or stick-and-carrot, has been most prominent in the fourth phase, which started with North Korea's announcement to withdraw from the NPT. On the one hand, the nuclear issue was referred to the UN Security Council, which could impose sanctions, economic or military, if North Korea refused to comply with its demand. On the other, the high-level talks were held between the United States and North Korea, and the prospect for the normalization of their relations, despite the official denial
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